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AN EXAMINATION 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNKNOWABLE 



AS EXPOUNDED BY 



HERBERT SPENCER, 



i> 



BY 



/ 



WILLIAM .\f. LACY. 






PHILADELPKl \: 
l; I .N.I A M I N I . LACY, l-'i 8. SEVENTH ST, 

I--::. 







[the library 

lot CONGRESS 
WASHINGTON 



Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1883, by 

WILLIAM M. LACY, 

In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at AVashington. 



/ 



PAGE. 



CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER I. 

The Issue. 
Introductory 1 

CHAPTER II. 

A Fundamental Fallacy. 
The Impossibility of Establishing Unknowableness. ... 5 

CHAPTER III. 

The Inductive Argument. 
Origin of the Universe; Causation 27 

CHAPTER IV. 

The Inductive Argument Continued. 
Space, Time, Matter, Motion, Force 47 

CHAPTER V. 

Tin: Imhctive Argument Continued. 

Self- knowledge ': Extent of Conxeiousne.ss end Merited 
Substance 70 



IV CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER VI. 

PAGE. 

The Inductive Argument Concluded. 
Transfigured Realism Confronted by the Problems of 

Realism 75 

CHAPTER VII. 

The Deductive Arguments. 
The Process of Comprehension. . 102 

CHAPTER VIII. 

The Deductive Arguments Continued. 
The Unconditioned. 113 

CHAPTER IX. 

The Deductive Arguments Continued. 
The Nature of Life . 145 

CHAPTER X. 

The Deductive Arguments Concluded. 
The Power of Thought to Transcend Consciousness. . 158 

CHAPTER XI. 

The Final Argument. 
The Reconciliation Between Science and Religion. . . 209 



/♦* 



AN EXAMINATION 

OF 

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNKNOWABLE 



AS EXPOUNDED BY 



HERBERT SPENCER, 



CHAPTER I. 

The Issue. 

Introductory Remarks. 

§. 1. Citations to be hereafter made will show that Mr. 
Spencer holds, and has endeavored to prove, that we can know 
nothing of the External World, save its bare existence; nothing 
of Mental Substance, save its bare existence; and noTEing of the 
Intrinsic Nature of mental modes, except that something of 
the kind exists. Otherwise stated, I conceive the theory to be, 
that, of reality external to consciousness, nothing but the exist- 
ence can be known. As stated in still a third form, the doctrine 
seems to consist in the belief that all* without the sphere of 
consciousness Is, in respect of its nature, — that is, the sum of 
its attributes minus its existence, — absolutely unknowable. 
Some realization of the equivalence of these three modes of 
expression is essential to an appreciation of the discussions 
which are to follow. 

To the scheme of nescience, substantially as above set forth, 
I oppose the doctrine that we are capable of realizing something 
of the nature of things occupying the region outside of con- 
sciousness. It is not meant by this that immediate knowledge 
of anything ooi present in consciousness is possible. X.> <me i> 
more firmly convinced than myself that there can I"' no con- 
sciousness, strictly so-called, of what fa beyond consciousness. 



2 THE ISSUE. 

But that there can be genuine thought of something not within 
consciousness, is an independent proposition, and the one here 
urged as true. 

It will be perceived, by those who have read thus far, that, 
as regards the question in dispute, Mr. Spencer is at great dis- 
advantage of position. To the disadvantage necessarily accru- 
ing to one who undertakes to establish a contested proposition, 
there is added, in Mr. Spencer's case, the greater disadvantage 
inherent in the effort to establish a rule as absolutely without 
exception. His task is far less arduous whose success is attain- 
able by breaking a single link in a chain of reasoning, or 
forcing recognition of a single exception to a rule. While, how- 
ever, it is obligatory upon any one to avail himself, in discussion, 
of every advantage which he can, in moderate self-gratu- 
lation, attribute to the greater justness of the views he has 
adopted, he should scorn to avail himself of any mere contro- 
versial formality. Ours is not the age of quibblings over the 
"the affirmative" and "the negative;" and no such quibblings 
shall the reader find. Wherever he finds denial, he shall find 
affirmation; wherever he finds attempted refutation of an im- 
portant doctrine, he shall find an endeavor to establish another 
doctrine in its stead. In this connection it is also well to men- 
tion that the dry and rigid epitome, above presented, gives no 
adequate idea of the entertaining variety of important topics 
which Mr. Spencer subordinated to his main design. All these 
are to be drawn into the discussion. To the reader may be 
promised, therefore, something more substantial than mere log- 
ical statement of the issue would lead him to anticipate. 

§ 2. The issue is not between Mr. Spencer, on the one hand, 
and a single opponent, on the other; nor is it of recent advent. 
"The question of an external world," said Mr. Mill, "is the 
great battle-ground of metaphysics." Says an eminent con- 
temporary metaphysician: "In this border country there has 
been a war for ages in the past, and there is likely to be a war 
for ages in the future." Over all external to consciousness, let 
us add, the conflict extends, engaging about as many factions as 



THE ISSUE. 3 

there are philosophers. Whoever enlists in it will find that the 
greatest are his allies and the greatest his opponents. 

This is, therefore, no attack upon Mr. Spencer personally. 
He is the most dangerous of adversaries, and one of the most 
worthy of men. But, as the latest authoritative exponent of a 
certain philosophic tendency, there is no proper alternative be- 
tween attacking his reasonings or refraining from the attack. 
Again, the sentiments here upheld are not peculiar to myself. 
They are those of a numerous class of enquirers, and are even 
entertained by mankind at large. It can scarcely be presumpt- 
uous to side with so many, although to do so is to decide against 
the rest. One thing that may seem presumptuous is to risk the 
defeat which has been repeatedly visited upon the strong. But 
if the contest is to be continued, and its antiquity and present 
unsettled state imply that it is, there must be a continual coming 
of recruits. He who thinks he has novel tactics to try should 
come forward and give them trial. 

§ 3. To the issue, the Doctrine of Evolution is not a party. 
There is, it is true, a connection between what I have called 
the "Philosophy of the Unknowable " and the Philosophy of 
Evolution ; but it is' not that of foundation and superstructure. 

Mr. Spencer has, indeed, prefaced the exposition of his 
System of Philosophy by a systematic treatise on "The Un- 
knowable;" and he does, moreover, return to the subject again 
and again throughout his writings, to give his views 1 hereon 
further expression, elucidation, and confirmation. His theory of 
knowledge he considers, not a doctrine of metaphysics only, but 
a biological, psychological, and even a sociological doctrine as 
well. Under the title of "Transfigured Realism," too, he gives 
it consideration not otherwise bestowed. 

Yet it is not indispensable to the Philosophy of Evolution, 
I >i 1 1 is rather a complication from which thai philosophy should 
be glad to extricate itself. Thai evolution is only a law of ap- 
pearances, not a law of things, ifl a thought fraught with dis- 
heartenment and burdened by a weight of complex subtilties. 
No evolutionist should harbor Bentimenl repugnant to the t<'n< t 



4 THE ISSUE. 

that realities are the subject-matter of the process of evolution 
and of the Evolution Philosophy. But if he must entertain a 
prejudice, let it not lead him into suspicion that he hears a voice 
from the hostile camp. In my own case, at least, I find the 
fullest acceptance of criticisms to be propounded not incompat- 
ible with estimation of the "Synthetic Philosophy " as perhaps 
the noblest speculative product of a single mind. 



A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 



, 



CHAPTER II. 

A Fundamental Fallacy. 

The Impossibility of Establishing Unknowableness. 

§ 4. On slightest acquaintance with Mr. Spencer's agnostic 
conclusions, there is enough to raise the question, How is it 
possible to establish the proposition that something is unknow- 
able? Accordingly with this question the examination shall 
begin. Incidentally to the search for an answer, the reader 
shall be introduced to the whole line of argument which it is 
my intention to investigate. 

The following is an epitome of the treatise on "The Un- 
knowable:" " Common Sense asserts the existence of a reality; 
Objective Science proves that this reality cannot be what we 
think it; Subjective Science shows why we cannot think of it 
as it K and yet are compelled to think of it as exMng; and in 
this assertion of a Reality utterly inscrutable in nature, Religion 
finds an assertion essentially coinciding with her own." (First 
Prin., § 27.) 

I 5. (J ran ting that "Common Sense asserts the existence of 
a reality," which -hull be provisionally called "The Unknow- 
able," we will first enquire in what manner Objective Science 
i- supposed to aid in proving that this reality i- bo far from 
being what we think it, that it is "utterly inscrutable in nature." 

To deduce unknowableness from knowledge of "The Unknow- 
able," would have been absurd, so what doubtless appeared t<> 
be an alternative method was adopted. It seemed t<» Mi-. 
Spencer that if successful in showing that every idea, vulgarly 
supposed to be representative of the nature of "The Unknow- 
able," conflicts witli itself, lie would have the testimony of 
Objective Science in Buppoii of his position. Pursuant bo such 



6 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 

view, he makes an attack upon all possible conceptions of the 
Origin of the Universe. These, if he commits no error, are 
demonstrated self-conflicting. Next, he grapples with the 
mental representation of Causation, and brings it before us, de- 
nuded of obscurity, that Mansel may point out its self-opposing 
tendencies. This disposition of " Ultimate Religious Ideas" 
being made, " Ultimate Scientific Ideas " are treated in a similar 
manner. The notions expressed by the terms, " Space, " " Time," 
"Matter," " Motion," "Force," "Extent of Consciousness," and 
"Mental Substance," are severally examined for the purpose of 
showing that each, when expanded, combats itself. 

We can aiford to be very generous with Mr. Spencer. Let 
it, for experiment, be conceded that he has been entirely success- 
ful in showing, that what we have heretofore deemed knowledge 
of " The Unknowable," the knowledge that it exists excepted, 
"proves on examination to be utterly irreconcilable with itself." 
(First Prin., § 22.) Nevertheless a gap effectually separates 
the premise from the conclusion. A certain portion of the 
universe was to be proved unknowable. Our ideas of it are, 
with one exception, shown to be utterly incongruous. The con- 
clusion is, that there is a total non-resemblance between these 
ideas and the part of the universe in question. But what shall 
be said to the polemic who will argue that this, the so-called 
"Unknowable," may, in exact correspondence with what have 
been esteemed its representatives in the world of mind, sustain 
necessary conflicts among its parts? Worse than hopeless 
would it be to rely upon the declaration that it is impossible to 
pronounce this assertion true or false ; for, if its falsity is not 
known, none can deny its truth; and if true, "The Unknow- 
able" is known. Of one defence, and one only, can Mr. 
Spencer avail himself. He must maintain that "The Un- 
knowable" is free from the conflicts which overwhelm the ideas 
commonly thought to represent it — that the notion of its self- 
consistency is as legitimate as the notion of its existence. The 
defence, that existence involves self-consistency, is not open to 
him; because he denies this in the case of the contested ideas. 
Such an inconsistency as the ideas have, may realities be sup- 



A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 7 

posed to have, unless the contrary be shown. Understand that 
if the proposition missing from Mr. Spencer's argument is im- 
plied, he has not only affirmed of "The Unknowable" a gen- 
eral and abstract consistency, but also denied that it possesses 
any of a multitude of special and concrete inconsistencies. 
Every time he showed, or tried to show, us an imperfection in 
the ideas which he impugned, he said, by implication, "The 
Unknowable is not subject to an imperfection answering to 
this one." Justice will be done if he be permitted to speak his 
own accusation. " In all imaginable ways we find thrust upon us 
the truth, that we are not permitted to know — nay are not even 
permitted to conceive — that Reality which is behind the veil 
of Appearance; and yet it is said to be our duty to believe (and 
in so far to conceive) that this Reality exists in a certain de- 
fined manner." (First Prin., § 31.) The "certain defined 
manner," in the case before us, is the possession of congruity 
and the freedom from certain incongruities. 

Thus it appears that the first proof that something is un- 
knowable, rests on the supposition that more of it than its ex- 
istence is known. Of course all would more willingly hear 
"The Unknowable" called congruous than incongruous. It is 
not this description, but the name and something said to justify 
its application, to which objection is made. That the objection 
lias been sustained by criticism, that there has been discovered, 
in the reasoning of Mr. Spencer, a difficulty from which he can- 
not extricate himself, they who still doubt may satisfy them- 
selves by considering what answers he can offer to the question, 
Is the unknowable portion of the universe a chaos correspond- 
ing to that mental chaos which you tell US OUT thoughts of 
something beyond the knowable compose? Refusing to an- 
swer, he would abandon his argument. Should he say "yes," 
he would deny his conclusion. Should he say "no," he would 

be thereby debarred it- affirmation, lie musl answer t<» avoid 

a surrender; yet any answer will defeat his cause. 

§ ('). Although Objective Science has jusi taught us, by its 
example, to think of the inscrutable reality as congruous, we 



8 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 

are now to learn how " Subjective Science shows why we cannot 
think of it as it is." Reduced to syllogistic form, the argument 
to be next investigated seems, a minor premise being supplied, 
to stand thus: 

There can be no knowledge of what is unconditioned; 
"The Unknowable" is unconditioned; 
.'.There can be no knowledge of "The Unknowable." 

To which, one objection is that the minor premise destroys the 
conclusion. Asserting that "The Unknowable" is uncon- 
ditioned, carries the implication that it is known to be uncon- 
ditioned. Lest it be thought unfair to present so briefly an 
elaborate argument, and particularly unfair to summarily sup- 
ply a minor premise, it will be well to go further into detail. 
First, however, it must be premised that the author has, because 
of supposed appropriateness, given to "The Unknowable" 
several titles, not yet mentioned, each of which is significant of 
a part of what is imported by "unconditioned," — significant 
of the absence of certain particular conditions. 

Assisted by Hamilton and Mansel, Mr. Spencer, in the 
chapter entitled " The Relativity of All Knowledge," puts forth 
considerable effort to convince us that "a thought involves rela- 
tion, difference, likeness." (First Prin., § 24.) By this is meant 
that every thought involves a relation of subject and object; 
also a difference and a likeness between the object and something 
else. So much being granted, it would follow that whatever 
cannot exist in relation to the thinking mind, and be known as 
different from something else, and as like something else, cannot 
be thought of at all. Because seeming not to fulfill the 
specified conditions of the thinkable, "the Real, as distinguished 
from the Phenomenal;" "the First Cause;" "the Infinite;" 
"the Absolute," or non-relative; "the creating;" "the un- 
caused;" "the Actual," as opposed to the "Apparent" — in 
short, "the Unconditioned" — is pronounced unthinkable, and 
the conclusion that "The Unknowable" can never be an object 
of thought is treated as too obvious to need definite expression. 

From his own words we may best learn how Mr. Spencer 



A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 9 

passes to the ultimate conclusion from the law of relativity. 
After quoting largely to show that "the Unconditioned" has 
been put to the first and second tests and found unthink- 
able, he proceeds ( First Prin., § 24 ) to apply the third axiom 
— what can be known can be classed. "A cognition of the 
Real, as distinguished from the Phenomenal, must, if it exists, 
conform to this law of cognition in general. The First Cause, 
the Infinite, the Absolute, to be known at all, must be classed. 
To be positively thought of, it must be thought of as such or 
such — as of this or that kind. Can it be like in kind to any- 
thing of which we have sensible experience? Obviously not. 
Between the creating and the created, there must be a distinction 
transcending any of the distinctions existing between different 
divisions of the created. That which is uncaused cannot be 
assimilated to that which is caused: the two being, in the very 
naming antithetically opposed. The Infinite cannot be grouped 
along with something that is finite; since, in being so grouped, 
it in ust be regarded as not-infinite. It is impossible to put the 
Absolute in the same category with anything relative, so long 
as the Absolute is defined as that of which no necessary relation 
can be predicated. Is it then that the Actual, though unthink- 
able by classification with the Apparent, is thinkable by classifi- 
cation with itself? This supposition is equally absurd with the 
other. It implies the plurality of the First Cause, the Infinite, 
the Absolute; and this implication is self-contradictory. There 
cannot be more than one First Cause; seeing that the ex- 
istence of more than one would involve the existence <>f 
something necessitating more than one, which something would 
he the true First ( ause. How self-destructive is the assumption 
of two or more infinities, i> manifest <>n remembering that such 
Infinities, by limiting each other, would become finite. And 
similarly, an Absolute which existed imt alone but along with 

other absolutes, would do Longer be an absolute hut a relative. 

The Unconditioned therefore, a- claSSlble neither with any form 
of the conditioned nor with any other Unconditioned, cannot 

he classed at all. And to admit that it cannot he known ;i- of 
such or such kind, is to admit that it IS unkuowahli/' A few 



10 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 

words more, and the entire argument is thus summarized and 
ended: "a thought involves relation, difference, likeness. 
Whatever does not present each of these does not admit of cog- 
nition. And hence we may say that the Unconditioned, as 
presenting none of them is trebly unthinkable." 

What, if we assent to all this, does it establish in regard to 
" The Unknowable?" A multiplicity of names, signifying the 
possession of certain characteristics, has been given to it; and 
these characteristics have, it is thought, been proved incogni- 
zable. Does "The Unknowable" possess these characteristics? 
is now the all-important question. To profess ignorance, is to 
yield the argument. To deny, is to leave a gap in the argu- 
ment and violate the conclusion. To affirm, is to complete the 
argument by violating the conclusion. Mr. Spencer has indi- 
cated a willingness to seize the last horn of the trilemma. By 
indulging in reasoning which postulates such knowledge, he 
has asserted that " The Unknowable " is real ( not phenomenal ), 
a first cause, infinite, absolute (non-relative), creating, uncaused, 
actual (not apparent): in brief, unconditioned. Surely this is 
an amount of information which we do not possess concerning 
many things that are called knowable. ISTot yet, however, have 
the limits been reached. All that has been affirmed of that 
possessing its alleged attributes, has been affirmed of "The 
Unknowable." It is, we are to understand, of such a nature 
that it cannot exist in relation to the knowing mind. In other 
words, we know "The Unknowable" as so conditioned that it 
is incapable of that relative existence without which any knowl- 
edge of it is impossible. Add to the intelligence already ac- 
cumulated the knowledge that "The Unknowable" is neither 
like nor unlike anything else existing ; and consider the number- 
less implications which might be developed and added to the sum. 
Should not "The Unknowable" be called by another name? 
Mr. Spencer must answer affirmatively or disavow many beliefs 
essentially implied in his mode of proof; but in the latter case 
he has proved nothing in regard to " The Unknowable." What 
matters it, as far as the question before us is concerned, whether 
a long list of attributes is conceivable or inconceivable, if they 



A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY.. 11 

are not known to belong to a The Unknowable?" Admit that 
"The Unknowable" is not known to be unconditioned, and 
we care not if "the Unconditioned" is unthinkable. Concede 
it impossible to say knowingly that "The Unknowable" has 
peculiarities which must forever prevent its existing relative 
to something knowing it, and in relations of likeness and un- 
likeness, and it will be necessary to consider all that has been so 
far said about the relativity of knowledge utterly irrelevant. 
Ineffective from end to end is the argument, unless the thought 
that "The Unknowable" is unconditioned, is as legitimate as 
the thought that it exists. 

§ 7. Notwithstanding the premise, above implied, and 
elsewhere repeatedly expressed, that "The Unknowable" 
transcends all relation, we are now to be shown how it is related 
to the mind; and the purpose is to farther convince us that 
"we cannot think of it as it is." From a point of view widely 
separated from that which he lately occupied, Mr. Spencer, in 
additional support of his theory of the unknowableness of 
something which exists, directs our attention (First Prin., § 25) 
to what purports to be the relativity of knowledge presenting 
another aspect. " Life," he says, " is definable as the continuous 
adjustment of internal relations to external relations." "If 
then," he argues, "Life, in all its manifestations, inclusive of 
Intelligence in its highest forms, consists in the continuous 
adjustment of internal relations to external relations, the 
necessarily relative character of our knowledge becomes obvious." 
11 If every act of knowing is the formation of a relation in 
consciousness parallel to a relation in the environment, then 
the relativity of knowledge is self-evident — becomes indeed a 
truism." Judging from what ha- been cited, one mighl be led to 
suppose that the relat ivity spoken of consists of relation- be- 
tween phenomena, relations between noumena, relations between 
phenomena and noumena, and relation- between phenomenal 
and noumena] relation-. Taking, however, all that is said into 
consideration, the meaning seems to be, that only phenomenal 
relation-, or relation- in consciousness, can ever come "withini 



12 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 

the reach of intelligence;" and that the impossiblity of trans- 
cending these relations proves noumena and their relations un- 
knowable. Witness the following: "The knowledge within 
our reach, is the only knowledge that can be of service to us. 
This maintenance of a correspondence between internal actions 
and external actions, which both constitutes our life at each 
moment and is the means whereby life is continued through 
subsequent moments, merely requires that the agencies acting 
upon us shall be known in their co-existences and sequences, 
and not that they shall be known in themselves." Remarks 
immediately following show this to mean that the necessities of 
life require a knowledge, not of noumena, but merely of the co- 
existences and sequences of the effects which noumena produce in 
consciousness. " If x and y are two uniformly connected proj:>erties 
in some outer object, while a and b are the effects they produce 
in our consciousness; and if while the property x produces in 
us the indifferent mental state a, the property y produces in us 
the painful mental state b (answering to a physical injury); 
then, all that is requisite for our guidance, is, that x being the 
uniform accompaniment of y externally, a shall be the uniform 
accompaniment of b internally; so that when, by the presence 
of x, a is produced in consciousness, b, or rather the idea of 6, 
shall follow it, and excite the motions by which the effect of y 
may be escaped. The sole need is that a and b and the relation 
between them, shall always answer to x and y and the relation 
between them. It matters nothing to us if a and b are like x 
and y or not. Could they be exactly identical with them, we 
should not be one whit the better off; and their total dissimi- 
larity is no disadvantage to us." Immediately after comes ^he 
conclusion of the argument. "Deep down then in the very 
nature of Life, the relativity of our knowledge is discernible. 
The analysis of vital actions in general, leads not only to the 
conclusion that things in themselves cannot be known to us ; 
but also to the conclusion that knowledge of them, were it 
possible, would be useless." 

What has all this to do with " The Unknowable ? " Are we to 
understand that it is believed to comprise "things in them- 



A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 13 

selves " which are known to be so constituted and connected 
with consciousness that a knowledge of their nature would not 
enable us to better procure the desirable and avoid the unde- 
sirable effects which they may produce upon us ? Silence on Mr. 
Spencer's part means death to the argument ; negation, abortion ; 
affirmation, self-destruction. Implicitly he affirms. "In the 
very definition of Life," he tells us, "when reduced to its most 
abstract shape," the "ultimate implication becomes visible." 
According to this definition, Life is "the continuous adjustment 
of internal relations to external relations." Because in this 
view of life is involved the belief that "every act of knowing 
is the formation of a relation in consciousness parallel to a re- 
lation in the environment," it is deemed beyond dispute that the 
mind can and need contemplate relations in consciousness only, and 
that therefore the environment is unknowable. But stop: it 
is impossible to realize that life is "the continuous adjustment 
of internal relations to external relations," or that "every act 
of knowing is the formation of a relation in consciousness par- 
allel to a relation in the environment," without forming a rela- 
tion in consciousness that is not parallel to a relation in the en- 
vironment, but representative of a relation between the environ- 
ment and the environed mind. Now, as in the author's words, 
"tin- consciousness of a relation implies a consciousness of both 
the related members" (First Prin., § 26), the knowledge of a 
relation between them proclaims the mind and its environment 
knowable and known. " In the very definition of life," then, 
as in everything which we have found Mr, Spencer employing 
for the same purpose, "this ultimate implication becomes vis- 
ible" — the nature of "The Unknowable" is partly known. 
Besides being known as one of the terms of a certain kind of 
relation, it is, according to implication- of remarks concerning 
the necessities of life, minutely understood. Knowing that 
promotion of life "merely requires thai the agencies : i « - 1 1 1 1 ir 
upon n- shall he known in their co-existences and sequences, 
and imt that they shall l>c knowD in themselves" — thai the 
record of past manifestations of "The Unknowable" will just 
as well enable us to regulate the character of future manifesta- 



14 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 

tions, as would a perfect understanding of "The Unknowable" 
and all the relations which it may possibly bear to us — 
is impossible unless "The Unknowable" is exceedingly well 
known. Repeatedly we discover the one unlawful implication. 
Again Mr. Spencer has thwarted his own design. 

§ 8. With the assertion that we cannot think of "The Un- 
knowable " as it is, fresh in our memory, we are called upon to 
listen to an argument, supplementary of those preceding, yet 
based on the supposition that we may rightly think of it as a 
cause. 

An entire chapter ( First Prin., Part I., Chap. I.) is devoted 
principally to establishment of the doctrine that "there must be 
a fundamental harmony" between Science and Religion; and 
another (First Prin., Part I., Chap. V.) to showing that this 
fundamental harmony is to be found in the conclusion that 
u the reality underlying appearances is totally and for ever incon- 
ceivable by us." The former chapter is almost unobjectionable; 
the latter is open to destructive criticism. In it we are told 
that in the " assertion of a Reality utterly inscrutable in nature, 
Religion finds an assertion essentially coinciding with her own ; " 
and this is what we question. How Science, represented by 
Mr. Spencer, proves the conclusion which is to end the Avar 
between Scientists and Religionists, by contradicting it, — how 
she uncovers something, to show it to be totally and eternally 
hidden from our view, has been observed. Forgetting this, as 
best we may, let us suppose that Science supports the conclusion 
that promises to harmonize her and her great antagonist. Will 
religious thought tend to the acceptance of the same belief? 

Religion is represented as having been forced to abandon 
position after position, retreating before advancing Science, 
until the impregnable point, the ultimate conclusion, was 
reached. "Leaving out the accompanying moral code, which 
is in all cases a supplementary growth, a religious creed is de- 
finable as a theory of original causation." (First Prin., § 14.) 
As religions developed, existing theories of causation gave way 
to others. " Each higher religious creed, rejecting those deli- 



A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 15 

nite and simple interpretations of nature previously given, has 
become more religious by doing this. As the quite concrete 
and conceivable agencies alleged as the causes of things, have 
been replaced by agencies less concrete and conceivable, the 
element of mystery has of necessity become more predominant." 
(First Prim, § 28.) "And now observe that all along, the 
agent which has effected the purification has been Science." 
(First Prin., § 29.) Here we must pause to consider of what 
the alleged development consists. It is asserted that Religion, 
d by Science, has, from time to time, abandoned causes 
relatively conceivable and assumed causes less conceivable. 
Note that Religion is not shown to have ever given up the hy- 
pothesis of causation. That the contrary is true, we are fre- 
quently reminded. Defining religious creeds as theories of 
original causation, is the same as affirming that they Avill be 
something else than religious creeds when they exclude belief 
in a cause. What says the author? " Be it in the primitive 
Ghost-theory which assumes a human personality behind each 
unusual phenomenon; be it in Polytheism, in which these per- 
sonalities are partially generalized; be it in Monotheism, 
in which they are wholly generalized; or be it in Pantheism, 
in which the generalized personality becomes one with the 
phenomena; we equally find an hypothesis which is supposed 
to render the universe comprehensible. Nay, even that which 
is commonly regarded as the negation of all Religion — even 
positive Atheism, comes within the definition; for it, too, in 
asserting the Self-existence of Space, Matter, and Motion, which 

irdfl as adequate causo of every appearance, propounds an 

a priori theory from which it holds the facts to be deducihle." 

(Firsl Prin., § 14.) Elsewhere, as well as here, the assertion 
is withheld, that Religion has consented, or will consent, to dis- 
pense with all causes. No more is said than thai "instead of 
die specific comprehensible agency before assigned, (here is sub- 
stituted a less specific and Less comprehensible agency." (First 
Prin., ^ 29.) Could any doubl in regard to Mi-. Spencer's 
meaning remain, it would l>e dispelled by the words of the 
alleged ultimate religious conclusion. To this we now pass. 



16 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 

"We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifesta- 
tion of some Power by which we are acted upon ; though Om- 
nipresence is unthinkable, yet, as experience discloses no bounds 
to the diffusion of phenomena, we are unable to think of limits 
to the presence of this Power; while the criticisms of Science 
teach us that this Power is Incomprehensible. And this con- 
sciousness of an Incomprehensible Power, called Omnipresent 
from inability to assign its limits, is just that consciousness on 
which Religion dwells." (First Prin., § 27.) 

Science proves that there is "a Reality utterly inscrutable in 
nature." Religion teaches us to believe that there is an agency 
producing all the phenomena we know, the cause of all known 
effects, a never-absent power. Mr. Spencer informs us that 
here is an agreement between Science and Religion: which 
means that "The Unknowable" of Science and the Cosmical 
Cause of Religion are identical. In the "assertion of a Reality 
utterly inscrutable in nature, Religion finds an assertion essen- 
tially coinciding with her own." Once more we learn much 
about "The Unknowable." It is an ever-present power, a 
universal cause, an all-working agency. Admit this, and it is 
possible to partially describe a nature called wholly indescrib- 
able, to conceive a nature said to be wholly inconceivable, and 
to know a nature deemed absolutely unknowable; deny it, and 
Religion does not contribute to the belief in something unknow- 
able. Even supposing that both Science and Religion were, as 
alleged, moving towards this belief, the fact is useless for the 
purposes of the argument unless a certain correspondence be- 
tween the general tendency of thought and " The Unknowable " 
be assumed ; but, again, to so assume, is to assume knowledge 
which the assumption is to prove impossible. 

§ 9. Every leading argument by which Mr. Spencer attempts 
to enforce acceptance of the conclusion, " that we cannot know the 
ultimate nature of that which is manifested to us" ( First Prin., 
§ 35) has now been considered. Examining the conclusion 
itself, none can fail to notice the fatal implication — we do know 
something of the ultimate nature of that which is manifested 



A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 17 

to us. Strike out everything descriptive of the ultimate nature 
of "The Unknowable," and, having substituted something 
which will (as nearly as is possible ) convey the idea of existence 
only, observe what is left of the conclusion. We must drop 
the words, " that which is manifested to us ; " for by describing 
"The Unknowable" thus, we imply that it is properly con- 
ceived, not merely as something capable of producing phe- 
nomena, but also as something that actually causes certain well 
known effects. Xeither can "the ultimate nature" of "The 
Unknowable" be spoken of: the possession of a noumenal 
nature, by an object, is something belonging to its noumenal 
nature; without doubt, then, Ave cannot speak of anything's 
noumenal nature without implying some knowledge of the same. 
Supplying the proposed substitute for what criticism compels 
us to exclude, the conclusion stands — "We cannot know some- 
thing which exists." Still it is suicidaL Denial that we can 
know something, is both a denial that it can exist in a certain 
relation to the mind and an affirmation that it must bear to the 
mind an opposite relation; therefore the phrase, "we cannot 
know," must be stricken out. There is left, not a conclusion, 
but what may be called by the more general name, "conception " 
— the conception of something existing. Such is the only 
thought that can be entertained of what is "utterly inscrutable 
in nature;" and it is a thought which does not express un- 
knowableness, but consists with the reverse. Some such modi- 
fications a- those which have been dropped are essential to Mr. 
Spencer's conclusion; yet any, however vague, would render 
that conclusion self-contradicting. Without them, there is no 
Conclusion; with them, there is worse than none 

§ 10. "Have we not," Mr. Spencer confidently asks | First 
Prin., $ 31), "seen how utterly incompetent our minds are to 
form even an approach to a conception of thai which underlies 

all phenomena?" It seems not. An attempt to translate the 

conclusion into thought has confirmed as in the observation 

that, "after it has been shown that every supposition respecting 

nesis of tin- Universe commits us to alternative impossi- 

2 



18 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 

bilities of thought — after it has been shown that each attempt 
to conceive real existence ends in an intellectual suicide — after 
it has been shown why, by the very constitution of our minds, 
we are eternally debarred from thinking of the Absolute; it is 
still asserted that we ought to think of the Absolute thus 
and thus." (First Prin., § 31.) Throughout we have found 
reason for believing that Mr. Spencer's Science of Nescience, 
as he says of the religion which is, he thinks, ultimately to 
support it, "has all along professed to have some knowledge of 
that which transcends knowledge; and has so contradicted its 
own teachings. While with one breath it has asserted that the 
Cause of all things passes understanding, it has, with the next 
breath, asserted that the Cause of all things possesses such or 
such attributes — can be in so far understood." ( First Prin., § 28.) 
Yes, it will even, as was seen before, consent to call that which 
transcends knowledge "the Cause of all things;" not realizing 
that power to cause, acts of causing, and the bearing of relations 
of universal cause to numberless effects, are attributes. The 
philosophical dissertation which we have casually surveyed, 
while seeming with loud voice to banish "The Unknowable" 
from the realm of speculation, silently acknowledges its title to 
a place in philosophy. The abstract truth that we cannot rea- 
son about that of which we know nothing, it seems, occurred to 
Mr. Spencer ; but it appears that he took no pains to determine 
just what knowledge was required to prove his particular 
proposition. He would have us observe, "that every one of the 
arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is demon- 
strated, distinctly postulates the positive existence of something 
beyond the relative. To say that we cannot know the Absolute, 
is, by implication, to affirm that there is an Absolute. In the 
very denial of our power to learn what the Absolute is, there 
lies hidden the assumption that it is." (First Prin., § 26.) But 
care has been taken to show that the ultimate proposition con- 
cerning "The Unknowable" is without meaning and without 
support, unless we know, not only that something besides the 
knowable is, but also, to some extent, what it is. It is admitted 
that we are compelled to form representations of " The Un- 



A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 19 

knowable" which are not representative of its existence only; 
but asserted that all such conceptions must be treated as entirely 
illusive. "Very likely there will ever remain a need to give 
shape to that indefinite sense of an Ultimate Existence, which 
forms the basis of our intelligence. We shall always be under 
the necessity of contemplating it as some mode of being; that 
is — of representing it to ourselves in some form of thought, 
however vague. And we shall not err in doing this so long as we 
treat every notion we thus frame as merely a symbol utterly without 
resemblance to that for which it stands. Perhaps the constant 
formation of such symbols and constant rejection of them as 
inadequate, may be hereafter, as it has hitherto been, a means 
of discipline. Perpetually to construct ideas requiring the 
utmost stretch of our faculties, and perpetually to find that 
such ideas mast be abandoned as futile imaginations, may realize 
to us more fully than any other course, the greatness of that 
which we vainly strive to grasp." (First Prin.. § 31.) Treat 
every notion of "The Unknowable" which has been found in 
Mr. Spencer's speculations, as "a symbol utterly without resem- 
blance to that for which it stands," and you will be obliged to 
consider his exposition of the Philosophy of The Unknowable 
as among the most remarkable of intellectual suicides. Having 
formed illegitimate symbols, they may with advantage, it is true, 
be sometimes permitted to enter into our reasonings; but when 
the intellectual gymnastic is completed by their rejection, all 
that depends apOD them for it- acceptance most he rejected too. 

A- yet, we have had no proof that a certain portion of the 
universe is unknowable; for, if all our ideas of it "musl he 
abandoned a- futile imaginations," then must Mr. Spencer's 
nescience theory hi- abandoned a- improved and unthinkable. 

> 1 1. Many flaws in Mr. Spencer's reasoning have been 
ignored in order to bring out more clearly an ever-recurring 

error, which, of itself, is sufficient to render ougatory his entire 
contribution to the doctrine of nescience. The establishment 
of a broader truth than any yet reached was also contem- 
plated. What we have learned ifl of more value to phil- 



20 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 

osophy than it has heretofore seemed to be, if it has prepared 
us for the apprehension of the fact that failure must be the re- 
sult of every attempt to prove that something is unknowable 
— can be known only to exist. Two considerations, each of 
which is alone adequate, combine to force this conclusion upon 
us: (1.) It is impossible to construct an argument which shall, 
without disabling itself, lead to the required conclusion ; and 
( 2.) It is impossible to realize the conclusion in thought. Tak- 
ing these propositions in their order, we will turn our attention 
to their substantiation. 

Nothing can be shown in justification of a belief, except that 
it is agreeable, or that an opposing belief is repugnant, to 
something which is held to be true. A conclusion, then, which 
denies, in its own case, the validity of such justification, makes 
every argument in its own support self-destructive. Such is 
the conclusion that something is unknowable. If we know 
nothing of " The Unknowable " but that it exists, we are not 
entitled to the postulate that there is congruity among its parts 
and between it and its opposite, the knowable. Precluded the 
assertion of this congruity, we cannot say that our legitimate 
thoughts of "The Unknowable" should harmonize with each 
other or with our thoughts of the knowable. That the propo- 
sition, expressing what we are permitted to think of " The Un- 
knowable," is consistent and agrees with truth in general is, 
therefore, no reason for believing it true. Can its truth be 
proved by showing that a contradictory proposition is inconsist- 
ent, and otherwise does violence to truth ? No ; because this last 
proposition declares something of "The Unknowable," and 
therefore, may be in so far true, no matter how great the incon- 
sistency which its acceptance would occasion. Anything may 
with impunity be declared of "The Unknowable." Were it 
even possible to show the belief in something unknowable to be 
intuitive, it would be useless to do so: "The Unknowable" 
cannot be known to be in harmony with the intuitive powers. 

The first obstacle lost sight of, another arises before us. Ex- 
pressed or implied, an inference must be drawn from premises. 
Our conclusion asserts that something is unknowable. As we 



A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 21 

cannot argue that the something is unknowable because it is 
unknowable, we must declare of it something, not unknowable- 
ness, which is a sign of unknowableness. Only one declaration 
besides that of unknowableness will our conclusion permit us 
to make; that is, that the something exists. Thus we have as 
a premise, " The something exists." This, which we see is a 
minor premise, will aid in finding the major. Unless the ma- 
jor premise predicates something of whatever exists, the minor 
is irrelevant; and if anything other than unknowableness is 
predicated, the conclusion does not follow. The only possible 
major premise then is, " Whatever exists is unknowable." The 
minor is, "The something exists." And the conclusion is 
" The sometiiing is unknowable." Now, one of two results must 
appear: either the major premise is wrong, and we have proved 
nothing; or it is right, and everything is unknowable, one 
thing no more than another. The existence of something is 
the datum from which its unknowableness is to be deduced. 
Some addition may be made to the datum; but not without 
professing more knowledge of the something than its existence, 
and thus assuming premises which the conclusion will destroy. 
Without such addition, the datum is insufficient, unless what- 
ever exists is unknowable; but if existence is a sign of unknow- 
ableness, many things unknowable are known, and the particular 
something may be one of them. 

Before the attempt was made, we might have known the im- 
possibility of reasoning about that of which no notion can be 
formed. Our reasoning was, by supposition, concerning some- 
thing; and we called it the something to distinguish ii from 
Other things. This we had DO right to do; since, until the 
conclusion was reached, we were not permitted to know that it 
differed from anything else existing. If, therefore, we really 
reasoned about something, it may have been anything — it may 
have been, e, </., an appearance. The nearest approach to a 
notion of that of which the conclusion makes a declaration, 
that may be consistently formed, is a notion of its existence. 
Not a notion of Us existence, however, for this again implies a 
distinction; but a notion of unqualified existence. Hut ii" the 



22 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 

notion contain nothing besides existence, our reasoning will 
apply to all existence, and our conclusion will be in regard to 
existence, and not something, not existence, which we wish to 
prove unknowable. All that can be done to complete the 
notion the conclusion will undo. 

Already the unthinkableness of something unknowable be- 
gins to emerge. "The Unknowable" is that of which nothing 
but the existence can be known. How any existence can be 
known separate from something to which it belongs, need not 
be asked. It is sufficient that if we contemplate existence 
wholly apart from other attributes, we cannot say to what it 
belongs, and have no reason to say that it does not belong to 
this or that which we know. 

Although it is that of which nothing but the existence can 
be known, "The Unknowable" is that of which everything: 
besides the existence is known to be not, in any measure, know- 
able. Notwithstanding the great discrepancy between these 
definitions, the latter is deducible from the former, and they 
contain the same element of incongruity. Unknowableness is 
an attribute which no one will identify with existence. When 
unknowableness is ascribed to an object, therefore, something 
more than existence is affirmed of it. To do this is improper 
if the object is really unknowable to such an extent as is 
alleged. Nor is unknowableness entirely a negative attribute. 
Volumes might be filled with an elaboration of the knowledge 
of an object which is inferable from its unknowableness. We 
might compare the object with all imaginable things, one by 
one, and each time say, " It is unlike this" It is throughout 
uniform and unchangeable in respect of its unknowableness. So 
strangely is it constituted that whatever there is of it besides its 
existence can never be presented to us, or be in the least degree 
represented by any conception we are able to form. The num- 
ber of such deductions is limitless; one would work destruction 
to the conception of " The Unknowable." 

Definitions of "The Unknowable" imply that it is divisible 
into two parts — the part known, or its existence; and the part 
absolutely unknowable, or what belongs to it besides existence. 



A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 23 

The whole is called unknowable, because so little of it can be 
known ; the existence is called the known part, because it is the 
only part known; that to which the existence belongs is called 
the absolutely unknowable part, because of it nothing whatever 
can be known. Yet it is contradictory to say that there is 
something of which we know absolutely nothing ; for the asser- 
tion implies a knowledge of this something's existence. Though 
the conclusion that what was called " the absolutely unknowable 
part" is not quite absolutely unknown, is thus forced upon us, 
it will be found as objectionable as the opposite conclusion 
would be. We now know the existence of " The Unknowable," 
and also the existence of one of its parts. Can the existence 
of the whole and the existence of the part be distinguished, one 
from the other? If they can, we are capable of observing 
differences between the whole and parts of " The Unknowable." 
If they cannot, we are unable to tell whether it is the existence 
of the whole or the existence of the part which we know : if it 
be the existence of the part, the existence of " The Unknow- 
able " is unknown, and, on the same principles, the existence of 
the part, or of a part's part, ad infinitum, is unknown ; if it be 
the existence of the whole which alone is known, we have re- 
turned to an absolutely unknowable part, which is the absurdity 
with which we set out. 

Again; "The Unknowable" embraces existence and some- 
thing else. This time we will leave out of consideration the 
incongruity of saying that we do or do not know the existence 
of the something else. Without doubt, the something else 
musl \>c distinguished from the existence which we know; and 
if so, we know more than such existence. If we do not know 
more than the existence, if we do not know that there is some- 
thing joined to the existence, which we distinguish from it; we 
do not know that "The Unknowable" contains anything besides 
existence, we do not know that there is anything belonging to 
it which is not known. 

A very formidable trilemma confronts all who proclaim that 
there is something unknowable. Excepting a very few 
propositions, they can affirm of it nothing, tiny can deny of it 



24 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 

nothing ; but they cannot refuse to either affirm or deny any prop- 
osition concerning it. "Is it like this?" (which we know), we 
ask them. They cannot say '"yes," without asserting a like- 
ness, or "no," without asserting an unlikeness, between "The 
Unknowable" and something known; yet if they say that they 
do not know how to answer, they confess that " The Unknow- 
able" may be in nature like something known — that it may be 
in so far knowable. 

Aside from the inconceivableness of an unknowable, the 
conclusion that there is such a thing is unlawful. He will 
make the best use of an illegitimate conception, who shall as- 
sert that if there is anything unknowable, the fact itself can 
never be discovered. This averment may be explained and 
justified by saying that what is unknowable is, its existence ex- 
cepted, ex hyphothesi, entirely unknown; but if so unknown, 
it is impossible to ascertain whether it is unknowable or merely 
unknown. 

§ 12. The considerations which men put forth for the con- 
viction of others are commonly not those upon which they, for 
their own conviction, principally rely. So it may have been 
in the present instance. The unquestionable legitimacy of the 
thought that something is unknown may have been deemed to 
bespeak the legitimacy of the thought that something is un- 
knowable. Knowing beyond knowledge seems to be involved 
in both until we enter into particulars, when the apparent 
analogy fades away. In the case of the unknown we do not think 
more than our conclusion permits us to conceive. Thinking 
that the exterior appearance of my friend's house is unknown 
to me, I both conceive that appearance and conceive it as un- 
known. The conception I form is vacillating, and because of 
this I affirm ignorance. A variety of conceptions float through my 
mind ; yet I cannot pronounce the reality like this, or this, or this. 
Contemplating one representation, I can conceive that the real- 
ity is, in each particular, like this or unlike it; contemplating 
more than one representation, I can conceive that the reality 
is, in each particular, most like this, or most like that. My 



A FUNDAMENTAL, FALLACY. 25 

inability to decide which, is my ignorance of something that I 
conceive. When I see the house, my conception will become 
constant: then I will conceive affirmatively what I now con- 
ceive in the alternative : then I will know as real what I now 
represent as doubtful, as unknown. If I find that I have repre- 
sented very little, the implication will be, not that I knew as 
unknown more than I could represent, but that I knew very 
little as unknown. "The Unknowable" has no similar means 
of finding representation. A vacillating conception cannot 
exhibit its relation to cognition; not alone because it cannot be 
viewed in relation, but also because no element in conception 
can, even provisionally, for an instant represent it. The ina- 
bility applies to anything essentially beyond knowledge, whether 
it extend throughout only a part of externality, instead of the 
whole ; whether it consist of an attribute of an attribute, instead 
of all attributes but one. 

Deprived of an essentially unknowable, its worshipers will have 
at least an unknowable which is necessarily such. Regretfully, 
but with confidence, they will accept this as their cry : " Informa- 
tion, however extensive it may become, can never satisfy inquiry. 
Positive knowledge does not, and never can, fill the whole region 
oi* possible thought At the uttermost reach of discovery there 
. and must ever rise, the question — What lies beyond? 
A- it is impossible to think of a limit to space so as to ex. hide 
the idea of space lying outside that limit; so we cannot con- 
ceive any explanation profound enough to exclude the question 
— What is the explanation of that explanation? Regarding 
Science as a gradually increasing sphere, we may say thai every 
addition to its surface does hut bring it into wider contact with 
surrounding nescience." (Firsi Prin., § L) There is no longer, 
to the Realist, terror in the cry. The nescience which we musi 
ever recognize is not <>f the quality which Mr. Spencer seeks to 

prove. Out beyond the known we See the unknown; but it is 

net a hare existence to as. slowly and with trembling thought, 
we magnifiy and multiply its attributions. No part of it do we 

know as absolutely unknown; to no particular part Can we 

point and Bay, "that never will he better known." 



26 A FUNDAMENTAL FALLACY. 

Many of Mr. Spencer's admirers believe that he has taught them 
what can be known and what cannot. The arbitrary line which 
he attempted to draw between possible knowledge and necessary 
nescience, they did not see him cross. Yet he did cross it, and 
was compelled to cross it, to obtain data to support the belief 
that it is impossible to be crossed. Encouraged by his example, 
others may attempt to cross at the same and other points, in the 
prosecution of other aims. His reasoning was general ; having, 
it was supposed, equal applicability to the whole line which 
forms the circumference of consciousness. Till he has shown 
us that the points where he breaks through are weaker than 
others, we may doubt the strength of all; and could we be 
repulsed at other points, where he has passed through we 
would assert our right to follow. 

§ 13. Seeing that the conclusion, lately in discussion, is 
unthinkable, and that it vitiates every argument from which it 
can be supposed to derive support, we are prepared to go a step 
further. Whenever a logically constructed argument leads to 
an illegitimate conclusion, it is competent to foretell that the 
premises will prove faulty. Who thus predict in Mr. Spencer's 
case will realize their expectation. 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 27 



CHAPTER III. 
The Inductive Argument. 

Origin of the Universe; Causation. 

§ 14. The reader will remember Mr. Spencer's first argu- 
ment : it purports to deal with all ideas of " The Unknow- 
able," and to prove, by experimenting with them, that they 
are wholly spurious. 

Were defences scarce, I would dwell at length upon the fact 
that most of such ideas have been left entirely out of mind. 
The conceptions, and the only ones, from experiment with 
which Mr. Spencer has drawn his induction, are those of the 
Origin of the Universe, Causation, Space, Time, Matter, Mo- 
tion, Force, Extent of Consciousness, and Mental Substance. 
That these do not comprehend all thoughts of things outside 
of consciousness, may be very readily shown by calling atten- 
tion to some such thoughts. We think we recognize, in exter- 
nalities, homogeneity and heterogeneity; and a surrender of 
this belief would not necessarily accompany a surrender of the 
ideas above enumerated; for likeness and unlikeness of parts 
is an abstraction which we could easily attach to "Unknowable 
Existence." So also, be it observed, are the abstractions, sub- 
stance and attribute, number and figure, whole and part. Of 
some attributes, after saying so much, we may say much more 
— we may add that they have been transferred to "The Un- 
knowable" by Mr. Spencer. He implies that it possesses 
quantity, when he calls it " infinite M or " unlimited;" he attrib- 
utes to it mobility , when he describes it as acting upon us; and 

allows it COngruity, in a manner before remarked. Now 

we may profitably enquire into the distinction between what 
Mr. Spencer attempted and whal he improperly ignored. He 
dealt with externalities in the particular, rather than in the 



28 THE INDUCTIVE AKGUMENT. 

general ; in the concrete, rather than in the abstract. The Origin 
of the Universe, Extent of Consciousness, and Mental Sub- 
stance are obviously very particular, very concrete. Causation, 
Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force are truly abstractions ; 
but they do not compare in degree of abstractness with other 
notions mentioned; indeed some of them, and to some degree 
all of them, may be, and are, considered things. Compare the 
assailed conceptions with the notions, of homogeneity, hetero- 
geneity, whole, part, quantity, congruity, and the like: these 
represent attributes common to them all and are therefore ab- 
stractions higher than them all. The importance of 
the distinction lies in the fact that the abstraction is more gen- 
eral than the particulars from which it is taken — involves a 
greater number of experiences. Abstractions formed by the sift- 
ing and combining of many experiences are doubtless more reliable 
than those formed by the sifting and combining of a few. 
Thus we reach the conclusion that the most general conceptions 
of externalities may not be proved illusive by proving the illu- 
siveness of the less general notions from which they have, to a 
considerable extent, been drawn. Besides difference 
in respect of generality, there is another difference, above sug- 
gested, which if analyzed will lead us to the same conclusion. 
To conceive the Origin of the Universe, or Space, or Mental 
Substance, for instance, it is necessary to represent a definite 
combination of various attributes; whereas such a conception 
as that of conditionality is both extremely simple and unre- 
stricted to any very particular form. Considering the immense 
difference in the conditions they should fulfill, it is evident that 
the one class of conceptions may be almost entirely spurious 
while the other is almost entirely true. The replies 
which it may be supposed Mr. Spencer could make to the fore- 
going may be met by the observation, that we shall find him 
employing the distinctions here drawn, and in a like manner, 
for a like purpose. We shall find him arguing that the exist- 
ence of "The Unknowable" is of the utmost certainty because 
it is an abstraction derived from all thoughts and experiences 
of externalities — thoughts and experiences which are, except 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 29 

as respects existence, totally delusive. And we shall find him 
arguing that, although definite conceptions of "The Un- 
knowable" must be renounced, we are nevertheless obliged 
to treat the unformed sense of its existence as completely reli- 
able. TTe have merely applied the same line of argument to 
abstractions intermediate between the notion of existence, which 
is of the highest abstractness, and certain abstractions, dealt 
with by Mr. Spencer, which are, as abstractions, relatively low. 
Not that there are no abstractions, (for relationship is one), 
that are as high as existence; but the intermediate abstractions 
are so much more numerous as to preponderate in importance. 
To all these the induction should have extended : inasmuch as 
it ignores them, it ls deficient. 

Were defences scarce, I would also enter into a detailed 
criticism, intended to show that besides not drawing his induc- 
tion from experiments with all ideas of "The Unknowable," 
he has not, even if his attacks cannot be repelled, shown, by 
experiment, the entire illusiveness of one. It is often inad- 
vertently assumed by Agnostics, and inadvertently cc needed by 
Realists, that the partial reliability and partial delusiveness of 
ideas is in some way inconsistent with Realism. An application 
of the principles of evolution would drive from speculation a 
supposition so manifestly repugnant to them. From a realistic 
stand-point it is supposable, nay, almost certain, that idea- may 
be Legitimate for some purposes, but not for others. They may 
in part represent, and in part misrepresent realities; or they 
may represent realities, when they are vague and connote little, 
and misrepresent the same realities, when, expanded into defi- 
niteness, they connote much. The attributes best represented 
are probably, on the whole, those which, being mosl genera] 
within the range of our faculties, are oftenesl experienced. 
Another supposition consistent with Realism, is thai ideas may 
be fitted for dealing with things in some relations, but not in 
other relations — that is, they may be Like things in .-Mine rela- 
tions, and Less Like them, or unlike them, in oilier relations. 
As was said of idea-, bo it musl be said of their relations, that 

those best realized are probably the ones which mosl affect us. 



30 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 

Again ; it is supposable by the Realist, that ideas may serve for 
approximate explanation, and yet not serve, or not serve so 
well, for final explanation. It will be noticed that, as in the 
earliest steps of explanation we deal with ordinary ideas and 
ordinary relations, while in ultimate explanation we deal with 
extraordinary ideas and extraordinary relations, the third sup- 
position leads us to the point to which we have been led by the 
preceding two. This, observe, is the point at which we arrived 
in the foregoing paragraph. There is much reason, then, to con- 
clude that representative consciousness is reliable in proportion 
to the quantity of experience by which it has been developed. 
Just as we before distinguished between ideas wrought by com- 
paratively few experiences and ideas wrought by comparatively 
many, we here distinguish between the components of thoughts 
produced by less and the components produced by more experi- 
ence. Just as we before complained because Mr. Spencer's in- 
duction had not been extended to the most trustworthy ideas, 
we now charge that it has not been extended to the elements 
of even the conceptions with which it dealt, presumably the 
most reliable, — those within the range of every-day experience. 
In other words, though he experimented with final, he ignored 
approximate, comprehension of things external. 

But the ideas attacked have separate defences, and to these 
we turn. 

§ 15. In the following manner conceptions of the genealogy 
of the universe are disposed of. (First Prin., § 11.) 

" Respecting the origin of the Universe three verbally intelli- 
gible suppositions may be made. We may assert that it is self- 
existent; or that it is self-created; or that it is created by an 
external agency." Self-existence is inconceivable, because "to 
form a conception of self-existence is to form a conception of 
existence without a beginning. Now by no mental effort can 
we do this. To conceive existence through infinite past time, 
implies a conception of infinite past time, which is an impossi- 
bility." Self-creation is unthinkable, since " really to conceive 
self-creation, is to conceive potential existence passing into 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 31 

actual existence by some inherent necessity; which we cannot 
do. We cannot form any idea of a potential existence of the 
universe as distinguished from its actual existence/' and 
"we have no state of consciousness answering to the words — 
an inherent necessity by which potential existence became 
actual existence." Besides, potential existence "would just as 
much require accounting for as actual existence; and just the 
same difficulties would meet us." "Creation by external 
agency," is unimaginable; for the production of matter out of 
nothing is not realizable in thought. Moreover, " if space was 
created, it must have been previously non-existent. The non- 
existence of space cannot, however, by any mental effort be 
imagined." "Lastly, even supposing that the genesis of the 
Universe could really be represented in thought as the result of 
an external agency, the mystery would be as great as ever; for 
there would still arise the question — how came there to be an 
external agency? To account for this, only the same three 
hypotheses are possible — self-existence, self-creation, and crea- 
tion by external agency;" and all of these "turn out, when 
critically examined, to be literally unthinkable." 

J la- Mr. Spencer forgotten that there is generally "a soul of 
truth in things erroneous"? And shall he, when he finds his 
views antagonized, be permitted to dispense with his rule for 
finding such soul of truth? "This method is to compare all 
opinion- of the ^inw genus; to set aside as more or Less dis- 
crediting one another those various special and concrete elements 
in which such opinion- disagree; to observe what remains alter 
the discordant constituents have been eliminated." | First Prin., 
§ 2.) This principle must be applied to the three hypotheses 
before considered. Much as they disagree in other respects, 
there is one in which there is absolute agreement among them 
— each postulates the Belf-existenoe of something, and thereby 
asserts its conceivability. Atheism asserts the Belf-existenoe of 
the essentials of the Actual Universe; Pantheism, of a Poten- 
tial Universe; Theism, of a Creator. Anomalous as it is, 
"Transfigured Realism" must <1«» Likewise. It allow-, knowl- 
edge of the existence of something more thai phenomena; the 



32 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 

problem of such existence therefore confronts it. How came 
"The Unknowable" to exist? On the supposition that we 
know no more about it than that it exists, there is no possible 
way of answering : we know nothing contrary to the conclusion 
that it was created by an agency external to itself, or that it is 
the product of something potentially what it now is, or that it 
is self-existent. Strangely, however, we must recognize in it, 
or back of it, self-existence. Something cannot have sprung 
from nothing; therefore there must have always been, within 
or back of "The Unknowable," a persistence of something — 
some kind of self-existence, if it is only the eternal persistence 
of the chain of causation. This is an important implication; 
but Mr. Spencer goes beyond it. He must have decided that 
"The Unknowable" is self-existent; for he calls it "The Un- 
caused" and "an unconditioned reality without beginning or 
end." Without beginning and without cause, is self-existent. 
Atheist, Pantheist, Theist, and the Promulgator of "Trans- 
figured Realism," rely upon the conception of self-existence: 
when such bitter antagonists agree, there is strong presumption 
that their bond is truth. 

Thus enforced by the reasonings of Mr. Spencer, his objec- 
tions must be met and overcome. The immense difference in 
point of conclusiveness, between the argument which he used 
against the theory of self-existence, and those which he opposed 
respectively to each of the other hypotheses, first presents itself 
for consideration. The hypothesis of self-creation, and that of 
creation by external agency, were intimated to possess, among 
other evil qualities, a remarkable proneness to self-contradiction; 
for he brings them to the point where they must affirm what they 
began by denying — namely, self-existence. But the postulate of 
self-existence is not even implicitly charged with suicidal pro- 
clivities. If our conception of self-existence is not self-contra- 
dictory, what can be said against it ? Does it involve absurdities ? 
Mr. Spencer has not preferred this charge against it It may, 
in perfect harmony with his remarks about it, be consistent and, 
so far as it goes, self-supporting; but he thinks it is not suffi- 
ciently comprehensive. That it is possible to think of exist- 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 33 

ence a? not derived from anything but previous existence dur- 
ing a finite portion of time, he seems to £.dmit. The alleged 
impossibility is the conception of self-existence during more 
than a finite portion of time. Our conception of self-existence, 
then, is no conception, because we are unable to comprehend 
its relation to infinite time. Again we must summon our dis- 
tinguished adversary to do battle with himself. Sensations he 
has classed among the perceivable and conceivable, yet are they 
considered by him "absolutely incomprehensible." (First Prin., 
§ 194.1 Why incomprehensible? Because their relations to 
"The Unknowable" are unknown. How knowable? In as 
far as a knowledge of them does not involve a knowledge of 
these relations. On Mr. Spencer's principles, therefore, the 
idea of self-existence may be no more fallacious than the notion 
of a seusation. Each may be a truthful representation of but 
a portion of a fact, though neither a representation nor a mis- 
representation of the remainder. A similar analogy also avails 
as. As "'The Unknowable" is considered a fact which can be 
Been but not circu inspected, so might self-existence be deemed 
a fact which is apprehensible though not delineable. 

We have been allowing Mr. Spencer benefit of the generally 
received supposition that a conception of infinity is impossible; 
it is dow time to withdraw the favor. To show, as he could 
not omit to do, that the conception of infinite past time is an 
impossibility, he was under obligation to entertain every con- 
ception thought to represent infinite past time, and render mani- 
fest it- unmitigated illusiveness. Instead of attempting this, 
however, b<- assailed but a single symbol, and one which do one 
supposed could be formed, and pronounced it impossible. Y< t 
there is a conception of infinite past time which is as far as it 
can be from being impossible; it is actual. Not only occasion- 
ally, when our mind- are free from the prejudices of this dis- 
cussion, but also in every act of thinking of the inability to 
travel in thought through infinite past time, does it li;i\ 
istence. The bare sound of the phrase, "infinite past time," 
calls up a corresponding representative mental state. Mr. 
Spencer has assumed the burden of showing that it is ool re- 
ft 



34 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 

preservative of a reality. This he cannot do by proving the 
conception inharmonious with other thoughts of infinite past 
time, since he does not admit the legitimacy of any such thoughts. 
Without employing other thoughts of what it purports to re- 
present, he cannot discover the conception in question to be in- 
complete. He must prove it self-destructive, or otherwise in 
conflict with undoubted truth; and that he can do neither, a 
short inspection of the conception spoken of will render probable. 
In conceiving infinite past time, I form a conception of some- 
thing, which conception excludes conception of a beginning of 
that something; therefore I consider infinite past time to be 
something of such a nature as is incompatible with a beginning. 
I do not try to let my thoughts run back through past time to 
an unlimited extent; for it is unnecessary to do this. The 
infinity of time is not conceived, as it is not discovered, by 
traversing time exhaustively; though we cannot conceive time 
without, to some extent, mentally traversing it. By conception 
of the nature, not the quantity of time, is its infinity discovered 
and represented. To bring into clearer view the distinction 
here indicated, let it be observed that there are two ways in 
which we might be supposed to form a conception of past time 
without limit — extensively and intensively. The former is to 
let the mental eye run back along the whole extent of past time ; 
scanning part after part, in their order, until all the parts have 
been exhausted; in vain searching for a beginning. Mr. 
Spencer and others are right in believing this impossible. The 
latter is to call into view a portion of time ending with the 
present and extending indefinitely back ; and perceive that it is 
of such nature that, no matter how much it may be added to by 
retrospection, its beginning must be in contact with the ending 
of another part. In this process, the extension of the portion 
with which we start, considered in regard to its essential quali- 
ties, is made the representative of extensions in general ; and 
entitles us to affirm that no extension can be brought to a 
termination by the beginning of a first portion of time. In 
the manner described there is formed a conception of time as 
having at no place a starting point; and this conception is quite 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 35 

as legitimate as the conception of all possible thoughts of " The 
Unknowable " as containing no truth ; since, even if their num- 
ber were finite, which it is not, it would be impossible to gather 
up all such thoughts and examine every one of them. 

Infinite past time is, then, conceived as something having no 
limit but the present, no place of beginning. Some will be 
curious to know if it really is what we conceive it to be. Let 
them neutralize their doubts by the assurance that we cannot 
know, or believe, or even imagine it to be something else. I 
am well aware that my words will not produce a lasting effect 
on these self-devouring minds. They will re-read skeptical ar- 
guments and return to their unwholesome feast, intoxicated by 
the superstition that they think infinite past time to be some- 
thing very different from what their finite faculties compel 
them to think it to be. " We cannot," they will say, " picture, 
either serially or simultaneously, all past time, and so are un- 
able to take an imaginary trip through it; but if it were con- 
ceivable, this would not be the case." That men are prone so 
to reason, only proves that the mind is confused by two concep- 
tions of the same thing — one conspicuous and imperfect, which 
is put to the test of legitimacy; and one obscure but reliable, 
by which the other is tested. The aberration would be avoided, 
were it as obvious as it is true, that only by employing what I 
hive described as the actual conception of infinite past time, 
i- ir possible to discover that we cannot picture all past time, 
and in fancy journey through it. A picture of some past time 
is easily formed and readily explored from end to cud: how 
do we know that it is not a perfect picture of all pasl time? 
Certainly by comparing it with that conception of infinite past 
time which is always recognized as being more than a mental 

picture of a Unite portion of tiim the picture of the illimit- 
able nature of prior duration. This representation relieves 
itself of tin- suspicion of disclosing it- own inadequacy, by en- 
abling n- to perceive that an infinite cannot he an all, be 

u all" smuggles in the limits which "infinite" excludes; and 

that, "through the infinite" is a contradiction in term-, because 

"through" asserts a beginning and an end. There i- hut one 



36 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 

charge more which is likely to be brought against the concep- 
tion which I have undertaken to defend — it may be called 
negative. The obvious answer is that in some respects it is 
positive, and that its negative qualities are believed to corre- 
spond to the negative qualities of what it represents, which is 
negative in that it is not limited. Is it not strange that thinkers 
should want the conception of the infinite to exactly re- 
semble the conception of the finite? They can picture all the 
finite, and consequently seek to picture all the infinite ; but the 
infinite refuses to be comprehended in the limits of an all. 
They may explore all the parts of the finite, from the first to 
the last, and desire to do the same with the infinite; but there 
is no last part for them to reach. The finite seems positive, 
and they complain because they cannot represent the mfinite as*, 
in the same degree, positive also. 

We return to the problem of self-existence, to enquire whether 
the conception of infinite past time, which Mr. Spencer 
ignored, will enable us to advance our cause. No difficulty is 
experienced in thinking of self-existence during a portion of 
time : as having during that time no creation and no beginning : 
as having from the beginning to the end of that section of time 
been derived from nothing but previous existence: as at any 
particular moment the effect of preceding existence and the 
cause of existence about to succeed. Have I described a com- 
plete conception of self-existence? Mr. Spencer would be among 
the first to answer, "no;" arid his answer could not knowingly 
be offered, without an antecedent recognition of the unlikeness 
of the given conception to one yet to be described. The latter 
represents self-existence as infinite in preceding duration. It 
is the conception of beginningless time filled in with the symbol 
of existence. Contemplating something in a portion of time 
past, and perceiving that its nature excludes a creation there, 
we involuntarily extend the time only to perceive the same 
in regard to the addition : thus, through the essentials of the 
one, we perceive that no addition of periods can bring us to a 
creative point, a place in time where the nature of the entity 
in question was compatible with the process of creation. The 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 37 

conception is negative as compared with the one which it is 
generally thought we should have; but it expresses as much as 
Ave know of self-existence, and, very likely, all that there is to 
know. The other, according to description, would express too 
much ; being a picture of all past existence, when there is no 
such thing. The assertion of infinity is the denial of aggrega- 
tion. It is the very want of an extreme that characterizes a 
thing, whether in thought or reality, infinite. 

Somewhat inconsistently, Mr. Spencer has asserted (First 
Prin., § 11), " that even were self-existence conceivable, it would 
not in any sense be an explanation of the Universe." It would 
trouble him to inform us how he became possessed of this in- 
formation. The truth is, he relied upon a conception of self- 
existence, as his words will show. "No one," he states (First 
Prin., § 11), "will say that the existence of an object at the 
present moment is made easier to understand by the discovery 
that it existed an hour ago, or a day ago, or a year ago; and if its 
existence now is not made in the least degree more comprehen- 
sible,' by its existence during some previous finite period of time, 
then no accumulation of such finite periods, even could we ex- 
tend them to an infinite period, would make it more comprehen- 
sible." Xot only must we protest against Mr. Spencer's attempt 
to describe as actual a conception which he has called impossible, 
but we must also persistently refuse to consider infinite time as 
an "accumulation of" "finite periods," "an infinite period." 
Self-existence does not pretend to be an explanation of the 
universe, but an essential part of that explanation. It does 
ooi explain the origin of the existence of aU things; it merely 
explains away the supposed origin of whatever cannot be 
believed to have come from non-existence into existence. Though 
it is true the knowledge that an object existed at some particular 
point, or during some particular portion of time past, will not 
much assist us in comprehending ii ; y<t it is also true that the 
genesis of whatever is self-existent is not so much a mystery, 
when it is thought that the present existence of the self-existent 
is derived from immediately preceding existence, tlii- 
from existence immediately preceding it, and soon without limit. 



38 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 

The Atheist, the Pantheist, and the Theist, may start with 
the self-existent, and attempt to derive all that is existent from 
it. The first may begin with Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and 
whatever else he thinks fundamental, and try to show how from 
them the present state of the universe was evolved. The 
second may commence with such a Potential Universe as he 
thinks most reasonable. He must take care that he does not 
leave out of his Potential Universe something self-existent, or 
include something not self-existent; and that the " inherent 
necessity by which potential existence became actual existence " be 
not such as will baffle conception. And he must understand, more- 
over, that potential existence is nothing else than actual exist- 
ence considered as the potency of what it has subsequently become. 
The third, to begin, may assume the existence of a Creator. 
He must conceive the Creator as, more or less, self-existent; 
and if anything else cannot have been created, he must consider 
it as self-existent also. The Creator must not be considered 
the Creator of anything self-existent, but as the moulder of the 
same, while the author of all or much that is not self-exist- 
ent. At the start, then, the advocate of Atheism, Pantheism, 
or Theism, will have nothing to fear from the logic of Mr. 
Spencer. In fact, they may compel him to join their order; 
for he must recognize in "The Unknowable Cause" the pro- 
cedure of the ephemeral from the self-existent. Did he look 
upon "The Unknowable" as entirely self-existent, he could 
allow in it no change, no occurring of what did not exist before, 
no activity by which it affects us, now thus, and now so. Yet 
if he could brin^ himself to assert that that " The Unknowable" 
is entirely changeless, he would still occupy essentially the same 
position ; for, by considering " The Unknowable " as the change- 
less cause of what we know, he would make it the self-exist cut 
cause of effects not self-existent. With the rest, lie must assume 
a fundamental something, and a product thereof, which is not 
fundamental. Only in regard to details, do they disagree with 
each other, or he with them. 

§ 16 The method by which Mr. Spencer attempts to expand 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 39 

the idea of causation into afelo de se is next in order. This is 
it. (First Prin., §§ 12,13.) 

" When we inquire what is the meaning of the various effects 
produced upon our senses — when we ask how there come to be 
in our consciousness impressions of sounds, of colors, of tastes, 
and of those various attributes which we ascribe to bodies ; we 
are compelled to regard them as the effects of some cause." 
This cause may be variously described. "But be the cause we 
assign what it may, we are obliged to suppose some cause. And 
we are not only obliged to suppose some cause, but also a first 
cause." If what we assume to be the cause of the sensation 
be the first cause, "the conclusion is reached. If it is not the 
first cause, then by implication there must be a cause behind it; 
which thus becomes the real cause of the effect." "We cannot 
think at all about the impressions which the external world 
produces on us, without thinking of them as caused; and we 
cannot carry out an inquiry concerning their causation, without 
inevitably committing ourselves to the hypothesis of a First 
Cause." Going a step farther, we are driven to the 

conclusion that the First Cause is infinite. "To think of the 
First Cause as finite, is to think of it as limited. To think of 
it as limited, necessarily implies a conception of something be- 
yond its limits: it is absolutely impossible to conceive a thing 
88 bounded without conceiving a region surrounding its bounda- 
"If the First Cause is limited, and there consequently 
imething outside of it, this something must have no First 
Caua — must be uncaused. J>ut if we admit that there can be 
something uncaused ' * * we tacitly abandon the hypothesis of 
causation altogether. Thus it is impossible to consider the 
First ( Sause as finite. And if it cannot be finite, it must be in- 
finite." A third "inference concerning the First 
Cause is equally unavoidable/' It must be absolute; that is, 
independent. "If" it is dependent it cannot be the First Cause; 

for that must be the First Cause OH which it depend-/' "But 

to think of the First Cause as totally independent, is to think 

of it as that which exists in the absence of all other existence; 

seeing that if the presence of any other existence is necessary, 



40 THE INDUCTIVE AEGUMENT. 

it must be partially dependent an that other existence, and so 
cannot be the First Cause. Not only however must the First 
Cause be a form of being which has no necessary relation to any 
other form of being, but it can have no necessary relation with- 
in itself. There can be nothing in it which determines change, 
and yet nothing which prevents change. For if it contains some- 
thing which imposes such necessities or restraints, this something 
must be a cause higher than the First Cause, which is ab- 
surd." Thus "in our search for a cause, we discover 
no resting place until we arrive at the hypothesis of a First 
Cause; and we have no alternative but to regard this First 
Cause as Infinite and Absolute. These are inferences forced 
upon us by arguments from which there appears no escape. 
It is hardly needful however to show those who have followed 
thus far, how illusive are these reasonings and their re- 
sults. " Having led us to the conclusion that there is 
a first cause, and that it is infinite and absolute, Mr. Spencer 
delivers us into the charge of Mansel ; who shows " the fallacy 
of these conclusions, by disclosing their mutual contradictions." 

If, as I suspect, and the words of Mr. Spencer imply, Mr. 
Mansel has done no more, or little more, than disclose the 
"mutual contradictions" of the three conclusions, — if he has 
not succeeded in showing, in regard to every one of them, that 
it annihilates every vestige of itself, — there may be one of these 
conclusions which is true, or partly true; and the self-contra- 
diction and mutual hostility of the others, joined to their con- 
flict with it, may serve only to furnish it support. However 
this may be, as I have no interest in defending the First Cause, 
the Infinite, and the Absolute, as Mr. Spencer describes them, 
I will not enquire into their conceivability, jointly or separately. 

It is enough to know that if Mansel has succeeded in proving 
them in no manner or degree conceivable, his criticism will be 
useless for the purposes of Mr. Spencer. A known fact cannot 
evidence to us a fact which is inconceivable (any farther than 
it is conceivable). What is inconceivable cannot be an object 
of thought; no relation which it bears can be an object of 
thought. If, therefore, the conclusion, that there is an infinite 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 41 

and absolute first cause be inconceivable, it is not forced upon 
us; and Mr. Spencer must have somewhere failed in his 
proof that the thought of sensations as effects leads to incon- 
oeivables. He has not even shown that this thought 

leads to absurdities. When a train of thought ends in absurd- 
ities, the notion with which it began is not therefore known to 
be logically faulty, unless the operation is known to be logically 
fruitless; and Mr. Spencer has granted that the reasonings 
which he employed are illusive as well as their results. He 
began with the notion of sensation as the effect of something 
external; reasoned, as he admits, illusively; and, because he 
reached nonsensical conclusions, thought he had proved the 
original notion illegitimate. Perhaps it will be 

thought that he could save himself by substituting a psycho- 
logical for a logical point of view — by explaining that if the 
mind is affected with a sensation, or the idea of a sensation, 
together with an idea of a cause thereof, its state invariably 
determines an operation ending in the vain endeavor to assume 
another representative state. Such was indeed the case with 
Mi-. Spencer; but not necessarily so, as logical analysis has 
already shown. The assumption is otherwise inefficient. It 
proves too little- for it does not decide whether the original 
state or the operation following is to blame. It can be so used 
as t<» prove too much. Impressions are produced on us, and, as 
Mr. Spencer says, "we are compelled to think of these in re- 
lation to a positive cause. " Now, if the thought of the rela- 
tion of* effed and cause, between sensations and external causes, 
is proved wholly illusive by the fad thai we are compelled bo 
pass from it to absurdities \ then are sensations wholly illusive, 
since we must puss from them to the misleading causal relation. 
Of no avail i- it to reply thai sensations are delusive only in so 

far as they must be thought of afl caused; for there is no part 

of a sensation that may be thoughl of as iincaused. Equally 
useless will it be to say thai we can think of a Bensation with- 
out thinking of it as caused— thai the thoughl of a Bensation 
need nol be developed until it be made to involve an idea of a 

Cause; lor in Like manner, can we defend any link in the chain 



42 THE INDUCTIVE AEGUMENT. 

of causation, by averring that we can ignore those which pre- 
cede it. The assumption in question is incapable of proof; 
since if the mind is essentially so constituted that it must frame 
false thoughts, necessity of thought is not a reliable test of truth. 
It may be disproved, as what follows will show. 

Whenever we have reasoned from what we deem the truth to 
absurdities, we think that perhaps the process of reasoning, and 
not that with which it began is responsible; and cannot suppress 
the suspicion that there may be another process which will be 
productive of better results. To find this process, we begin 
again, determined to avoid errors. Fault cannot be found with 
the assertion, that, " when we inquire what is the meaning of the 
various effects produced on ourselves," "we are compelled to 
regard them as the effects of some cause." When again, "we 
inquire what is the meaning" of this cause, we are obliged to 
suppose a cause for it; and, again, a cause for this cause; and 
thus repeat the process, until thought, wearied, turns from the 
pursuit. Are we obliged to suppose & first cause? Experience 
answers in the negative; for if at any place we say, "the next 
must be a first cause," we are unable to give a reason. Shall 
we suppose a first cause? Criticism will tell us that we cannot. 
A first cause would be one that precedes and produces all others ; 
but no cause can fulfill these conditions. It is a matter of fact, 
that there is, in the sequence of causation, change and something 
which changes. No one is likely to consider the change as the 
first cause, since it could not exist before that which sustains 
change, and could not, for that reason if for no other, have 
produced the latter. There is, however, a tendency to credit 
that which changes with being the first cause. Yet this sup- 
position is no better than the other. That which changes can- 
not have existed before change, which, as it can have sprung 
from nothing but change, is eternally persistent; nor can it 
have produced change, for the additional reason that the change- 
less cannot have spontaneously begun to change. Is it, then, 
some particular mode of permanence and change combined, 
which is the first cause? This cannot be: for the eternal 
persistence of this mode would imply the eternal persistence of 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 43 

all its effects; and if it has not been eternally persistent, that 
is a prior cause upon which its last state is consequent. And 
so on to infinity. 

It is observable that we went along smoothly until we tried 
to postulate a first cause, and that we then became overwhelmed 
with difficulties. We will, therefore, abandon the hypothesis 
of a first cause. Being unable to find a beginning to the chain 
of causation, we know that retrogression cannot bring us to a 
cause preceding and producing all other causes. This is a con- 
ceivable conclusion ; and, contrary to the supposition of its fals- 
ity, it is least resistible when viewed in the concrete. 

Sensations are felt, and causes are looked for. Xo matter 
what the sensation, the cause is always found to be substance 
acting. The activity may be on the part of the body, or extra- 
organic matter, or both; and in such cases, it is undoubtedly the 
activity of material substance. Sometimes the mind itself is 
looked upon as the chief factor; but analysis leads us to believe 
that the mind is but an activity of something which we call 
mental substance. Again, when it is said that all things else 
are to be attributed to the agency of a spiritual substance, the 
same generalization is exemplified. The cause of sensations 
may, then, be assumed to be substance in activity, and of course 
whatever this implies, as relation and change of relation, space 
and time. To the question — what is the cause of this cause? 
and of the next? and the next? and so on without end, — we 
have the answer — Substance in action back in the past without 
beginning. Analyzing this cause, the questions may arise, 
whence the substance? and whence its activity? To both these 
interrogatories, satisfactory answers are at hand. Substance is 
conceived as self-existent. The conviction is unavoidable that 
at do point in past time was its existence derived from, or, we 
may say, caused by anything but it- previous existence. It- 
self-existence is thought of as infinite in past temporal extent. 
Activity doc- not hold so strong a title to the attribute of self- 
existence; for, while it is evident that substance can bethought 
to exist in the absence of activity, activity cannot be thought 
to exist in the absence of substance capable of action. Vet in 



44 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 

some respects does activity fulfill the conditions of self-exist- 
ence : inactive substance cannot be conceived as starting spon- 
taneously into activity. Activity, then, must be believed to 
have been at no time derived from anything but preceding 
activity of substance. 

We have been led to belief in a cause which may be con- 
sidered as at any moment the effect of what it was in an im- 
mediately preceding state, and the cause of what it will be in 
an immediately succeeding state. Such doctrine is novel, but 
necessary to a reconciliation between the abstract and the 
concrete view of causation; for as in the first we can discover 
no beginning to the chain, so in the second we must not think 
we discover something with which the chain began. By look- 
ing upon that which constantly persists as ever consequent 
upon its prior being, we bring our thoughts of causation into 
even verbal congruity. Yet it may not be always expedient 
that verbal congruity should be scrupulously maintained. The 
self-existent may be called the Uncaused, if it is borne in mind 
that the meaning is that it is uncaused by anything other than 
its previous self. It may also be called the First Cause, mean- 
ing that it existed prior to any passing phase discoverable, no 
matter how far back we look ; but suppressing the thought that 
it brought about a beginning. Far better, however, would it 
be to call it the Eternal Cause ; for eternality, not beginning, 
is its distinguishing attribute. 

Is this cause infinite or finite? In some respects, one; in 
some, the other; not infinite in all. Mr. Spencer reasons to 
the contrary. "To think of the First Cause as finite, is to think 
of it as limited. To think of it as limited, necessarily implies 
a conception of something beyond its limits : it is absolutely 
impossible to conceive a thing as bounded, without conceiving a 
region surrounding its boundaries." The argument is appli- 
cable to the temporal extent of the First Cause, and to little else. 
The First Cause cannot, for example, be infinitely harmonious: 
it can be absolutely (completely) harmonious, and no more. 
To think of harmony as complete, does not imply a conception 
of greater completeness. But supposing we can imagine some- 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT. 45 

thing more, it does not follow that the First Cause should ern- 
es / 

brace the something more ; for much that we can picture we 
know not to exist. For instance, we limit its homogeneity in 
thought, as it is limited in realitv, when we think that it 
might have had this quality in a higher degree. Nevertheless 
we do not think of the lacking degrees, supplied by the imagina- 
tion, as existing external to the cause and encroaching on its 
sphere. It should also be remarked, that the existence of the 
finite marks limitations to the infinite. While, then, the First 
Cause is infinite in temporal extent, it is in many respects 
limited. The Infinite which Mr. Spencer submits to Mansel's 
criticism is, by supposition, infinite in every particular. Ours, 
being free from its pretensions, will escape its fate. 

Is our First Cause absolute, in the sense of being out of 
relation ? It certainly bears relations, and necessarily so. While 
it doc- not depend for its being upon any relation to something 
else, it could not exist without bearing relations within itself. 
These relations are not something more fundamental than that 
which sustains them; for they depend upon it as much as it 
upon them. In fact so far as relation is immutable, and only 
thus far is it accessary, it is a component of the First Cause. 
Neither is the principle of necessity which determines what 
relations shall obtain in the constitution or conduct of the First 
Cause "a higher cause, or the true First Cause." This prin- 
ciple is not self-dependent. It is but a part of the First ( !ause 
which could not exist without the other part-. The compo- 
nents of the First Cause reciprocally sustain each other. To- 
gether they form a unit; divided, they are not at all. Our 
First Cause, being comparatively independent, may be called 
absolute. It does not pretend to be free from all relation; and 
bo does not call down upon itself the logical chastisement which 
Man-el inflicts upon its more pretentious rival. 

Vehement condemnation of the idea of causation docs not 
prevent Mr. Spencer from employing thai very idea when it 
seem- favorable to his cause. Once did we find him reasoning 
from the postulate that "The Unknowable" is the can 
Bensations (supra, i 7)j and once, from the postulate that it is 



46 THE INDUCTIVE AKGUMEXT. 

the cause of all things (supra, § 8). Often, too, throughout his 
writings, does he speak of it as a cause, and far more often does 
he imply as much. I submit that if causation is unthinkable, 
causation by "The Unknowable" is pre-eminently so; and 
that if we cannot think of "The Unknowable" as causing, we 
cannot assert that it does cause, much less make this a postulate 
in our reasoning. Mr. Spencer's example shows that the con- 
ception of causation is so persistent that it cannot be repressed. 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 47 



CHAPTER IV. 
The Inductive Argument Continued. 

Space, Time, Hatter, Motion, Force. 

§ 17. Mr. Spencer next directs his critical powers to expo- 
sure of the entire fallacy of the various conceptions of Space and 
Time. Of such conceptions, those which represent Space 
and Time as realities, being the only ones the writer deems de- 
fensible, shall be the only ones defended. What then has Mr. 
Spencer said against conceiving Space and Time as realities? 

This is his first argument. "But while, on the hypothesis 
of their objectivity, Space and Time must be classed as things, 
we find, on experiment, that to represent them in thought as 
things is impossible. To be conceived at all, a thing must be 
conceived as having attributes. We can distinguish something 
from nothing, only by the power which the something has to 
act on our consciousness; the several affections it produces on 
our consciousness (or else the hypothetical causes of them), we 
attribute to it, and call its attributes; and the absence of these 
attribute- is the absence of the terms in which the something 
is conceived, and involves the absence of a conception. What 
now are the attributes of Space? The only one which it is 
possible for a moment to think of as belonging to it, is thai 
of extension; and to credit it with this implies a confusion of 
thought. For extension and Space are convertible terms: by 
extension, as we ascribe it to surrounding objects, we mean 
occupancy of Space; and thus to say that Space is extended is 
to say that Space occupies Space. How we are similarly 
unable to assign any attribute to Time, scarcely needs point- 
in- out." ( First Prin., J L5.) 

But is it true that "extension/ 5 i meaning the quality ), and 
"Space" are convertible term-"/ There needs no vocabulary to 



48 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 

tell us that they are not. We never speak of matter as having 
Space; we never speak of matter as occupying the quality ex- 
tension. By extension, as we ascribe it to surrounding objects, 
we do not mean occupancy of Space; although these two qual- 
ities are almost always found together. The idea of extension 
is, indeed, involved in the idea of the occupancy of Space ; but 
it is not all that is contained therein. Besides being extensive, 
an object occupying Space is known as being co-extensive — co- 
extensive with the Space which it occupies. Another element, 
moreover, is noticeable in occupancy of Space, which is not 
only lacking to bare extension, but repugnant to it. To occupy, 
as its etymology discloses, signifies to keep something "so that 
it cannot be held by others." This an object occupying Space 
is believed to do, and is what we have in view when we say 
that no two portions of matter can occupy the same portion of 
Space at the same instant of time. Occupancy of Space thus 
proving to be far more than extension, it becomes evident that 
we can attribute extension to Space without ascribing to the 
same occupancy of itself. Consequently extension may be 
claimed as one of the attributes of Space. 

In the case of Time, there is an analogous justification for an 
analogous claim. This truth cannot be realized without ani- 
madverting to a striking dissimilarity between the affections 
which Space and Time respectively produce on our conscious- 
ness; that is, by Mr. Spencer's admission, a striking dissimi- 
larity of attributes. While Space is occupied by things, Time 
is occupied by events. Space is extended in all directions; 
Time in only two. The extension of Space is spoken of liter- 
ally ; that of Time, more or less metaphorically ; as is observed 
when we reflect that a line extended in Space is that by which 
we commonly symbolize the extent of Time. Differences like 
these must have forced themselves upon Mr. Spencer when he 
said (First Prin., § 15) that a to deny that Space and Time are 
things, and so by implication to call them nothings, involves 
the absurdity that there are two kinds of nothing." They are 
also perceived to differ from other things, no less than from 
each other. A child shows no more liability than Mr. Spencer 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 49 

to confound Space and Time with Matter, Motion, or Force. 
We have been looking upon attributes of Space and Time while 
contemplating their contrast, both mutual and with other ob- 
jects. Some of these attributes have names, and some have 
not ; but we must not conclude that therefore the latter are less 
deserving to be treated as attributes. 

While it seemed more thorough to thus point out how many 
of the contested attributes are to be discovered, there was no 
imperative necessity to do so, as numbers of these attributes 
are already much remarked. To Time belong mutability, ob- 
jectivity and subjectivity; to Space, immobility, objectivity, 
penetrability. Common to both are the attributes — self-exist- 
ence, conditionally, limitedness in many respects, relativeness, the 
quality of being inclusive of other things, likeness and unlikeness 
of parts, continuity, divisibility, inseparability, and others. 
That infinity, too, is of their number will, it is hoped, soon 
appeal-, notwithstanding the second and last argument which 
Mr. Spencer has directed against the belief that Space and 
Time are entities. 

'* Nor," he says, "are Time and Space unthinkable as entities 
only from the absence of attributes; there is another peculiarity, 
familiar to readers of metaphysics, which equally excludes them 
from the category. All entities which we actually know a- such 
are limited; and even if we suppose ourselves either to know 
or to 1"' able to conceive some unlimited entity, we of necessity 
in so classing it positively separate it from the class of Limited 

[ties. But of Space and Time we cannot assert either limitation 
or the absence of limitation. We find ourselves totally unable to 
form any mental image of unbounded Space; and y< t totally 
unable to imagine bound- beyond which there is do Spice. 
Similarly at the other extreme: it is impossible to think of a 
limit t<> the divisibility of Space; yet equally impossible to 
think of its infinite divisibility. And, without stating them, 
it will he seen that we labor under like impotencies in respect 

to time." i First Prim, § 15.) 

Concerning the doctrine, that a thing to he known must he 
classed, something critical -hall be said when we enter upon a eon- 

i 



50 THE INDUCTIVE AKGUMENT CONTINUED. 

sideration of the deductive arguments. Here it will be sufficient 
to remark, that if Space and Time were the only infinities they 
could be classed together; but that, in fact, they may be classed 
with anything else we know as extended ; for the latter is an 
infinity, inasmuch as it has an infinite number of parts. 

Concerning the other difficulty, — the difficulty of picturing 
infinity, — enough was said before (§ 15), could it be easily 
remembered and applied. Briefly let us recapitulate. Time 
was the example before; now the example shall be Space. 
All Space is inconceivable, because there is nothing answering 
the description. The assertion of an all is the denial of infin- 
ity. The infinity of Space is represented by means of the 
quality not the quantity of the Space we picture, though we 
cannot have quality without some quantity. The same mode 
of representation is employed when we think of all thought as 
essentially relative; for we cannot picture all thought in bulk. 
And now take in mind that these remarks will apply whether 
we have in view the absence of limit to extent or the absence 
of limit to divisibility. 

§ 18. Immediately after the discussion of Space and Time, 
the author proceeds (First Prin., § 16) with an attempt to dis- 
close to his readers the self-destructibility of the idea of Matter. 

"Matter," he says, "is either infinitely divisible or it is not." 
We cannot think that it is not, as no part can be thought indi- 
visible. We cannot think that it is ; for really to conceive the 
infinite divisibility of matter, "is mentally to follow out the 
divisions to infinity." 

Here is an infinity which may be classed with the other in- 
finities whose conceivability has been explained. To conceive 
the infinite divisibility of Matter is but to realize that Matter 
and indivisibility cannot exist together as substance and attri- 
bute; which is done when one division is perceived to be essen- 
tially like any other division, in that it must leave parts capable 
of division. Conception of the infinite divisibility of Matter 
owes its appearance of impossibility largely to being confounded 
with the conception of Matter infinitely divided. The two 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTIjSUED. 51 

conceptions are so repugnant in nature as to be exclusive of 
each other. Matter infinitely divided would admit of no 
farther division; would thus present a limit to divisibility. In- 
finite divisibility, on the other hand, precludes infinite division; 
precludes us from following out the division to infinity, — that 
is, until all divisions have been traced in thought. 

The next charge is that absurdities are involved in the 
thought of Matter as at any place in contact with Matter. 

" Were Matter thus absolutely solid, it would be, what it is 
not — absolutely incompressible; since compressibility, imply- 
ing the nearer approach of constituent parts, is not thinkable 
unless there is unoccupied space between the parts. Nor is 
this all. It is an established mechanical truth, that if a body, 
moving at a given velocity, strikes an equal body at rest in 
such wise that the two move on together, their joint velocity 
will be but half that of the striking body. Now it is a law of 
which the negation is inconceivable, that in passing from any 
one degree of magnitude to any other, all intermediate degrees 
mint be passed through. Or, in the case before us, a body 
moving at velocity 4, cannot by collision, be reduced to velocity 
2, without passing through all velocities between 4 and 2. 
lint were Matter truly solid — were its units absolutclv incom- 
pressible and in absolute contact — this Maw of continuity' as it 
is called, would be broken in every case of collision. For 
when, of two such units, one moving at velocity 4 strikes 
another at rest, the striking unit must have its velocity 1 In- 
stantaneously reduced to velocity 2; must pass from velocity 
•1 to velocity '1 without any lapse of time and without passing 
through intermediate velocities; must be moving with velocities 
1 and '1 at the same instant, which is impossible. 

"The supposition that Matter is absolutely solid being unten- 
able, there presents itself the Newtonian supposition, thai if COU- 
siste of solid atoms not in contact hut acting on each other by 
attractive and repulsive force-;, varying with the distances, To 
a— nine this, however, merely A\\\'\< the difficulty: fhe problem 
is simply transferred from the aggregated masses "I* matter t<» 
these hypothetical atoms, ■ * • Exactly the same inquiries may 



52 THE INDUCTIVE AKGUMENT CONTINUED. 

be made respecting the parts of which each atom consists; 
while exactly the same difficulties stand in the way of every 
answer." 

Two ways of reconciling the compressibility of a sensible 
portion of Matter with its contiguity of parts are likely to 
occur to any one contemplating the problem. One is to suppose 
that a quantity of Matter escaped in the so-considered act of 
compression; the other is to assume that within the portion of 
Matter compressed there were spaces unoccupied. Either 
theory may be accepted alone, or they may be blended, with- 
out adopting Newton's hypothesis that atoms act upon each 
other through such a medium as unfilled space. Eemark, 
moreover, that when we have to deal with the ultra-micro- 
scopic portions of Matter, we shall not be troubled by the phe- 
nomenon of compression. But we shall be confronted by the 
above-quoted appeal to the law of continuity, which, if con- 
sidering perceptible aggregates of matter, the assumption of 
empty spaces within would empower us to withstand. 

If at any place Matter touches Matter, we can carve out 
imaginatively, and the proper influences might carve out 
physically, a portion in which there shall be no point where 
there is an absence of contact. We may consider this block 
of any size, but for our purposes it will be convenient to give 
it the name of atom. Now, supposing, as Mr. Spencer sug- 
gests, that one such atom in motion should strike another such 
atom at rest, what would take place? Were each of these 
atoms, as visible Matter is supposed to be, composed of many 
minute particles, not in unbroken contact, though not every- 
where apart, we might imagine that, as one atom strikes the 
other, the components of each at the place of contact are forced 
back upon their next neighbors, these in turn upon those still 
more remote, and so on throughout. Thus would we avoid 
the implication that a body can go from one velocity to another 
without passing through intermediate velocities. For as the 
bodies come from no contact into the closest contact they attain, 
resistance is gradually exerted upon the striking body, and, 
therefore, its velocity gradually reduced ; while motion is grad- 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 53 

ually imparted to the body struck, and, therefore, its velocity 
gradually initiated and increased. But the experiment is to be 
with absolutely solid atoms. How shall it be shown that, under 
the given circumstances, they will not violate the law of con- 
tinuity as Mr. Spencer understands it? 

Shall it be by explaining that, after the contact begins by 
the atoms becoming so close that they cannot longer be said to 
be apart, an interim, during which they draw still nearer, in- 
tervenes before they can be said to touch? Unsatisfactory as 
thi- explanation certainly is, it may yet be so used as to dis- 
concert Mr. Spencer. If the contact cannot be conceived as 
continuous, but must be conceived as instantaneous, as in fact it 
is, we conceive an essential breach of continuity, — something as 
having widely contrasted states in contiguous points of time. 
Mr. Spencer dare not admit that change from the state of ab- 
solute separation to the state of absolute union is thinkable as 
an entirely gradual change, because he would thereby deny the 
sity of imagining an immediate imparting of motion. 
On the other hand, if he would maintain that gradual touch- 
ing is inconceivable, he is bound to establish such proposition; 
and this can be done only by pointing out that we cannot avoid 
conceiving the change from no contact to some contact as in- 
stantaneous. 

After it has been granted that change from separation to 
slightest contact cannot be conceived except as being suddenly 
ended by the production of some contact, we are prepared to 
bring forward stronger instances of like implication — instances 
which manifest mosl clearly that it i< not "inconceivable that 
in passing from any one degree of magnitude to any other, all 
intermediate degrees musl be passed through." Between no 
contact of cubes and contact extending throughout their adja- 
cent side-, many quantities of contact might intervene; a- it' 

they should be brought precisely face to lace by touching the 

Corner of the one t<> the corner of the other and gradually 

bringing them more and more together, by sliding the first 
upon the second. Mr. Spencer would not hesitate to allow that 
by clashing them together we could produce the greatest quan- 



54 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 

tity of contact at a point in time, and without producing a 
plurality of degrees. And again: consider that the objects 
are of different sizes; that the smaller is a unit, and the larger 
an aggregate of matter; and that when they come together they 
will form a larger aggregate. Evidently, if they can be con- 
ceived to unite, as the portions of time in which their different 
relations severally endure unite, the aggregate may be con- 
ceived as passing from one magnitude to another many degrees 
greater without ever having any of the magnitudes that poten- 
tially lie between. 

In all the instances given, we have seen our ability to con- 
ceive what Mr. Spencer said we could not conceive. Is it so 
in the case in question? Introspection discloses that it is. 
Nothing is more definitely representable than motion as in- 
stantly lost and instantly acquired. No one ever doubted the 
fact except those who, like Mr. Spencer, looking at it in the 
abstract, thought it implied an exception to a rule which they 
deemed invariable. By comparison with the concrete, the ab- 
straction has been corrected. The difficulty of conceiving an in- 
stantaneous transition from one state to another, so unlike that 
we symbolically picture them as in the distance, has been shown 
not to be universal. While this is so, there has been no denial 
that the difficulty is very general. No such denial was neces- 
sary. Mr. Spencer has been completely answered, if it now 
appears that velocity can be thought to be acquired and lost, 
as a man may acquire a dollar or lose his hat — all at once. 

Supposing himself successful in exposing the self-contra- 
diction of other conceptions of Matter, Mr. Spencer takes in 
hand that of Boscovich ; which is, " that the constituents of 
Matter are centres of force — points without dimensions, which 
attract and repel each other in suchwise as to be kept at specific 
distances apart." Over this absurdity, Mr. Spencer gains a 
speedy victory ; but one not as extensive as he seems to think it. 
"A disciple of Boscovich," he argues, "may reply that his 
master's theory is involved in that of Newton; and cannot in- 
deed be escaped. ' What/ he may ask, ' is it that holds together 
the parts of these ultimate atoms V 'A cohesive force/ his 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 55 

opponent must answer. 'And what/ he may continue, 'is it 
that holds together the parts of any fragments into which, by 
sufficient force, an ultimate atom might be broken V Again 
the answer must be — a cohesive force. 'And what/ he may 
still ask, i if the ultimate atom were, as we can imagine it to 
be, reduced to parts as small in proportion to it, as it is in pro- 
portion to a tangible mass of matter — what must give each 
part the ability to sustain itself, and to occupy space 'V Still 
there is no answer but — a cohesive force. Carry the process 
in thought as far as we may, * * * and we can find no limit 
until we arrive at the conception of centres of force without 
any extension." (First Prim, § 16.) 

To the acceptance of centres of force without any exten- 
sion, there is, for those who follow Xewton, an alternative; 
namely, to accept an infinite series. If a cohesive force sus- 
tains an atom, there is no reason for not saying that it sustains 
half an atom, quarter of an atom, any part of an atom, though 
we divide forever. 

§ 19. After Matter, Motion is put upon the rack. ('First 
Prim, § 17.) 

"Here, for instance," says the author, "is a ship which, for 
simplicity's sake, we will suppose to be anchored at the equator 
with her head to the AVest. AVhen the captain walks from 
stem to stern, in what direction does he move? East is the 
obvious answer — an answer which for the moment may pass 
without criticism. But now the anchor is heaved, and the vessel 
sails to the West with a velocity equal to that at which the 
captain walks. In what direction does he UOW move when he 

■Min stem to .-tern? Von cannot say East, for the vessel 
is carrying him as fast toward- the WeBi a- he walks to the 
East; and you cannot say West for the converse reason. In 
respect t<> surrounding space he is stationary; though to all on 

board the -hip he seem- to he moving. But now are we quite 

sure of this conclusion? — Is he really stationary?" The 
author answers this question by showing us that we have n<»t 

allowed lor the earth's rotary and orbital motions, or for the 



1)6 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 

motion of the whole solar system, or for the possible motion of 
our whole sidereal system ; and that when we do this we must 
confess that " that which seems moving proves to be stationary ; 
that which seems stationary proves to be moving; while that 
which we conclude to be going rapidly in one direction, turns 
out to be going much more rapidly in the opposite direction." 

We have, in the above example, a very good specimen of 
false inference from partial premises. The captain is first per- 
ceived to move with respect to the ship, and secondly perceived 
not to move with respect to the water. To the untaught child 
he would be thought motionless in respect to space. How do 
we know that he is not motionless? Not by finding that there 
is something in the perception which vitiates it; not by being 
led by the perception into conceptions which prove self-destruc- 
tive ; but by considering that the earth is moving variously, and 
that the captain is moving with it. The error of the child, then, 
arises from a mere mistake of fact. Explain the mistake, and 
the child will follow you in thought until you reach a combina- 
tion of facts too complicated for its faculties. At some point it 
would, of course, stop bewildered; and so would Mr. Spencer, 
if he should attempt to follow out, in all their complications, 
the phenomena of evolution. Now, if nothing has been shown 
to prevent our conceiving Motion, except its complications and 
our ignorance of what they are, it does not yet appear that we 
may not form of Motion, as we do of other facts, a conception 
always corresponding with what might be, and always coming 
more and more into correspondence with what is. It is probably 
owing to a sense of the inefficiency of the argument before us 
that it was supplemented by the following. 

" We take for granted that there are fixed points in space 
with respect to which all motions are absolute ; and we find it 
impossible to rid ourselves of this idea. Nevertheless, absolute 
motion cannot even be imagined, much less known. Motion 
as taking place apart from those limitations of space which we 
habitually associate with it is totally unthinkable. For motion 
is change of place; but in unlimited space, change of place is 
inconceivable, because place itself is inconceivable. Place can 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 57 

be conceived only by reference to other places; and in the 
absence of objects dispersed through space, a place could be 
conceived only in relation to the limits of space; whence it 
follows that in unlimited space, place cannot be conceived — all 
places must be equidistant from boundaries that do not exist." 
Try the experiment of imagining a body moving from point 
to point in space. You do not meet the least suggestion of a 
difficulty. Tin's is, as far as it goes, good evidence, and raises 
a favorable presumption. Moreover you have not contemplated 
Motion as a change of relation with respect to the limits of 
space, but with respect to points. Were it not so, however, 
you would not be involved in perplexities; for the limitations 
which we habitually associate with extensive Motion are them- 
selves real. They are nothing but the outskirts of that district 
of space which for the moment chiefly engages the mind. The 
district is an actuality, and so are its confines. The latter, it is 
true, appear to recede, when the mind, with a fresh impulse, 
seeks to pierce with its vision a region still more remote; but 
observation shows that the limits to the first region fade 
out of contemplation as those of the second become distinct. 
They are not thought of as going out of existence, or as chang- 
ing place. You know, then, of some realities which, in the 
absence of matter, would enable you to conceive place. Had 
tli'-'' escaped you, you would still have been able to find others 
which would do as well; for instance, the spacial point of view 
we occupy. Nothing illusive has so far appeared in the habit- 
ual conception of Motion. But Mr. Spencer would say that 
tin- concept ion is not of absolute Motion, because nothing 
u fixed" can be pointed out. Think, if you can, of anything 
appertaining to void space that is not fixed. Think of a point 
moving, of a line shifting it- direction, of a spherical portion 
of space flying through an Infinite vacuum, and revolving as 
it goes. Here is an object, and here the place it occupies. 
Think of the objed Leaving it- place. Now think of the 
place leaving the object Von at once perceive a difference, 
The place i- immovable. The relations which it bears to other 
place- are necessary and eternal. We do not seem to he 



58 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 

deprived of the means of location. Everything within the 
universe may be located by reference to any point, line, figure, 
place, or object holding place. We may start with any one of 
these; knowing that in relation to it every object has absolute 
situation, and all motion is absolute. 

"Another insuperable difficulty," our author continues, "pre- 
sents itself when we contemplate the transfer of Motion. • • • 
In what respect does a body after impact differ from itself before 
impact? What is this added to it which does not sensibly 
affect any of its properties and yet enables it to traverse space? 
Here is an object at rest and here is the same object moving. 
In one state it has no tendency to change its place; but in the 
other it is obliged at each instant to assume a new position. 
What is it which will forever go on producing this effect with- 
out being exhausted? and how does it dwell in the object? The 
motion, you say, has been communicated. But how? — What 
has been communicated? The striking body has not trans- 
ferred a thing to the body struck ; and it is equally out of the 
question to say that it has transferred an attribute. What then 
has it transferred?" 

I will suggest what seems to me to be the explanation of the 
phenomenon. A boy wields a bat, and striking a ball sends it 
flying through the air. What has taken place? The activity 
called willing has set free and given direction to certain nervous 
energies, which in turn have produced a co-ordination of muscu- 
lar movements. By these movements, the bat was impelled and 
the ball struck. It being impossible for the ball to share with 
the bat any portion of the space it occupied, it was under the 
necessity of stopping the bat or being pushed along by it. 
Both effects were in a measure produced. But lo ! in a moment 
more the ball left the bat and flew onward. While we per- 
ceived an urging we did not marvel ; but when this ceased to 
be perceived the mystery began. The solution, like the problem 
itself, is not given in perception. It is the answer to the 
query — what took place that was not perceived? As usual, 
no account has yet been taken of the atmospheric or ethereal 
mediums. May not the initial moving of the ball have given 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 59 

direction to and increased their activities, thus inducing a con- 
tinuance of the propulsion which the bat began? May not 
the ball, also, have been given an internal activity, which, by 
acting upon surrounding mediums, promotes motion? There 
is no other conceivable hypothesis; which is the best reason 
that could be had for accepting either one or both of these. 
In respect to details we are liable to err, but concerning the 
abstract proposition there can be no mistake. Motion, in the 
absence of propulsion is unthinkable. Propulsion must con- 
sist in the action of the object on something in contact with it, 
or in the action of the latter upon the object, or in both; and 
this is the essence of our conclusion. In its most abstract form 
it is as readily realized as was that concerning the mental, ner- 
vous, and muscular antecedents of the ball's motion. What- 
ever is said to render it more definite, must be understood to 
be advanced as a provisional elaboration. 

According to a law which seems to be exemplified by all 
orders of phenomena, anything affected by motion — as an ob- 
ject made to move and a medium around about it — would tend 
to acquire the combination of state and activity most consistent 
with the affecting motion; and this would be a combination 
eventually promotive of such motion. This proposition, like 
the other, is not to be prejudiced by what follows it. AV r ith 
this caution, we shall leave the more for the less abstract, the 
general lor the particular. 

Little sua is known of the action of air and the ethereal sub- 
stance under an influence which, in the important particular, 
transcends observation, and novel as is the thought of them 
;i- continuers of motion, no violence is done to the current un- 
derstanding of their nature by imagining tlieni as in the act of 
urging forward an object enveloped in them. The object can- 
not be made to move without causing much that is before it to 
move in the same direction, and much also to be dissipated 
laterally. Thus, by opening a path, is resistance Lessened. The 
lessening of resistance obviously affects the ease with which the 
motion of the object may he continued after the initiatory im- 
pulse. Now consider what musi simultaneously take place in 



60 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 

the rear. A space must be vacated by the object, and as 
quickly filled by an in-rushing from all directions except that 
of the object. To the confluence of forces so formed there is 
no outlet except in the direction of the object; consequently this 
direction they take, impelling the object forward. Thus far 
the explanation postulates no other external activity than that 
derived from propulsion of the object itself; for the filling iu 
behind might be attributed to the forcing out from the path be- 
fore — to alternative compression here and expansion there. 
Important agencies there are, however, which, existing inde- 
pendent of the object's motion, powerfully aid in its prolongation. 
One of these is gravity. Supposing a vacuum to be formed, 
gravity would cause it to be filled to overflowing. The momen- 
tum acquired by an in-rushing medium would be expended in 
the direction in which resistance is already overcome. Other 
activities besides those of gravity would be similarly diverted 
in the same direction. Minute perturbations of the atmos- 
phere or of the less stable substance which is supposed to per- 
vade it — and there must be many of them besides heat and 
light — would, taking the line of least resistance, ultimately 
make their contribution too. It needs but a statement to carry 
conviction that such a concatenation of activities as that de- 
scribed must, when once established, repeat itself until by 
resistance overcome. Internal activities we cannot so 

exhaustively conceive. In the case of a ball, we may imagine 
a compression, caused by resistance on one side and propulsion 
on the other, alternated by an expansion which inclines from the 
propulsive toward the less powerful resistant force. The action 
of compression and expansion may be realized by pressing an 
elastic ball down upon the floor and then gradually taking the 
hand away. This shows how expansion in the line of least 
resistance may change the relation of an object to space. In 
the case of an arrow we may superadd the notion of a shiver 
or of a lateral expansion running from end to end, or of such 
undulations as an eel makes in moving through the water. In 
the case of a clot of mud, on the contrary, we cannot go far 
towards imagining any internal activities whatever. Examples, 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 61 

however, we have which enable us to conceive very definitely 
how an object may aid in propelling itself. 

Is not the explanation arrived at more in harmony with ob- 
servation than that which is universally accepted? Xo answer 
can be based on the supposition that an object once started in an 
infinity of unoccupied space would journey on alone forever. 
Bach a fact has never been, and can never be, observed ; and 
Mr. Spencer's argument rests on its inconceivability. It is 
pleasing to have such good authority for the proposition that 
we are unable to realize that there can be something dwelling 
in an object, which, in the absence of anything else, impels it 
onward; since if there is no such entity or property our con- 
clusion is necessitated. Mr. Spencer's last resort appears to be 
the paradox, that, although nothing can be imagined as continu- 
ing motion in vacuo, nothing can be imagined as bringing it to 
an end. The problem at once disappears when it is observed, 
that motion of matter, not in contact with other matter, cannot 
be thought of as beginning; and that therefore questions in re- 
gard to its termination are idle. Should we suppose an object 
to be poshed into a region of space absolutely void, we could 
not suppose it to break contact with that which pushes it, upon* 
the stoppage of the latter. If it be asked what there is to 
hinder it from going on, the answer is, — nothing but the want 
of something to make it move. It could not acquire an inher- 
ent tendency to move under such conditions, and would there- 
fore be -topped by the withdrawal of external influence, inde- 
pendent of any inherent tendency to come to rest. 

With renewed confidence, we may proceed with the comparison 
of fad and theory from which we have digressed. It is an 
observed law of Motion that, other conditions being the same, 
the greater the extent of surface which an object in motion 
presents in the direction of resistance, the sooner it will be 

brought to rest. One might think that, as the same amount of 

surface must be presented in the direction of the propulsive 
force, an exact compensation would be made. This would be 
approximately true in respect to the Less stable medium, but 
far from true in respect to the more stable medium, The 



62 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 

larger the surfaces in question, and the faster the rate of speed, 
the more resistance the atmosphere would oppose in front, and, 
after reaching a certain maximum, the less assistance it would 
afford behind. Where the speed is great, its action may be 
compared to that of water stoutly resisting and slowly filling 
in behind a moving oar. Of the ethereal fluid the same is 
doubtless true, only in a different degree; that is, its maximum 
of propulsion is greater. 

That a heavy object is, other things being equal, more diffi- 
cult to stop than a light one, is a rule which, though possibly 
not without exception, must not be ignored. The prevalent 
notion of inertia will not explain it. No one can answer why, 
on the old hypothesis, there should be found a stronger tend- 
ency to continue motion in a heavy object than in a light one. 
To think that that which has the most power to refrain from 
motion must have the most power to resist stoppage, is but to 
formulate the reverse of an explanation ; for that which at first 
chiefly hinders the object's motion — gravity — continues all 
along to act. Inertia is an internal passive proclivity. Why 
should a moving object have a greater internal passive pro- 
clivity to fly onwards whenever there exists a greater external 
tendency to bring it to rest? Why should the surplus of tend- 
ency to move, over resistance to motion, be small where the 
resistance is small, and great where the resistance is great? 
What is this secret, inactive, yet acting, perversity? Is an in- 
ternal, passive proclivity to act, is inertia even thinkable? Any 
conceivable explanation would be preferable to the old one. It 
may be to offer but a vague solution, but it is certainly to offer 
what is, to some extent, a solution, to say that a body's suscep- 
tibility to aerial and ethereal impulses must depend, in a great 
degree, upon its internal structure — for instance, upon its den- 
sity. And it will as surely carry this solution further to remark 
that a body's ability to promote its own motion must depend 
largely upon the same condition — for example, upon vibratory 
peculiarities. In the last remark we have an explanation of 
what the inherent tendency, which we find it almost impossible 
to banish from our thoughts, really is. 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 63 

The next question is, — Why is a moving object more diffi- 
cult to stop in proportion as its speed is great? We totally 
fail to comprehend how a stronger inactive tendency to change 
place can be stored up inside an object by starting it rapidly, 
than by starting it slowly; but we are far from being unable 
to realize how, by starting motion with a more rapid impulse, a 
greater quantity of both external and internal activity is in- 
duced to act in a given time. 

On the theory of Motion here advanced, some would expect 
to feel a rush of air and ether following every moving object. 
They must be reminded that the older theory involves the same 
filling-in, and with about the same force and rapidity. Con- 
cerning its imperceptibility, the same explanation must be 
given, whichever theory we adopt. In the first place, the phe- 
nomenon is frequently noticeable; and in the second place, it is 
more often too slow or too inextensive to be perceived. 

Experience and theory seem in perfect harmony; and if so, 
our conclusion is unassailable. 

One more puzzle connected with motion confronts us. We 
cannot, Mr. Spencer assures us, represent the transition from 
resl to motion, and from motion to rest. 

"Truly to represent these transitions in thought, we find im- 
possihle. For a breach of the law of continuity seems neces- 
sarily involved ; and yet no breach of it is conceivable. A body 
traveling at a given velocity cannot be brought to a state of 
rest, or no velocity, without passing through all intermediate 
velocities. At first sight, nothing seems easier than to imagine 
it doing this. It is quite possible t<> think of its .Motion as 
diminishing insensibly until it becomes infinitesmal; and many 
will think equally possible to pass in thought from [nfinitesmal 

motion to no motion. lint this is an error. Mentally follow 

out the decreasing velocity as long a- yon please, and there still 
remain- some velocity. Halve and again halve the rate of 
movement forever, yet movement still exists. • • ■ 

Whoever admit-, as Mr Spencer has, the possibility of con- 
ceiving a loss of the first half of the velocity, can allege no 
obstacle to conceiving a loss of the second. If in the one case 



64 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 

the alternative is between passing in thought over an infinite 
series and thinking of the sudden loss of a quantity of motion, 
so is it in the other. Waiving this tacit admission, 

there are grounds for believing either alternative conceivable. 
Some pages back it was shown that to the rule, that in passing 
from one degree of magnitude to another all intermediate de- 
grees must be passed through, there are exceptions, and that 
the transition between velocities is of their number. That an 
infinite number of degrees potentially lie between some velocity 
and no velocity, and between any two velocities, must be 
granted by all who believe infinite divisibility thinkable; but 
that each must be actually passed through whenever there is a 
transition between states of which it is a conceivable mean, is 
as untrue as that three apples cannot at once be taken from a 
lot of five. The other alternative is likewise con- 

ceivable. The infinity, of which unlike velocities are the ex- 
tremes, is not an infinity in respect of extent but in respect of 
divisibility. Now it is the extent which the mind is supposed 
to glance over, and not the possible divisions thereof. An in- 
finitude of parts is indeed traversed, but without contemplation 
as such. In thought itself, however, there is a corresponding 
infinitude. Change from one mental state to another, if it be 
gradual, is infinitely divisible. So we find subjective infinity 
representative of objective infinity; and this is what Mr. 
Spencer thought could not be. 

§ 20. The conception of Force was the next to be assailed. 
(First Prin., § 18.) 

" On lifting a chair, the force exerted we regard as equal to 
that antagonistic force called the weight of the chair; and we 
cannot think of these as equal without thinking of them as like 
in kind; since equality is conceivable only between things that 
are connatural." "Yet, contrariwise, it is incredible that the 
force as existing in the chair really resembles the force as present 
to our minds." "So that it is absurd to think of Force as in 
itself like our sensation of it, and yet necessary so to think of 
it if we realize it in consciousness at all." 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 65 

To avoid the imputation of accepting a very questionable 
proposition, it mast be said that it is not the force known in 
consciousness that is thought to be equal to the force by which 
the chair is drawn downwards. The effort of volition nee 
to the lifting of the chair, probably acts by directing into cer- 
tain channels forces that are not present in consciousness. But 
after this correction has been made, the fact remains that we 
are compelled to attribute to volitional and extra-yolitional force 
a certain likeness of nature. On this fact, howeyer, the refuta- 
tion may be made to rest. A resemblance of causes is inferred 
because there is observed a likeness of their effects. Such in- 
e Is legitimate. What matters it that one agency is an 
ingredient of consciousness and the other not? Their difference 
in -nine respects is not repugnant to their similarity in others. 
Mr.Spencer , s unexpressed major premise is, that things which are 
equal in any particular are like in all. lie would shrink from 
relying on this premise; and if he does not rely on it, his 
lusion fails. 

J j! it Mr. Spencer does not permit the preceding argument to 
go forth alone. The next is, that when we contemplate cither 
attraction between objects separaf&b! or the transmission of light 
and heat from the Sun to the Earth, "we are obliged to conclude 
that matter ■ ' ■ acts upon matter through absolutely vacant 
: and yet this conclusion is positively unthinkable." i tf 
con:-' it was impossible to justify such a position without dis- 
posing of the hypothesis of an intervening fluid. This is what 
s of it. " Remembering that this ether is imponderable, 
we are obliged to conclude that the ratio between the Interspaces 
of these atoms" (those of ether) "and the atom- themselves, 
is [ncommensurably greater than the like ratio in ponderable 
matter; else the densities could not be incommensurable. In- 
stead then of a direct action by the Sun upon the Earth with- 
out anything intervening, we have to conceive tie- Bun's action 
propagated through a medium whose molecules arc probably as 
small relatively to their interspaces as are the Sun and the 
Earth compared with the space between them : we have to con- 
ceive these infinitesmal molecule- acting on each other through 



66 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 

absolutely vacant spaces which are immense in comparison with 
their own dimensions/ 7 

Strange the thought that ethereal units are made to convey force 
by projecting them upon each other through the spaces interven- 
ing should have escaped one who was bound to show its incon- 
ceivability. What has been here neglected, let an admission 
supply. The real key to the problem is the fact that there is 
no necessity of concluding that the ethereal fluid is less dense 
than the hardest metal. If it is only sufficiently less coherent 
than other fluids, it will consist with all that we actually know 
about it. That it is imponderable proves nothing. A sub- 
stance which permeates all other substances is necessarily 
incapable of being weighed. But that it has no weight is a very 
different proposition, and one not admitting of the ordinary 
proof nor easy to believe. 

How delusive is our supposed knowledge of the nature of 
the force of gravitation, Mr. Spencer, in the next paragraph, 
proceeds to show. 

"That the gravitation of one particle of matter towards 
another, and towards all others, should be absolutely the same 
whether the intervening space is filled with matter or not, is 
incomprehensible. I lift from the ground, and continue to 
hold, a pound weight. Now, into the vacancy between it and 
the ground, is introduced a mass of matter of any kind what- 
ever, in any state whatever — hot or cold, liquid or solid, trans- 
parent or opaque, light or dense; and the gravitation of the 
weight is entirely unaffected. The whole Earth, as well as 
each individual of the infinity of particles composing the Earth, 
acts on the pound in absolutely the same way, whatever inter- 
venes, or if nothing intervenes. Through eight thousand miles 
of the Earth's substance, each molecule at the antipodes affects 
each molecule of the weight I hold, in utter indifference to the 
fullness or emptiness of the space between them. So that each 
portion of matter, in its dealings with remote portions, treats 
all intervening portions as though they did not exist; and yet, 
at the same time it recognizes their existence with scrupulous 
exactness in its direct dealings with them." 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 67 

If we dismiss, as manifestly gratuitous, the assertion that 
objects attract each other where nothing intervenes, our first 
defence may be a demurrer — a provisional admission of the 
facts alleged, coupled with a denial that they make out a 
case of essential incomprehensibility. The truth to be ascer- 
tained is, not what we know, but what we are capable of know- 
ing. It is lawful for us to admit that gravitation is, as yet, 
nothing to us but a fact, and to nevertheless believe that its 
cause will some time be known. The only way in which the 
facts asserted could be effectively used to deprive us of this 
belief is by showing every possible conception of the nature 
of gravity to be inconsistent with them. This has not been 
attempted. In the popular understanding of attraction, — in the 
thought of the exercise of force upon distant things independ- 
ent of anything intervening, — absurd as it is, there is nothing 
to imply that it should make any difference whether there be 
or be not a substance intervening, or whether an intervening 
substance be "hot or cold, liquid or solid, transparent or opaque, 
light or dense." Indeed consistency demands the contrary in- 
ference. The theory that a fluid which permeates everything 
else is the medium of attraction has also little to fear from Mr. 
Spencer's criticism. Such fluid could not be intercepted in its 
work of communication by grosser forms of matter. This 
theory may be elaborated into greater strength. If the ulti- 
mate form of all matter is the very fluid in question, then no 
difference what is inserted between two objects the Bpace be- 
tween them is filled, and solely (illed,by the medium of attrac- 
tion. I have in mind another theory which is similarly capable 
of defence; namely, that the intervening object, attracting and 
attracted by both objects which it intercepts, forms a Link in the 
chain of attraction equivalent to the one or one- supplanted by 
it. Many theories being consistent with them, we may con- 
clude that, granting Mr. Spencer's Tact-, bis case proves prima 

fade incomplete. 

Were it not so, we could still -how that he is estopped from 

siting the facte on which he relic-. For this purpose, the 
following is quoted. "Throughout the investigations Leading 



68 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 

the chemist to the conclusion that of the carbon which has dis- 
appeared during combustion, no portion has been lost, what is 
his repeatedly assigned proof? That afforded by the scales. 
In what terms is the verdict of the scales given? In grains 
— in units of weight — in units of gravitative force. And 
what is the total content of the verdict? That as many units of 
gravitative force as the carbon exhibited at first it exhibits still. 
The validity of the inference, then, depends entirely upon the 
constancy of the units of force. * ■ * Everything turns on the 
truth of the assumption that the gravitation of the weights is 
persistent, and of this no proof is assigned, or can be assigned.'''' 
(First Prin., § 61.) Without accepting this to its full extent, 
it is competent to say that the difficulties which are here held to 
preclude the demonstration that the weight of a body of matter 
is unchanged by combustion, will, as far as they are real, similarly 
prevent us from satisfying ourselves that the body's weight 
is unaffected by interposing heat, for instance, between it and 
the earth. In the latter case, moreover, there is the additional 
feature that the change of condition is likely to modify the 
scales and the weights. But dropping these considerations, 
there may, nay, there must be differences of weight, infinitely im- 
portant, which the finest scales, though unaffected by change of 
surroundings and used in combination with unchanging weights, 
cannot indicate. 

The allegations in question are refutable. It is not known 
that attraction between separated objects is the same "whatever 
intervenes, or if nothing intervenes." The latter condition is 
never, to our knowledge, fulfilled : something always intervenes. 
With this in view, we must conclude that what intervenes is a 
matter of great moment. Where much extent of matter inter- 
venes between objects, their attraction is small. It is therefore 
untrue "that each portion of matter in its dealings with remote 
portions, treats all intervening portions as though they did not 
exist." Exactly the reverse is true: portions of matter which 
arc near are dealt with to the partial exclusion of portions 
which are remote. And again: were Mr. Spencer 

right in saying that attraction is not affected by what intervenes 



THE INDUCTIVE ABGUMEN1 CONTINUED. 69 

between attracting objects, he would be compelled to deny that 
such attraction may be added to by substituting for the interven- 
ing matter, matter of greater density. Air at first intervening 
between the pound weight and the earth, their attraction 
towards each other should be increased by inserting between 
them a mass of solid metal. Undoubtedly Mr. Spencer 

would assent to both these corrections. He no doubt holds 
that the gravity of a pound weight is increased by inserting 
between it and the earth matter of greater density ; and would 
explain that the difference is too slight to be detected. On the 
other hand, it is equally probable he would concede that the 
gravity of the weight would be lessened by bringing between 
it and the earth matter of greater extent. To thus correct 
himself, however, would be to allow that attraction is af- 
fected by the character of that through which the line of 
attraction runs.* 

* Until the preceding had been electrotyped, I thought to reserve 
entire for future elaboration, but will here in part disclose, a theory of 
gravitation to which I have been led, or rather helped, by my theory 
Of motion above expounded. I regard that tendency to move which 
we call gravity, as well as the motion resulting from it and all other 
perceptible motion, as due (principally) to ethereal UfPUISES. The 
fact that substances are susceptible to the force of gravitation just in 
proportion as they are susceptible to a tendency to move imparted to 
them by other agencies, is what Led metosusped that one explanation 
might serve to account for the two phenomena, in the cae 
gravity, the theory is that the motion or tendency to move is due to 
Listing and continuous perturbations of the Inter-stellar medium, 
urging what it envelops and permeates towards centres of attraction, 
or repulsion, or, more properly, propulsion. Thai the lines of attraction 
converge, elucidates the increase of gravity towards the centres. Such 
lines may be straight or spiral Bodies doubtless take an active pari 

in their own gravitation, as they do in other motion ; which is « pari 

of tin- explanation of why gravitation is increased by gravitating. 
Constituted subject to the influence of gravity, perhaps constituted 
mainly by it, nil bodies must be of nature consistent u Ith, and suscep- 
tible to its tendencies. Probably those eptible to it pass its 
Influence most readily on: if bo .Mr. Spencer's attack and my d< 

stand much B6 they Stood before; for then the chain of attraction mUSl 

be strongest u here its links are most \\ eighty and compact 



70 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 



CHAPTEK V. 
The Inductive Argument Continued. 

Self-knowledge: Extent of Consciousness and Mental Substance. 

§ 21. Before proceeding, a short explanation must be inter- 
polated. Hitherto the contest has been over ideas of what we 
call the " External World." That upon which we are about to 
enter, will concern ideas of the Substance of Mind and the 
Intrinsic Nature of its modes. In other words, Mr. Spencer 
maintains that we can have no legitimate ideas of Mental 
Substance or even of the Noumenal Nature of states of conscious- 
ness; and it is a defence of ideas purporting to be such that is 
next to engage us. Mr. Spencer's object, it is hardly necessary 
to remind the reader, is to show States of Mind to be partly, 
and Substance of Mind wholly, unknowable — components of 
"The Unknowable." 

His method, it must be observed, is not as thorough as was 
that employed to prove the External World unknowable; for, 
whereas he aimed to dispose of every possible idea of it, he 
has not sought to experiment with more than a partial concep- 
tion of the Real Nature of conscious states, or with more than 
a partial conception of the underlying Substance. Almost all 
thoughts of the Intrinsic Nature of the Mental World are left 
in oblivion, and therefore in integrity. The reader will observe 
how few are noticed. 

§ 22. What has Mr. Spencer to say ( First Prim, § 19) about 
the unthinkableness of the Intrinsic Nature of mental affections? 
Notwithstanding that the inconceivability of an infinite series 
prevents us from thinking of the chain of consciousness as in- 
finite, he argues, we are as conclusively prevented from thinking 
it finite. " Go back in memory as far as we may, we are wholly 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 71 

unable to identify our first states of consciousness: the per- 
spective of our thoughts vanishes in a dim obscurity where we 
can make out nothing. Similarly at the other extreme. We 
have do immediate knowledge of a termination to the series at 
a future time; and we cannot really lay hold of that temporary 
termination of the series reached at the present moment. For 
the state of consciousness recognized by us as our last, is not 
truly our last. That any mental affection may be contemplated 
as one of the series, it must be remembered — represented in 
thought, not presented. The truly last state of consciousness 
is that which is passing in the very act of contemplating a state 
just passed — that in which we are thinking of the one before 
the last. So that the proximate end of the chain eludes 
us as well as the remote end." 

\ - Mr. Spencer has not attempted to show that a first state 
of consciousness is unthinkable, and as we have seen that in- 
finite continuance is thinkable, we might, in the face of his 
argument, take the position that consciousness had a beginning 
but will have no end. To those who choose to do this, it will 
not matter whether a last state is or is not conceivable. Or 
we might assert that a last state will occur without beino; con- 
templated, just as he maintains that a state, temporarily the last, 
occur- without being contemplated. But this supposition, that 
a state of consciousness occurs before it is perceived — that it 
cannot be contemplated until it is represented — is the central 
fallacy in the author's reasoning. There exists in the mind a 
conception of a series of feelings, while there arises a feeling to 
take its place as one of the Beries. Can it be denied thai rela- 
tions between present feeling and feelings present by represen- 
tation may establish themselves simultaneously with it- estab- 
lishment? As it cannot, we are convinced of* our ability to 

lay hold of the temporary termination of the series a- com- 
pletely as we should expect to lav hold of a point in continuous 

change. Having this power, we can a- easily conceive a future 
termination as we can a past beginning, There remain- no 
assigned reason why we cannot conceive a future termination, 
after dispelling tin- delusion that a mental affection and its 



72 THE INDUCTIVE AKGUMENT CONTINUED. 

recognition cannot co-exist; for this delusion is all that gives 
the following extension of the argument the air of plausibility. 

" i But/ it may be said, i though we cannot directly know 
consciousness to be finite in duration, because neither of its 
limits can be actually reached; yet we can very well conceive it 
to be so. ? No : not even this is true. In the first place, we 
cannot conceive the terminations of that consciousness which 
alone we really know — our own — any more than we can per- 
ceive its terminations. For in truth the two acts are here one. 
In either case such terminations must be, as above said, not 
presented in thought, but represented ; and they must be repre- 
sented as in the act of occurring. Now to represent the termi- 
nation of consciousness as occurring in ourselves, is to think of 
ourselves as contemplating the cessation of the last state of con- 
sciousness; and this implies a supposed continuance of con- 
sciousness after its last state, which is absurd. In the second 
place, if we regard the matter objectively — if we study the 
phenomena as occurring in others, or in the abstract, we are 
equally foiled. Consciousness implies perpetual change and 
the perpetual establishment of relations between its successive 
phases. To be known at all, any mental affection must be 
known as such or such — as like these foregoing ones or unlike 
those: if it is not thought of in connection with others — not 
distinguished or identified by comparison with others, it is not 
recognized — is not a state of consciousness at all. A last state 
of consciousness, then, like any other, can exist only through a 
perception of its relations to previous states. But such per- 
ception of its relations must constitute a state later than the 
last, which is a contradiction." 

They who hold that a state of consciousness cannot be per- 
ceived while it exists, must face this difficulty. It is theirs ex- 
clusively. They may, if they prefer, avoid it by embracing 
the belief that consciousness is unending, or that a last state 
may occur unperceived. But they are recommended to the 
doctrine that the perception of a state of consciousness is not 
subsequent to, but contemporaneous with, the state perceived. 
It is m I easy to discover how any can object to this view, 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 73 

seeing that to have consciousness and to know that we have it 
form not distinct acts, but one indivisible aet. 

The supposed difficulty is put in still another form. " If 
ceaseless change of state is the condition on which alone con- 
sciousness exists, then when the supposed last state has been 
reached by the completion of the preceding change, change has 
ceased; therefore consciousness has ceased; therefore the sup- 
posed last state is not a state of consciousness at all; there- 
fore there can be no last state of consciousness." 

Either of two replies may be made, accordingly as the person 
replying holds one or the other of two alternative positions. If 
he thinks that consciousness follows after change in Mental 
Substance, he can say consistently that consciousness may exist 
after such change has ceased. If, on the other hand, he thinks 
that consciousness consists in, and is simultaneous with, chance 
of substance, he need only suggest that when the last change 
is completed, the last state is completed and at an end. Neither 
opinion obliges the holder to think of consciousness as persisting 
after the termination of its conditions. 

§ 2-*]. Confident of having demonstrated that any notion of 
the extent of consciousness is essentially incongruous, Mr. 
Spencer next ostensibly takes in hand the notion of Mental 
••Nor do we meet," he says, "with any greater 
success when, instead of the extent of consciousness, we eon- 
• its substance." According to his usual practice, he devotes 
a paragraph to showing that, "belief in the reality of self, is, 
indeed, a belief which no hypothesis enables us to escape/' and 
and then concludes with the following argument. 

"But now, unavoidable as is this belief — established though 
it is not only by the assent of mankind at large, endorsed by 
divers philosophers, but by the suicide of the Boeptical argu- 
ment — it is vet a belief admitting of no justification by reason: 
nay, indeed, it is a belief which reason, when pressed for a 
distinct answer, rejects. ■ ■ ■ The fundamental condition to all 
consciousness, emphatically insisted upon by Mr. Mansel in com- 
mon with Sir William Hamilton and others, is the antithi sisof 



74 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONTINUED. 

subject and object. And on this ' primitive dualism of conscious- 
ness/ ( from which the explanations of philosophy must take their 
start/ Mr. Mansel founds his refutation of the German abso- 
lutists. But now, what is the corollary from this doctrine, as 
bearing on the consciousness of self? The mental act in which 
self is known implies, like every other mental act, a perceiving 
subject and a perceived object. If, then, the object perceived 
is self, what is the subject that perceives? or if it is the true 
self which thinks, what other self can it be that is thought of? 
Clearly a true cognition of self implies a state in which the 
knowing and the known are one — in which subject and object 
are identified; and this Mr. Mansel rightly holds to be the 
annihilation of both." 

A mistaken application of the foregoing argument has re- 
sulted from the confounding of self with the Substance of Mind. 
This substance is truly a part of self; but it is not all of self; 
nor is it that part in regard to which the difficulty arises. It 
is inferred from the fact of consciousness. Only that part of 
self which is immediately known in what is called " self-con- 
sciousness" is involved in the perplexity. The question is, how 
can this present at once the contrast between the subject and 
object of cognition? Obviously it is not sufficient to say that 
in self-consciousness we contemplate two sides of the same 
fact; for, in this case, the subject and object present absolutely 
the same appearance. The mind, looking upon itself, sees but one 
thing — the mind thus looking upon itself. One other propo- 
sition is available; namely, that what is known in self-con- 
sciousness is the same thing under two sets of relations; and 
this is the theory which analysis justifies. In the first place, 
self is classed with other objects of thought. It is perceived 
to differ with them in other respects, but to resemble them in 
being an object. In the second place, self as knowing self is 
classed with, although at the same time, distinguished from, 
self as knowing other objects. By the process postulated, the 
same aggregate of consciousness is made to present at once the 
contrast between the subject aud the object of thought. 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 75 



CHAPTER VI. 

The Inductive Argument Concluded. 

Transfigured Realism Confronted by the Problems of Realism. 

§ 24. The preceding three chapters were confined to a con- 
futation of certain reasons given by Mr. Spencer for "having 
repudiated as impossible the Philosophy which professes to 
formulate Being as distinguished from Appearance." (First 
Prim, § 35.) In the present one it is to be shown that these 
reasons, if adequate for the purpose to which they were directed, 
are similarly adequate to prove impossible a Philosophy which 
professes to formulate Appearances. Upon a theory of the 
function of Philosophy, which none can gainsay, and which 
Mr. Spencer asserts, I ground the charge. " Besides," he says 
( First Prim, § 41 ), "seeing that the unified knowledge consti- 
fcuting a completed Philosophy, is a knowledge composed of parts 
that are universally congruous; and besides seeing that it is the 
business of Philosophy to establish their universal congruiiy; 
we also see that every act of the process by which this universal 
congruity is to be established, down even to the components of 
every inference and every observation, consists in the establish- 
ment of cnnLiTiiity." Could there be a complete congruity 
among phenomena while Mr. Spencer's puzzles remain un- 
solved? To thi- question we shall now address ourselves. 

§ 2o. When we arc self-conscious, we arc conscious of noth- 
ing not phenomenal. If we are conscious of more, if we are 
conscious of the Substance of Mind, then must Philosophy 
take this "component of observation " in hand and find it a 
place in the universal congruity. Bui Mr. Spencer is ool one 
who will assert that Mental Substance is immediately known 
in self-consciousness, [nhis "Principles of Psychology" (§59) 



76 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 

he employs several arguments to confirm the contrary. How, 
then, could he excuse the philosophy, which is to establish 
congruity among phenomena, from showing the congruity 
among the phenomena composing self-consciousness? Not, 
certainly, by distinguishing between the apparent and intrinsic 
natures of mental affections, and saying that the latter are the 
authors of the difficulty: if they are, they are given in con- 
sciousness, and therefore necessitate a philosophy of more than 
appearances; or they are not given in consciousness, and from 
this we know that there is no incongruity in self-consciousness. 
Accepting this latter conclusion, would be equivalent to admit- 
ting the entire congruity of a state of consciousness, in which 
subject and object are completely identified. By refusing to 
make this admission, he would assert an incompatibility of ap- 
pearances. Escape would be possible if the doctrine that there 
can be no identification of subject and object were peculiar to 
Ontology. That Ontology, as we have seen, is in a position to 
reject such a doctrine, is scarcely less to be doubted than that 
the prevailing Phenomenal Philosophy accepts it. Mr. Spen- 
cer would no more affirm that the same phenomena can be at 
once the subject and object of cognition, than he would deny 
that in the act of self-consciousness they seem to be the same. 
He must therefore acknowledge the paradox to be, until ex- 
plained away, an obstacle to the establishment of phenomenal 
congruity. 

The stumbling-block, which he has placed in the path of 
those who search for an understanding of Mental Substance, 
constantly rises in his own path as an impassable barrier. 

Having seen that a mental state aware of itself is a mystery 
similar to a mental substance aware of itself, we are prepared 
to appreciate the remark, that there is an element in conscious- 
ness which Mr. Spencer will consent to call metaphorically the 
Substance of Mind. Meaning this, he will allow (Prin. of 
Psy., § 58) that "we do know something about the substance 
of Mind, and may eventually know more." This element is 
the primordial element of consciousness — the unit of feeling, 
whose various combinations constitute those states of mind 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 77 

which to introspection seem indecomposable. He is desirous of 
showing that the ultimate unit of phenomena is a feeling akin 
to a nervous shock. "It is possible, then — " he says (Prin. 
Psy., § 60), "may we not even say probable — that something 
of the same order as that which we call a nervous shock is the 
ultimate unit of consciousness; and that all the unlikenesses 
among our feelings result from unlike modes of integration of 
this ultimate unit." Undoubtedly; but if so, we have a 
mental substance which is more closely involved than any other 
is supposed to be with the perplexities of self-consciousness. 
Mr. Spencer is as much under necessity of explaining self-con- 
sciousness as they who assert that we can be conscious. of the 
noumenal Substance of Mind. He is far more under such 
necessity than one who deals with this Mental Substance as 
lying wholly out of consciousness. 

In a very different instance, we shall find Mr. Spencer con- 
fronted by the problem of self-consciousness. The hypothesis 
that like units of feeling, differently combined, form a phe- 
nomenal substratum of states of consciousness, is supported 
(Prin. of Psy., § 60) by pointing out "the complete congruity 
between this view and the known character of nerve action." 
Be explains that "if each wave of molecular motion brought 
by a nerve fibre to a nerve-centre, has for its correlative a shock 
or pulse of feeling; then we can comprehend how distinguish- 
able differences of feeling may arise from differences in the 
rati- of recurrence of* the waves, and we can frame a general 

idea of the way in which, by the arrival through other fibres, 
of waves recurring al other rates, compound wave- of molec- 
ular motion may he formed, and give rise to units of compound 
feelings: which process of compounding of waves and produc- 
tion of correspondingly-compounded feelings, we may imagine 
to be carried on without limit, and to produce any amount <.i* 
heterogeneity of feelings." Of course Mr. Spencer is careful 
to explain thai he baa not been guilty of here striving 
to comprehend the ooumena] something which underlies 
mind — that Qerve-substanoe and nerve-action are nothing but 
phenomena. For present purposes, the camion is immaterial. 



78 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 

save as it tends to modify our language. It merely tells of two 
substrata under consciousness, instead of one. In the above 
example, as in multitudes that might have been chosen, Mr. 
Spencer is found endeavoring to explain the phenomena of 
mind through the phenomena of matter. What is noteworthy 
is that he attempts this, leaving self-cognition unexplained. 
His objective elucidation of consciousness can never, he is com- 
pelled to admit, explain self-consciousness. He is therefore in 
a position analogous to that of one who, being unable to offer 
an explanation of self-consciousness, yet holds the belief in a 
substance of mind which does much to render consciousness 
in general comprehensible. The incompleteness of the one 
explanation is equivalent to the incompleteness of the other. 

Let us turn, from what may be thought more or less adven- 
titious, back to essentials of Mr. Spencer's philosophy. Phe- 
nomena distinguished as external are no less real than phenomena 
distinguished as internal. Moreover, the phenomenon of the 
externality of the former is no more readily suppressed than 
the phenomenon of the internality of the latter. Mr. Spencer 
speaks (Prin. of Psy., § 62) of the "distinction of Subject and 
Object" as "the consciousness of a difference transcending all 
other differences." Now, if Philosophy can neither banish 
from its realm external manifestations, nor resolve them into 
internal manifestations, by banishing so much of them as 
characterizes them external, she must entertain the question — 
Can internal manifestations be resolved into external manifes- 
tations? Having shown our warrant for propounding this 
question, we are entitled to an answer. Whether it be "yes" 
or "no," we need not accept it unless it be justified. In either 
case, the justification must be that a comparison of internal and 
external phenomena was made, and that the answer given is 
authorized by the result. In either case, however, we can inter- 
pose the objection, that, as tliere can be no comparison between 
something inscrutable and something else, the conclusion that 
self-consciousness is, or the conclusion that it is not, identical 
with objective manifestations, can never be justified. Thus is 
Mr. Spencer's philosophy brought face to face with a question 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 79 

which it cannot answer. The charge is, the reader must ob- 
serve, not that there is a question to which his philosophy has 
not found an answer, but that any answer which can be found 
is, in its mouth, illegitimate. It will clarify our ideas somewhat 
to learn how Mr. Spencer actually deals with the question raised. 
"Let it be granted," he says ( Prin. of Psy., § 62), "that all 
existence distinguished as objective, may be resolved into the 
existence of units of one kind. Let it be granted that every 
species of objective activity, may be understood as due to the 
rhythmical motions of such ultimate units, and that among 
the objective activities so understood, are the waves of molecular 
motion propagated through nerves and nerve-centres. And let 
it further be granted that all existence distinguished as sub- 
jective, is resolvable into units of consciousness similar in nature 
to those which we know as nervous shocks; each of which is 
the correlative of a rhythmical motion of a material unit or 
group <>1" such unit-. Can we then think of the subjective and 
objective activities as the same? Can the oscillation of a 
molecule be represented in consciousness side by side with a 
nervous Bhock, and the two be recognized as one? No effort 
enables as to assimilate them. That a unit of feeling has noth- 
ing in common with a unit of motion, becomes more than ever 
manifest when we bring the two into juxtaposition.''' Mr. 
Spencer can hardly consider this a solution of the question. 
"When we recall the fact that molecules are never at rest, and 
that by carrying their individual rhythmical motions into the 
Compound molecule- formed of them, they produce compound 

rhythm- — when we recoiled the extreme complexity of the 
molecules of nervous matter, and imagine how various and in- 
volved must be the rhythms <>f which they are the seats — 
when, further, we infer the countless modifications <>f rhythms 
that must under Buch condition- become possible" ( Prin, of 
<;i i; we shall doubt whether Mi-. Spencer really made 
a serious endeavor to compare a unit of feeling with each dis- 
tinct phase of aeura] modes. WTien also we reflect that he is 

ever pointing out similarities between nerVOUS and mental phe- 
nomena; when we add to this that we have recently found him 



80 THE INDUCTIVE AEGUMENT CONCLUDED. 

giving a material explanation of mental heterogeneity, and 
think of his theory that all explanation is assimilation; we 
shall be inclined to doubt his complete acceptance of his own 
conclusion. If he had seriously attempted to make the com- 
parison, he would have discovered an obstacle of his own cre- 
ation. The feeling, called a nervous shock, involves self-con- 
sciousness. Concerning their relations to each other, two sup- 
positions may be made, either of which will answer our purpose. 
If we argue that, as to have a feeling and to know that we 
have it constitute but one feeling, the self-consciousness in which 
a unit of feeling is known, is that feeling or a considerable part 
of it, we assert a mental mode which cannot, if self-conscious- 
ness is beyond our grasp, be compared with material phenomena. 
If, on the contrary, we assert a distinction between a unit of 
feeling and the self-consciousness which accompanies it, we 
nevertheless allow a kind of consciousness similarly incapable 
of comparison. In fine: in whatever way we strive to reduce 
consciousness, subjectively considered, into its elements, there 
must always remain at least one element, of which Mr. Spencer 
can affirm neither materiality nor immateriality. 

After the answer that the phenomena of consciousness are 
not contained in the phenomena of matter, surprise must be 
called forth by the declaration that Mr. Spencer deals with 
mental phenomena as entirely included in those that are phys- 
ical. Yet the declaration must be made. Evolution, as Mr. 
Spencer sets it forth, purports to include every knowable activ- 
ity. What is Evolution ? Here is his definition. " Evolution 
is an integration of matter, and concomitant dissipation of 
motion) during which the matter passes from an indefinite, in- 
coherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and 
during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel trans- 
formation." (First Prin., § 145.) This process includes all 
phenomenal activity; includes the activity, consciousness; in- 
cludes the evolving of consciousness; includes the production 
and maintenance of every element in consciousness. Again is 
Mr. Spencer met by self-consciousness. Is this produced by, 
and does it consist in, the above-described activity of matter? 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 81 

is a question to which he, not being cognizant of self-conscious- 
ness, can give no answer. 

The collateral importance of some of the foregoing criticisms 
must not cause us to lose sight of the main issue. An impeach- 
ment, which had been brought against the Noumenal Philos- 
ophy, we have found it possible to reiterate in many ways 
against the Phenomenal Philosophy. Confining ourselves to 
internal phenomena, we observed that self-consciousness never- 
theless demanded explanation. From the same point of view, 
we saw Mr. Spencer occupying a position as objectionable, as 
far as self-consciousness is concerned, as that of those who assert 
consciousness of Mental Substance. Assuming next an objec- 
tive stand-point, we learned that Mr. Spencer's attempts to ex- 
plain mental affections through material manifestations were as 
much restricted by the difficulties of self-consciousness as is 
the attempt to accomplish the explanation by means of Mental 
Substance. Next it was shown that the question of identity or 
non-identity of subjective with certain objective phenomena 
was a question for the Phenomenal Philosophy; and that there 
are but two answers, neither of which, on Mr. Spencer's prin- 
ciple, it can advance. Lastly we find that Mr. Spencer has 
given both answers, but that he had no right to give either; the 
problem of self-consciousness not being, in his opinion, soluble. 

§ 26. The Extent of Consciousness will not require as much 
discussion as was given to Mental Substance. "Difficult as 
We find it distinctly to Separate and individualize them, it is 
nevertheless beyond question that our states of consciousness 
ocmr in succession." ( Kirst Prin., § 19.) Feeling justified by 
the deliverance of consciousness in making this statement, Mr. 
Spencer is obligated, if any one is, to ascertain whether the 
succession of* consciousness is of finite or infinite extent Here 
i- the fact that the phenomena of consciousness occur in HJ ,._ 
eeasion. Here is the belief, itself a phenomenon, that in the 
succession tli<T<- musl have been a state or no state which all 
others follow, and necessarily will be a state or no state which 
all others precede. And here are the imagined absurdities to 



82 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 

which any of these suppositions leads. How is Mr. Spencer to 
establish congruity? He is both powerless and unwilling to 
dispute the fact of succession. The belief in extremes or no 
extremes he has not ability to suppress. It may be called 
speculative, but still it will remain as a phenomenon which will 
persist in repugnance until reconciliation. Moreover it is a 
speculative difficulty which arises on the contemplation of phe- 
nomena solely, and has no necessary reference to their intrinsic 
nature. There remains no course but to establish congruity be- 
tween the fact and the belief. In doing this, Mr. Spencer will 
be met by the precise difficulties which he presented to us, and 
will be compelled to adopt precisely the same means of over- 
coming them. If he cannot believe the series infinite, he must 
believe it finite. He can have no experience of a beginning or 
a termination. Of a temporary termination he cannot be con- 
scious, as such, unless relations between states and the states 
themselves can exist together. When he tries to conceive a 
future ending of his own consciousness, he is confronted by the 
same difficulty : he must conceive an affection and perception 
of it as simultaneous, or the perception as intercepted and pre- 
vented from occurring. Upon consciousness presented objec- 
tively and in the abstract he cannot refuse to look. When we 
think of consciousness as depending for all its modes upon 
something out of consciousness, (though it be a The Unknow- 
able"), we view it objectively. When we think of conscious- 
ness as characterized by changes, and class these changes with 
other changes, we view it objectively. When we think of con- 
sciousness as always manifesting changes, without regard to 
any particular change, we view it in the abstract. Since these 
views are necessitated, Mr. Spencer cannot but entertain them; 
and when he does, he will find for himself the problems which 
he found for us, and be obliged to resort to our solutions. 

As unworthy of notice, Mr. Spencer treats the incongruities 
of extended consciousness when they tend to circumscribe his 
speculations. He has virtually decided, and from an objective 
and abstract point of view, that the extent of consciousness is 
finite. Somewhere in the process of evolution, he must recog- 



THE nTDUCTIYE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 83 

nize for it a beginning, and in the state of stable equilibrium, 
which he predicts, he must recognize for it an end. 

§ 27. By considering Force as a mere shadow thrown from 
beyond upon the screen of consciousness, Mr. Spencer expects 
to eliminate the problems which it otherwise presents. We 
shall see that the expectation is not to be realized. 

On lifting a chair, two phenomena present themselves: one 
objective, the other subjective; one an effort of volition, the 
other a downward pulling of the chair. Contemplating the 
two phenomena as such, we wonder whether, if realized more 
fully (as phenomena may be), they would or would not present 
similarity. As they exhibit some equivalence, we should incline 
to think they would, had not Mr. Spencer told us that so to think 
is impossible. Here, again, unless a former explanation be 
applicable, we have a phenomenal incongruity — an inclination to 
think phenomena like, opposed by inability to conceive the same. 

"When it comes his turn to explain this equivalence, he duly 
adopts our explanation. According to him, mental forces are 
nothing but transformed physical forces, capable of being re- 
fransformed. I quote his words. "Various classes of facts 
th as unite to prove that the law of metamorphosis, which holds 
among the physical forces, holds equally between them and 
the mental forces. Those modes of the Unknowable which 
we call motion, heat, light, chemical affinity, &c, are alike 
transformable into each other, and into those modes of the 
Unknowable which we distinguish as sensation, emotion, 
thought: these, in their turns, being directly or indirectly re- 
ftransformable into the original shapes. That no idea or 
feeling arises, save as a result of some physical force expended 
in producing it, is fast becoming a common place of science j 

and whoever duly weighs the evidence will see, that DOthing 

but an overwhelming bias, in favor of a preconceived theory, 
can explain it- Qon-acceptanca How this metamorphosis takes 

place how a force existing a- motion, heat, or light, can he- 
come a mode of consciousness — how it is possible lor aerial 
vibrations to generate the sensation we call sound, or for the 



84 THE INDUCTIVE AEGUMENT CONCLUDED. 

forces liberated by chemical changes in the brain to give rise to 
emotion — these are mysteries which it is impossible to fathom. 
But they are not profounder mysteries than the transformations 
of the physical forces into each other." (First Prin., § 71.) 
Judging from this, Mr. Spencer must be understood to assert 
a conceivable likeness between mental and material forces; and 
this whether the force we know is like anything in the nou- 
menal w^orld or not. 

Presence of the Sun, and sensations of heat and light, are co- 
existent phenomena. The latter two seem consequent upon the 
the first ; yet we cannot trace out the connection of dependence. 
Perhaps, we think, if the phenomena were on a very much 
larger scale, or if our perception of them were more minute, we 
could do this. But the fact is, the phenomena are not contigu- 
ous, and there can be no connection in the absence of contiguity. 
We must, therefore, submit to the perplexity, or set about 
supplying, by means of the imagination, the intervening phe- 
nomena. We must surrender to incongruity, or think that if 
the shadows upon the screen could only be intensified (as with 
other phenomena often is the case), something now unper- 
ceived would be perceptible, and would connect the phenomena 
in perception as they are now connected in thought. The phe- 
nomena to be supplied, can be nothing but what we call the 
activities of a medium; and it is as necessary to make them 
contiguous as it was to complete the contiguity of the original 
phenomena. 

Which does Mr. Spencer prefer : incongruity of thought, or 
the conception which brings about congruity? This implies 
his answer : " the elevation of water to the height whence it 
fell, is due to solar heat, as is also the genesis of those aerial 
currents which drift it about when evaporated, and agitate its 
surface when condensed. That is to say the molecular motion of 
the ethereal medium is transformed into the motion of gases," &c. 
( First Prin., § 139.) Shortly after this he speaks of " molecular 
movements propagated by the Sun to the Earth." The hypoth- 
esis of an ethereal medium, notwithstanding the phenomenon of 
imponderability, seems both conceivable and acceptable to him. 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 85 

In the fact of gravitation there is a latent problem for even 
those who think with Mr. Spencer. Call the fact an appear- 
ance, if you please, and consider it as taking place entirely 
within the mind. You cannot by this means eradicate the 
thought of another appearance which, were our faculties (as 
they are ever becoming) more acute, would be found con- 
nected with this one, and would render it comprehensible. 
The possibility of another appearance is as persistent as the 
actuality of the one we know. We should conceive the pos- 
sible appearance to be some so-called activity of the ethereal 
medium, but then we would be met by other actual appear- 
ances, which Mr. Spencer has pronounced conflicting with it. 
What should we do? Mr. Spencer shall decide. 

He explains (First Prin., § 57) that gravity "is probably a 
resultant of actions pervading the ethereal medium." This is 
the conclusion we once found it necessary to defend against his 
charges. He justifies us by professing it. 

§ 28. Motion as a phenomenon, is no more readily brought 
into philosophical congruity than Motion as a noumenon. 

Owing to vast and unknown complications, "that which 
seems moving proves to be stationary ; that which seems station- 
ary proves to be moving; while that which we conclude to be 
going rapidly in one direction, turns out to be going much more 
rapidly in the opposite direction." All this appears upon 
comparison of phenomena. To realize the confusion, and to 
resolve it into consistency, it is necessary to imagine absolute 
direction ; that is, direction through positions that are fixed. If, 
as Mr. Spencer claim-, to do this is impossible, the phenomena 
of Motion must ever remain a mas- of incongruities. 

"Motions, visible and invisible, of masses and of molecules, " 
says In- I Pirsi Prim, g 55), "form the larger hall" of the phe- 
nomena to be interpreted. * • • " It is, therefore, of great 
moment to know whether Motion, as a phenomenon, can be 
congruously conceived. What the conception involves, Mr. 
Spencer explains. kk A something that moves; a series of 
positions occupied in Bnccessionj and a </roup of eo-existerU 



86 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 

positions united in thought with the successive ones — these are 
the constituents of the idea." (First Prin., § 49.) It is not to 
be pretended that Mr. Spencer conceives, or thinks he con- 
ceives, positions as not fixedly related to other positions; whence 
it follows that he conceives motion as absolute. To see that he 
invariably does this, nothing more is necessary than a reference 
to his chapter on "The Direction of Motion," (First Prin., 
Part II., Chap. IX.), where he will be found conceiving direction 
as fixed and as congruous with other manifestations. 

To the ball which I hold in my hand I can very readily im- 
part motion. What continues the motion of the ball? we ask; 
meaning what new phenomena would be presented, if the phe- 
nomenon before us were (as phenomena often are) expanded? 
The question is one which we cannot suppress. It is impossible 
to conceive that under the conditions described no new phenom- 
ena would appear; and Mr. Spencer thinks, equally impossible to 
conceive such phenomena. It is for him to reconcile the conflict. 

The reconciliation could be brought about only by an expla- 
nation essentially like the one called for and given when the 
supposition was that we contemplated noumena. Phenomena 
involved in that phenomenon, the ball, or phenomena external 
and contiguous with it, or both, must be imagined. Mr. Spencer 
advances no explanation ; but does what is less allowable. He 
accepts (^First Prin., § 49) "the necessity which the moving 
body is under to go on changing its position" as the "funda- 
mental element" of the idea of motion, regardless of the per- 
plexities to which the acceptance leads. This is only another 
instance in which he does what he insists we have no right to do. 

" We daily witness the gradual retardation and final stoppage 
of things projected from the hand or otherwise impelled. * * " 
(First Prin., § 17.) Can we construe the phenomenon in 
thought without conceiving a breach of continuity? We will 
argue that the phenomenon of motion cannot change into the 
phenomenon of rest without taking the forms of each of the nu- 
merous phenomena that potentially intervene, and that to follow 
out the transmutation is impossible, because there must always 
remain some intermediate phenomenon which might be 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 87 

presented. What escape is there for Mr. Spencer? Is he not 
committal, if ever we were, to a choice between a breach of 
graduality and an infinite series? 

What his explanation would be is problematical, since he has 
given none. Perhaps, as his philosophy is the one threatened, 
he would explain that, in the case presented, continuity does 
not mean graduality; and that the second choice is not to follow 
out infinite divisibility, but to pass over something capable of 
unending division. Whatever the answer, it would be no de- 
nial of the late assertion that "we daily witness the gradual 
retardation and final stoppage" of moving things. The per- 
ception occurring daily, the conception must be possible. One, 
no less than the other, is a subjective thing infinitely divisible. 
It would be far better for Mr. Spencer to accept some explana- 
tion suggested than to proceed, as he has been doing, in utter 
disregard af a supposed phenomenal incongruity. 

§ 29. The conclusion that what we contemplate when per- 
ceiving Matter is nothing but an aggregate of manifestations, will 
not dispel the mysteries of its infinite divisibility and ultimate 
constitution. 

N<»t only any phenomenon called a portion of matter, but 
any phenomenon whatever, objective or subjective, having ex- 
tent, is either infinitely divisible or not infinitely divisible. The 
manifestation Matter can be conceived as dividing into two 
such manifestations; either partial manifestation may be con- 
ceived to similarly divide; and so on. When parts too small 
to be distinguished have been reached, we can imagine them 
magnified into perceptibility (as phenomena sometimes are), 
and proceed with the division. The query Is, can we, or rather 
could we if eternity were given us, reach parts which, having 

no extent, cannot be divided? We cannot think so, and Mr. 

Spencer insists thai we cannot think the contrary ; jrel one or 

the oth.r we imiM think, if we think congruously. 

Which maintain- in Mr. Spencer's thoughts? I quote from 
him. " We are obliged to conceive every portion of matter as 

containing more than one resistant position — that is,aSOOCUpy- 



88 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 

ing Space. Hence the necessity we are under of representing 
to ourselves the ultimate elements of Matter as being at once 
extended and resistant: this being the universal form of our 
experiences of Matter, becomes the form which our conception 
of it cannot transcend, however minute the fragments which 
imaginary subdivisions produce." (First Prin., § 48.) The 
preference here indicated is for an infinite series of conceptions, 
rather than a terminal conception of an indivisible part. The 
thought of such infinite series contains all that was considered 
objectionable in the thought of infinite divisibility. 

If Mr. Spencer imagined that he either could or would refrain 
from all inquiry into the ultimate constitution of Matter, he 
was guilty of considerable inadvertence. We cannot but think 
that accompanying that mode of "The Unknowable" which 
produces in us the appearance Matter, there are other modes 
which, were our faculties more susceptible, would prove in the 
manifestation Matter the quality of unbroken or broken con- 
tinuity. If we conclude that unbroken continuity would ap- 
pear, we cannot imagine how the manifestation can be made to 
contract its limits. To the same conclusion another fact is 
repugnant. It is an established mechanical truth that when a 
material aggregate of manifestations, to which is joined the 
manifestation motion, is brought into a certain dynamical rela- 
tion with an equal material aggregate of manifestations, to 
which a manifestation of motion is not joined, the two aggregates 
divide the manifestation of motion equally between them. This 
division cannot be gradual unless the parts of the aggregates 
( supposing the whole phenomenon to be, as phenomena may be, 
expanded) are capable of closer approximation; and if the 
division is not gradual, it contravenes the law of continuity, as 
Mr. Spencer understands it. Confining ourselves now to a part, 
we see that we have the same reason for believing that, imagin- 
ing it magnified, its parts cannot be in unbroken contact; and 
so we may proceed unendingly. Is this result satisfactory to 
Mr. Spencer? Will he consent to reject the atomic hypothesis, 
because solid atoms will not observe the law of continuity? 

What he says on the subject (First Prin., § 48) is very 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 89 

satisfactory. " "We may therefore deliver ourselves over with- 
out hesitation, to those terms of thought which experience has 
organized in us. We need not in our physical, chemical, or other 
researches, refrain from dealing with Matter as made up of 
extended and resistant atoms; for this conception, necessarily 
resulting from our experiences of Matter, is not less legitimate 
than the conception of aggregate masses as extended and resist- 
ant. The atomic hypothesis, as well as the kindred hypothesis 
of an all-pervading ether, consisting of molecules, is simply a 
necessary development of those universal forms which the 
actions of the Unknowable have wrought in us. The conclu- 
sions, logically worked out by the aid of these hypotheses, are 
sure to be in harmony with all others which these same forms 
involve, and will have a relative truth that is equally complete." 
Considering Mr. Spencer's strenuous, and it may be said suc- 

sful, endeavor to convince us that one of "the conclusions 
logically worked out" from the atomic hypothesis is that, in 
the transfer of motion, matter violates his notion of continuity, 
a pleasurable surprise is awakened by the assertion that such 
conclusions "are sure to be in harmony with all others which 
tli ae same forms involve." 

Banish nonmena from the sphere of legitimate inquiry, and 
the problem of the coherence and incomprcssibility of Matter 
will remain. In contemplation there is a phenomenon which 
will not be, like some other-, metamorphosed into a less exten- 
sive phenomenon, or into two or more. The conviction is 
strong within us that, could the noumenal mode which pro- 
duces this phenomenon affed as more deeply, — or more properly, 
were the phenomenon (as phenomena may be) magnified, — 
we should be able to distinguish what makes it impossible to 
compressor rend. Thai which we think would be disclosed is 
some force manifestation; and we imagine that this would be 
found to pervade any part of the materia] phenomenon, any 
part's part, and so on eternally; unless we could eventually 
reach parts which are centres of force without extension, shall 
we say that part- of matter ad infinitwm are extended, and thus 
accept an infinite series; or .-hall we say that the ultimate 



90 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 

components of matter are extensionless centres of force? 
This is the author's solution of the problem. " Centres of force 
attracting and repelling each other in all directions, are simply 
insensible portions of matter having the endowments common 
to sensible portions of matter — endowments of which we can- 
not, by any mental effort, divest theni." (First Prin., § 74.) 
So it appears that no matter how far the division of the mani- 
festation Matter be pursued, we can never arrive at parts which 
are the phenomena known as extensionless centres of force — 
that insensible portions of the manifestation Matter have the 
endowments common to its sensible portions, though divided 
for ever and ever. This is essentially like a conviction which 
Mr. Spencer once sought to prove absurd. We have escaped 
no difficulty by considering Matter a phenomenon, nor have Ave 
found any explanation other than the ones we had before. 

§ 30. Between Space manifestations and Time manifestations, 
a distinction must be drawn. All of the former are thought to 
be objective; while many of the latter are considered subjective. 
Time being given in subjective manifestations, does not depend 
for its recognition on objective manifestations. Neither, there- 
fore, does the question concerning the character of its attributes, 
the quantity of its extent, and its infinite divisibility. These 
questions will obviously arise, even if we exclude from the 
mind thought of anything beyond its limits. 

What, for instance, are the attributes of Space manifestations? 
What, in other words, are their peculiar manners of aifecting 
that which contemplates them? Shall the answer be, that 
Space manifestations present the attribute extension? Such 
answer will not be sufficient; for to give an object but one attri- 
bute is to identify it with that attribute. We must say what 
there is in Space besides extension, or we must say what are the 
attributes of extension. Finding their attributes difficult to 
name, must we conclude that Space and Time manifestations 
have no peculiar ways of appearing in consciousness — are not 
distinguishable from each other and from other manifestations? 
What does Mr. Spencer do? 



THE INDUCTIVE AKGUMENT CONCLUDED. 91 

His writings abound with proof that he does not do this. 
" The abstract of all sequences is Time. The abstract of all 
co-existences is Space." (First Prin., § 47.) The chapter in 
which this occurs sets forth the antithesis between the manifes- 
tations called Space and Time; and between these respectively 
and those called Matter, Motion, and Force. Yet the Realist 
was denied the means of an antithesis. 

Supposing self to travel out into Space is but imagining a 
certain sequence of experiences. Might such sequence, as far 
as it depends upon Space experiences, be prolonged forever? 
We cannot believe that the sequence could be terminated by the 
want of a Space experience. There is, then, no limit to the 
manifestation, Space. Conceive this and you conceive the 
infinite. " Similarly at the other extreme." Dividing a portion 
of Space is but dividing an appearance, and dividing an appear- 
ance is but causing or imagining one appearance to take (as 
they readily will) the form of several. The division always 
leaves more appearances than it found, and so long as there is 
an appearance left, it may continue or be imagined to continue. 
Conceive this, and you again conceive infinity. Now if infin- 
iteness of extent and divisibility are unthinkable, we are in- 
evitably committed to the unthinkable by contemplation of the 
appearance Space and, let us add, the appearance Time; from 
which the inference is that these appearances are delusive. 

Mr. Spencer does not treat either as delusive. Throughout 
his endeavor to establish universal congruity, he makes frequent 
Use of them, never hesitating, because to expand them is to in- 
duce perplexities. The problem of their infinite divisibility, 
I believe, be entirely ignores; the question of their infinity of 
extent he has dared to pronounce upon. In a recent article 

in tin- Popular Science Monthly (Oct., 1882) he declares thai 
"The Unknowable " is "without limit in space, and without 
beginning or end in time." This means thai Space and Time 
manifestations of w The Unknowable" are potentially without 
limit, lint the potentially limitless is no more readily conceived 

than that which is actually Limitless. IT the one conception 
is possible, 80 is the other. 



92 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 

§ 31. At this point we are brought back to the difficulties 
dealt with in the third chapter. It is to be shown that they, 
like the rest, are not born to Realism only. 

It is not possible for Mr. Spencer to suppose that when a 
sensation has been attributed to the agency of " The Unknow- 
able," all inquiry concerning its antecedents is at an end. Feel- 
ing a tap on his shoulder, he would look around to ascertain, 
as he must explain, what knowable antecedent occasioned the 
sensation felt. Seeing a friend, he would cease to wonder ; or, 
if surprised to find his friend so near, a disclosure of remoter 
antecedents would afford solution. All this without a single 
thought of " The Unknowable : " illustrating that even if a sen- 
sation has unknowable antecedents, it nevertheless has a chain 
of antecedents that are knowable. Is this chain infinite or 
finite? Apprehending that some real or imaginary knowable 
antecedent of any effect upon the mind must precede such effect, 
we should prefer to call the chain infinite. Mr. Spencer repu- 
diates an infinite series; consequently he must accept the alter- 
native, which is a First Cause, that is, a first knowable antece- 
dent of an effect upon any mind. His own arguments should 
be sufficient to convince him that his phenomenal First Cause 
is Infinite in backward extent, and Absolute in the sense of 
being independent of other phenomena. 

In his favor it must be said that he does not seek to avoid the 
question. "Be it in a single object or the whole universe, any 
account which begins with it in a concrete form, or leaves off 
with it in a concrete form, is incomplete; since there remains 
an era of its knowable existence undescribed and unexplained. 
Admitting, or rather asserting, that knowledge is limited to the 
phenomenal, we have, by implication, asserted that the sphere 
of knowledge is co-extensive with the phenomenal — co-exten- 
sive with all modes of the Unknowable that can affect con- 
sciousness. • * ' These preceding and succeeding existences 
under sensible forms, are possible subjects of knowledge and 
knowledge has obviously not reached its limits until it has 
united the past, present, and future histories into a whole." 
(First Prin., § 93.) Thus are the past, present, and future 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 93 

histories united into a whole : "if, as we have seen reason to 
think, there is an alternation of Evolution and Dissolution in 
the totality of things — if, as we are obliged to infer from the 
Persistence of Force, the arrival at either limit of this vast 
rhythm brings about the conditions under which a counter- 
movement commences — if we are hence compelled to entertain 
the conception of Evolutions that have filled an immeasurable 
past, and Evolutions that will fill an immeasurable future; we 
can no longer contemplate the visible creation as having a definite 
beginning or end, or being isolated. It becomes unified with 
all existence before and after; and the Force which the Universe 
presents, falls into the same category with its Space and Time, 
as admitting of no limitation in thought." (First Prin., § 190.) 
Here is another passage to the same effect. "Apparently, the 
universally-co-existent forces of attraction and repulsion, which, 
M we have seen, necessitate rhythm in all minor changes through- 
out the Universe, also necessitate rhythm in the totality of its 
changes — produce now an immeasurable period during which 
the attractive forces predominating, cause universal concent ra- 
tion, and then an immeasurable period during which the repulsive 
forces predominating, cause universal diffusion — alternate eras 
of Evolution and Dissolution. And thus there is suggested 
the conception of a past, during which there have been successive 
Evolutions analogous to that which is now going on; and a 
future during which successive other such Evolutions may go 
on — ever the same in principle, but never the same in concrete 

result." (First Prin., $ 183.) Ever the same fundamentally 
but otherwise ever in change — this was our history of the past 
and prophecy for the future. 

\ 32, The last <>!' our analogies Is one of peculiar interesi and 
supreme importance. It has been supposed by both the adherents 
and opponents of Mr. Spencer, thai by considering thai through 
which ;ill thin'.:- exisl as unknowable, it is possible to preclude the 
old question of self-existence or creation. We have seen th.it 
this question ariseswith regard t<» "The Unknowable;" we 
have vci to Bee that, in regard t<> appearances, it w ill qo< subside, 



94 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 

In addition to sequence of the knowable from "The Un- 
knowable," and of "The Unknowable" from "The Unknow- 
able," ad finem or ad infinitum, there is a sequence of the 
knowable from the knowable, with or without limit. This 
stupendous mass of partly constant, partly variable manifes- 
tations, known as the universe, must have had a beginning or 
no beginning. Absence of a beginning implies infinity, and 
infinity cannot be detailed in thought. Moreover want of a 
beginning is not a complete history of any manifestation ; par- 
ticularly such as have had a beginning. Turn now to the 
hypothesis of creation. The phenomenon of a beginning im- 
plies a phenomenon from which the beginning is a consequent. 
Try to think, for example, of the phenomenon of nebular dif- 
fusion as the first phenomenon, and learn how signally you will 
fail. There arises in consciousness a vague conception of a 
manifestation back of this one, and essential to its occur- 
rence. To think congruously that any phenomenon is the first 
belonging to the universe, we must think of it as due to some 
prior phenomenon not belonging to the universe. Such prior 
phenomenon may be deemed as either external to the universe 
or as not actual. First suppose it to have been primarily 
potentially actual, and to have contained some element which 
caused it to develop actuality. In making such a supposition, 
we trifle with words. Potential actuality, if it be thinkable, 
is nothing but actuality. The element which is said to cause 
the transmutation from non-existence into existence is as 
unthinkable as the transmutation itself. Besides potential actu- 
ality, whatever its nature, must have had antecedents, and an 
inquiry into them would bring us around again into the same 
difficulties which it is the object of the hypothesis to avoid. 
Next we will suppose the first manifestation belonging to the 
universe to have been the sequence of some manifestation not 
included in the manifestations of the universe. That we may 
deal, as much as possible, in familiar thoughts, let us imagine 
that at the inauguration of the universe there were present 
manifestations to which, when viewed collectively, we can attri- 
bute personality, just as we attribute personality to those collec- 



THE INDUCTIVE AKGTJMENT CONCLUDED. 95 

tions of manifestations called our fellows. And let us imagine 
also that one of the manifestations belonging to this personality 
was the act of creation — a manifestation from which followed 
the initiatory manifestation of the universe. You are asked to 
frame a thought that will baffle your powers. There are some 
manifestations, belonging to the universe, which can have had 
no creation — which are sequences from nothing but their former 
selves. No first material manifestation can be imagined. 
Matter in its remotest known form, is always thought of as the 
product of Matter in some unknown form. The same is true 
of Motion. If the phenomenon, Space, was brought about by 
some preceding phenomena, it must have been sometime absent. 
A time when Space was absent, however, is inconceivable. 
Indeed the phenomenon of creation is always imagined as tak- 
ing place somewhere in Space. Time calls for the same com- 
ments as Space. One more difficulty, inherent in the last hy- 
pothesis, remains. Turning to pre-universal phenomena, we 
cannot but entertain the question of derivation; yet if we do, 
we find the difficulties we struggle to escape again confronting us. 
Who shall lead us out of this maze? Perhaps the author. 
Let us see what solution he has to offer. "All the apparent proofs 
thai something can come out of nothing, a wider knowledge 
has one 1 >y one cancelled. The comet that is suddenly discovered 
in the heavens and nightly waxes larger, is proved not to be a 
newly created body, but a body that was until lately beyond 
the range of vision. The cloud which in the course of a few 
minutes forms in the sky, consists not of substance that has just 
begun to be, but of substance that previously existed in a more 
diffused and transparent form. And similarly with a crystal or 
precipitate in relation to the fluid depositing it. Conversely, 
eming annihilations of .Matter turn out, on closer observa- 
tion, to be only changes of state." ( First Prin., > 52.) "The 
annihilation of Matter is unthinkable for the same reason 
thai the creation of Matter is unthinkable." | Firei Prin., §53.) 
"Could it he shown, oi* could it with any rationality be even sup- 
posed, th;it Mattel-, either in it- aggregates Or in itfi unit-, ever 

became non-existent, there would he Deed either to ascertain 



96 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 

under what conditions it became non-existent, or else to confess 
that Science and Philosophy are impossible." (First Prin., § 52. ) 
Of Motion he speaks similarly. " Motions, visible and invis- 
ible, of masses and of molecules, form the larger half of the phe- 
nomena to be interpreted; and if such motions might either 
proceed from nothing or lapse into nothing, there could be no 
scientific interpretation of them." (First Prin., § 55.) In 
another place (First Prin., 53) he explains that "it is impos- 
sible to think of something becoming nothing, for the same 
reason that it is impossible to think of nothing becoming some- 
thing. * * * ", The eternal persistence, or self-existence, of 
manifestations of Matter and Motion is, then, firmly believed in 
by Mr. Spencer. He manifests no repugnance to the infinite 
series involved, which is something of which he warned us to 
beware. How near he comes to occupying our former position 
may be best known from the following comprehensive state- 
ment of the universal retrospect and prospect. " This rhythm 
of evolution and dissolution, completing itself during short 
periods in small aggregates, and in the vast aggregates distributed 
through space completing itself in periods which are immeasur- 
able by human thought, is, so far as we can see, universal and 
eternal. • • • " (Pop. Sci. Monthly, Oct., 1882.) Thus Mr. 
Spencer professes belief that the Universal Manifestation is a 
rhythmical activity of substance pervading all Space and per- 
sisting throughout beginningless and unending Time. 

§ 33. It appears, then, that all the perplexities which were 
pointed out as resulting from the attempt to formulate Being, 
are similarly consequent upon the endeavor to formulate 
Appearances. And, which is more remarkable, it appears that 
Mr. Spencer has been detected in disregarding every one of 
them. In consistency, therefore, he could not have complained 
if we had chosen to do the same. But the fact is, that the 
choice was to attempt the very opposite, and we see we have 
happened upon a justification for so doing. Every philosophy 
aims at the establishment of congruity. No philosophy can 
attain congruity while these perplexities remain ; consequently, 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 97 

if any philosophy is to reach its goal, they are explicable. On 
the supposition that they are explicable, unless other explana- 
tions are to be had, those given must be received. 

Further important results are to be gathered. Perhaps we 
have been tracing an analogy applicable to more than the in- 
stances that have come before us. Perhaps we have reached a 
generalization which, if duly realized, would put an end to the 
kind of argument we have been reviewing. We will inquire 
if the likeness of the mysteries, which confront respectively 
the Noumenal and the Phenomenal Philosophies, does not 
result from some likeness between these two Philosophies. In 
this they may be said to agree : that we perceive nothing but 
appearances. Without noting a disagreement, the concurrence 
is inappreciable. The one holds that we look upon things in 
a measure appearing as they are; the other that the appearances 
which we look upon are not in any measure components or 
semblances of things. The one persists in partly identifying 
the appearance with the reality outside of consciousness, while 
the other wholly " transfers the appearance into consciousness 
and leaves the reality outside." ( First Prin., § 46. ) 

Unknown appearances are a necessary and legitimate subject 
of inquiry for each. This truth is much obscured by its com- 
plexity. It is sufficiently obvious that if appearances are modes 
of things, we can philosophize about appearances absent in space, 
and appearances absent in time; appearances too great for our 
faculties, and appearances which cannot be presented to us 
because they are too minute. But it is far from sufficiently 
obvious that if appearances are only modes which tilings pro- 
duce within the mind, a purely inferential appearance is not 
an absurdity. Consequently this last truth must be elucidated* 

ll is well known that neither Mr. Spencer nor any Other 

agnostic philosopher confines his speculations within the Limits 

Of perception. It is readily realized that to do SO would he to 
preclude the possibility of a philosophy. On what theory, 

then, do these philosophers proceed? Their theory I shall now 
attempt to sel forth. 

lie-ides the appearance- wrought in us directly through our 

7 



98 THE nroiTCTTVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 

senses, there are appearances wrought in us indirectly through 
other appearances. Thus, when the appearance hardness is 
perceived in total darkness, it carries with it the appearance 
color. Though we cannot say that the mode of the External 
Cause which wrought the hardness, wrought also the color con- 
templated ; we can say that the External Cause, considered as a 
whole, wrought both effects, because, by previous uniformity, it 
caused one to be produced upon production of the other. Be-. 
sides this simple example, others might be given in which, 
througluappearairces "indirectly produced, others are similarly 
produced ; in which the inference made is not the only one that 
could be made; and in which the appearances inferred are not such 
as have ever been directly produced. In addition, it might be 
shown how, from the constant verification of inferred appear- 
ances, we learn to place implicit reliance on inferred appearances 
which can never be verified. But it is the meaning of reliance 
on inferred appearances which alone needs much explanation. 
It means that the mental mode present in the act of conception 
is regarded as no less the obverse of some extra-mental mode 
than the mental affection present in the act of perception. It 
may mean belief that the inferred appearance would be directly 
produced if certain other appearances were directly produced ; 
or it may not mean so much. It may mean no more than con- 
fidence that the inferred appearance is, in the world of thought, 
the equivalent of some mode in the world beyond. Thus much, 
at least, it always means. Now we know why we were so well 
able to turn the questions addressed to us, back upon the 
questioner. Now we have an explanation of that irresistible 
tendency to seek appearances answering (as they say) to even 
those modes of things which do not, and never can, affect the 
senses. They are constituents of the world of thought; and 
thought can never be' completely organized while the least of 
them is lacking. By means of them, we reason from experience 
to experience, separated by a gap which experience could never 
fill. By means of them, we pass beyond the circumference of 
all possible experience. Constructed by analogy with direct 
impressions, they bear the same relation to insensible external 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 99 

modes, as direct impressions bear to the external modes which 
make them. They are the obverse of whatever is external and 
insensible; and as such, must be sought for until none remain 
unknown, but not finally accepted until they are reduced to 
complete congruity. 

"We may now proceed with our analogy. However our 
theories of knowledge may differ, we contemplate precisely the 
same direct appearances. Though we may differ as to which 
of such appearances are real, yet, were the truth known, the 
same would be pronounced real by all. Exactly the same is 
true of our inferred appearances. While we differ as to which 
are properly inferred, the difference is due to some one's inad- 
vertence. There is not one set of appearances with which the 
Noumenal Philosophy must start, and one set of inferences 
which it must make; and another set of appearances with 
which the Phenomenal Philosophy may start, and another set 
of inferences which it may make; but they must, from the 
same direct appearances, obtain the same inferred appearances. 
Should there, then, occur, in the synthesis of appearances, an 
incongruity or an omission which is necessitated by irrepressible 
direct appearances and unavoidable inferences from them, it 
would be equally preclusive of the two Philosophies. Neither 
can obtain the advantage by arbitrarily limiting its sphere to 
certain kinds of appearances, because the same appearances are 
thrust upon the cognizance of both. Neither can do otherwise 
than synthetize all persistent appearances into a complete and 
harmonious whole, or confess it- own incompleteness. 

There is another, perhaps a better, method of presenting the 

fundamental analogy now in view. Realism and Transfigured 
Realism may concur in calling all ideas of things external t«> 
consciousness symbols. They disagree, of course, concerning 

tin- natures of these symbols and what they empower as to do. 

Realism hold- that the symbols, being in many respects like 
things, are, in many respects, substitutes of things for purposes 
of contemplation. Transfigured Realism holds that the symbols 
resemble coumena in reaped of existence only, and therefore 
enable us to contemplate nothing noumenal besides exist 



100 THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 

Notwithstanding so great a variance, there is concurrence in 
that the symbols of thought must form a complete set and 
admit of congruous combination. Whenever a symbol is 
wholly or partly wanting, the deficiency must be supplied; 
whenever one is found incongruous internally or with the pre- 
ponderance of the rest, it must be rejected as illegitimate. For 
one Philosophy to ask the other to reject a number of symbols 
because there is a vacancy or an incompatibility among them, 
is to acknowledge its own obligation to reject them. If it will 
not reject them, it cannot compel its antagonist to do so. A 
number of persistent symbols presenting irremediable deficiency 
and conflict, would be an everlasting obstruction to the comple- 
tion of even an idealistic philosophy. 

§ 34. Conformably to necessity, Mr. Spencer elects to retain 
the symbols which he denies to the Realist. As we have seen, 
he endeavors, in a manner which Realism approves, to develop 
them into harmonious completeness. It must be added that he 
encounters one problem which Realism escapes, and leaves it 
unsolved. 

Choose any symbol of reality beyond consciousness, and ask 
yourself — How does the mode of "The Unknowable" which 
this symbolizes differ from it? To answer this, you must form 
another symbol, in regard to which the same question arises; 
and so on ad infinitum, unless 1 you can sometime reach a symbol 
which is like the thing for which it stands. Suppose you try 
to evade this infinite series of problems by employing the same 
symbol as often as the question is put — suppose you say with 
Mr. Spencer, that, the consciousness of Force being the ultimate 
symbol, all modes of "The Unknowable " must be symbolized 
by Force. Then when we ask you how you symbolize the 
non-resemblance of "The Unknowable" to its symbol, you 
must answer — by Force. Force, then, is the symbol of the 
contrast with itself. This is very absurd ; but it does not reach 
the climax of absurdity. When you are asked how you 
symbolize the consciousness of Force you must, unless you will 
allege that a state of consciousness is symbolized by something 



THE INDUCTIVE ARGUMENT CONCLUDED. 101 

unlike itself in the very respect in which it is symbolized, 
answer — by Force. Force is, then, the symbol of itself and 
the symbol of "The Unknowable": hence Force and "The 
Unknowable," the symbol and the thing, are like. Thus there 
proves no alternative for Transfigured Realism but to proceed 
with its infinite series of problems, giving a different answer 
every time. It cannot make any symbol of externality the 
secoud time the symbol of the mode for which it stands; it 
cannot make any permanent symbol of externality the symbol 
of the symbol. Always there will be a question ahead and a 
necessity to answer it. Realism encounters no such difficulties ; 
since, in as far as the symbol is likened to the thing, the 
question of how to symbolize the thing anew is erased from 
thought. Assert an Unknowable and you encounter all the 
problems of Realism and more. 



102 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 



CHAPTER VII. 

The Deductive Arguments. 
The Process of Comprehension. 

§ 35. We pass now to the author's deductive considerations. 
The following ( First Prin., § 23 ) is the first of this class. 

" If, when walking through the fields some day in September, 
you hear a rustle a few yards in advance, and on observing the 
ditch-side where it occurs, see the herbage agitated, you will 
probably turn towards the spot to learn by what this sound and 
motion are produced. As you approach there flutters into the 
ditch, a partridge; on seeing which your curiosity is satisfied — 
you have what you call an explanation of the appearances. 
The explanation, mark, amounts to this; that, whereas through- 
out life you have had countless experiences of disturbances 
among small stationary bodies, accompanying the movement of 
other bodies among them, and have generalized the relation 
between such disturbances and such movements, you consider 
this particular disturbance explained on finding it to present 
aa instance of the like relation. Suppose you catch the par- 
tridge ; and, wishing to ascertain why it did not escape, examine 
it, and find at one spot, a slight trace of blood upon its feathers. 
You now understand, as you say, what has disabled the par- 
tridge. It has been wounded by a sportsman — adds another 
case to the many cases already seen by you, of birds being 
killed or injured by the shot discharged at them from fowling- 
pieces. And in assimilating this case to other such cases con- 
sists your understanding of it." In like manner, Mr. Spencer 
carries the reader through several further steps of investigation, to 
illustrate a generalization which we shall permit him to disclose. 

" Observe now what we have been doing. Turning to the 
general question, let us note where these successive interpreta- 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 103 

tions have carried us. We began with quite special and con- 
crete facts. In explaining each, and afterwards explaining 
the more general facts of which they are instances, we have 
got down to certain highly general facts. * * * The particular 
phenomena with which we set out, have been merged in larger 
and larger groups of phenomena; and as they have been so 
merged, we have arrived at solutions that we consider profound 
in proportion as this process has been carried far. Still deeper 
explanations are simply further steps in the same direction." 
From the induction thus set forth, Mr. Spencer proceeds to 
deduce the unknowableness of noumena. 

* Is this process limited or unlimited '? Can we goon for ever 
explaining classes of facts by including them in larger classes; or 
must we eventually come to a largest class? The supposition 
that the process is unlimited, were any one absurd enough to 
espouse it, would still imply that an ultimate explanation could 
not be reached; since infinite time would be required to reach 
it. While the unavoidable conclusion that it is limited ( proved 
not only by the finite sphere of observation open to us, but 
also by the diminution in the number of generalizations that 
necessarily accompanies increase of their breadth) equally im- 
plies that the ultimate fact cannot be understood. For if the 
successively deeper interpretations of nature which constitute 
advancing knowledge, are merely successive inclusions of special 
truths in general truths, and of general truths in truths still 
more general; it obviously follows that the most general truth, 
not admitting of inclusion in any other, does not admit of 
interpretation. Manifestly, as the most general cognition al 
which we arrive cannot be reduced to a more general one, it 
cannot be understood. Of necessity, therefore, explanation 
must eventually bring us down to the inexplicable. The 

deepest truth which we can get at, musl be unacconntahle. 

Comprehension must be something other than comprehension 
before the ultimate fact can be comprehended." 

Muse awhile upon the dogma to which we have been intro- 
duced. Can the author mean to tell us that a fad is to be 
explained only by likening it to the Less intelligible? Can he 



104 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 

mean to say that the first step towards the comprehension of a 
fact consists in assimilating it to facts not so capable of com- 
prehension? that further steps of the process are but further 
inclusions of the fact with obscurer facts? and that the clearest 
understanding is attained upon categorizing the fact with the ab- 
solutely inscrutable ? He can mean nothing else. Strange, then, 
and numerous are his oversights. A moment's reflection, had 
he thought it necessary, would have suggested to him that a 
fact cannot become comprehensible in proportion as it ceases to 
be comprehensible. Classification, making one fact comprehen- 
sible, should, by the same magic, make its fellow members 
comprehensible also. Consequently the largest class should be 
the best understood ; or, to vary the expression, the most gen- 
eral truth should (it having no existence apart from the facts 
which are its exemplifications) be the one most completely 
realized. Out of the implications of the argument may we 
thus weave its refutation. 

It may be disposed of by reduetio ad absurdum. At every 
step in the direction of more extensive classification of facts, 
some of their individual elements must be dropped. Extension 
and intension accompany each other in inverse proportion. 
The consequence of this principle is, that when the maximum 
of classification, and consequently of comprehension, has been 
reached, there will be retained a minimum of elements. Such 
minimum of elements must be a single element; for if it were 
a plurality of elements, the cognition of them would be a cog- 
nition of facts not to be assimilated to each other or to other 
facts — not to be assimilated at all. As each other element has 
already been cast aside as unclassible, each has proved incom- 
prehensible. The universal element must, then, be the only 
element of a fact that the mind can graap, ! >ut neither, on the 
other hand, can it be known ; for it can be classed with nothing. 
Nothing, therefore, can be known. The same result, in its 

concrete form, may be arrived at by another process. There is no 
attribute which Mr. Spencer will assert to be possessed by all 
things actual except existence. Similarity in this respect is, he 
would say, the only one by which they can be bound together 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 105 

in a universal class. From this it is inferable that the most 
thorough comprehension of facts consists in contemplating 
their existence only. Existence seems, indeed, to be all that 
we can comprehend about them. In the process of constructing 
the most general class, all other attributes have been rejected as 
unclassible. Though we have classed facts together because 
of their common possession of some of these attributes, yet we 
have at the end of such classifications been compelled to reject 
them as of no aid to comprehension. In as far as the facts 
grouped together were unlike, there was, by admission, no 
comprehension ; and in as far as they were alike, they consisted 
of an element which, being unique, could not be comprehended. 
We have the same grounds, however, for pronouncing the 
universal element incomprehensible. Existence cannot be 
identified with what is not existence; and if it could, we would 
obtain an unclassible something by the fusion. If existence or 
what is not existence cannot be comprehended, nothing can. 
Surely the conclusions to which the argument leads proclaim 
its great absurdity. 

We may meet it by a direct denial. Comprehension of a 
fact does not necessarily consist in merging it "in larger and 
larger groups of phenomena." Wishing to illustrate this truth, 
I shall employ the instances cited by Mr. Spencer. On hear- 
ing a rustle and seeing the herbage agitated, you seek an expla- 
nation. When you have learned that the disturbance was due 
to the movements of the bird, you consider the explanation 
found. What, in this case, is the explanatory act? It is 
the reduction of an instance of disturbances in general to an 
instance of disturbance caused by a partridge. You have 
ceased to contemplate the fact as one of the vast and indefinite 
class of disturbances, and Learned to contemplate it as one of the 
less general, but more definite, class of a particular kind of 
disturbance. "Suppose yon catch the partridge; and, wishing 
to ascertain why it did not escape, examine it, and find al one 
spot, a Blighi trace of blood npon its feathers. Yon now wnder- 

stand, as you say, what has disabled tin* partridge. It has 

been wounded lw a sport-man. • * * ' At lirM you did not 



106 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 

understand the bird's disability, because you could not abstract 
it from the large class of disabilities. But now you have a 
better understanding of it, having found it to belong to the 
comparatively restricted class of wounds on the wing. What 
caused the wound? This you do not understand while the 
cause is thought of only as one of the very extensive class of 
probable causes. The understanding comes when the cause is 
recognized as belonging to a much less extensive class — the 
class composed exclusively of discharges from fowling-pieces 
in the hands of sportsmen. In these instances, comprehension 
is forwarded by merging the fact to be explained in a less 
numerous group of facts than that to which it was first recog- 
nized as belonging. Enough has been elicited to put us 
upon inquiry. Classification seems to be an aid to compre- 
hension; but not in proportion to its generality. Other things 
being equal, there would doubtless be a direct correspondence 
between the degree in which a truth is known and the number 
of truths to which it is perceived, to bear a resemblance. But, 
then, these other things, which are usually very unequal, are of 
preponderating importance. It is very sure that one analogous 
truth, clearly and firmly grasped, will afford more aid than a 
thousand vaguely apprehended. No one expects to solve a mys- 
tery by determining that it is one of a class of mysteries. The 
reason that the observation of analogy so often facilitates the 
understanding of a truth is because it is an assimilation of that 
which we strive to understand to that which is, in a further de- 
gree, understood. Again, there is an aid to comprehension 
which, besides being complementary to classification, is exclusive 
of it. This aid is distinction. Before long we shall find Mr.. 
Spencer arguing that nothing can be known except what presents 
contrast with everything else. On adherence to such doctrine I 
here insist. The complete assimilation of all truths would leave 
no truth known. As long as a single truth is indistinguishable 
from all others, we cannot be said to have a cognition of it. 
The moment it becomes distinguishable in any degree, a smaller 
class only will include all that is distinguishable in it. Its 
peculiarities are not embraced in the largest class because all 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 107 

things have not the same peculiarities. Likewise it is evident 
that what is indistinguishable from the other members of a 
very large class cannot be very thoroughly understood. It may 
be better understood by bringing to view its contrasts with 
fellow members; but if this be done, there will be observed 
peculiarities about it which are common to only the members 
of a still smaller class. Every step towards more complete 
distinction is a step from universal assimilation. Some attribute 
appears at even- stage which will not merge in the class last 
contemplated. The more completely a fact is distinguished, 
the more completely it is brought within the mental grasp. 
The difficulty of understanding the cause of the wound, for 
instance, was due to its indistinguishability from other suppos- 
able causes. By relegating it to a sub-class, it was made to 
manifest the distinctions common to that class, and so became 
better known. In this way is classification often employed as 
an auxiliary of distinction; but usually when it is, it will be 
found to be less general classification. Proceeding with the 
process of distinction, whether aided or not aided by classifica- 
tion, a point must be reached at which further assimilation is 
impossible, but past which, distinction must and does advance. 
While even two facts are indistinguishable, neither is known; 
since when we think we know one we may be really nearer 
knowing the other, and vice versa. As a matter of fact, too, 
that which is spoken of as known is distinguished ma only 
from something else, but from all things else. Even that, 
which i- in the Least degree known, is so distinguished. The 
can-.- of the wound was set apart in the imagination before as 
.well as after recognition. It was known to be, inter (ilia, what 
no other cause could be, the cause of the particular effect in 
contemplation. Something distinguishes any fact which can he 
named from everything else in the universe which has been 
observed or can be imagined. We, in every case, realize this 
something hut cannot classify it. It i- no answer t<> say that 
qualities which excludes Cad from one class admit it t<> some 

other, and so all that is known of it ifi classed. Admitting the 
verity of fchifl proposition is an allowance that all things known 



108 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 

are classed; but not that all distinction may be eliminated. 
By no means, however, is it to be admitted. The same attri- 
bute is not absolutely the same in two objects. The existence 
of this is not the existence of that. Stronger vindication is 
forthcoming. Calling, as we may do, the combination of attri- 
butes belonging to anything, an attribute, we are able to recog- 
nize in any fact an attribute of which there is no counterpart 
among all that is. Attributes of this attribute need not be 
dwelt upon; for they too are involved in the last remark. 
After all similarities have been cancelled, something must re- 
main. Whatever remains is known independent of assimil- 
ation. Nor is it insignificant: it belongs not only to every in- 
dividual object of cognition, but to every class; it is found not 
only in every whole, but in every part. Knowledge of the 
unlike is more extensive than knowledge of the like. Sum- 
ming up what has been said regarding distinction, by the 
observation that truth, being heterogeneous, cannot be reduced 
to homogeneity, let us note that there are relations, heretofore 
left out of consideration, of which comprehension is not entirely 
independent. The relations of cause and effect, whole and 
part are such. It is probable Mr. Spencer would include them 
in relations of unlikeness. In them, nevertheless, may be dis- 
covered more than mere unlikeness. Sufficient for the argument, 
is it that they are not relations of likeness. No longer 

need we hesitate to repudiate the exorbitant claims made on 
behalf of classification. As it depends upon them, the argu- 
ment is null. 

It may be nullified by citing Mr. Spencer to the contrary. 
Something over a hundred pages after the argument in hand, 
the reader's curiosity to know what the most general truth is 
supposed to be, is gratified. Says Mr. Spencer: "As before 
shown (§ 23), we cannot go on merging derivative truths in 
those wider and wider truths from which they are derived, 
without reaching at last a widest truth which can be merged in 
no other, or derived from no other. And whoever contemplates 
the relation in which it stands to the truths of science in gen- 
eral, will see that this truth transcending demonstration, is the 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 109 

Persistence of Force." (First Prin., § 61.) On the next page 
he discloses what he means by the "Persistence of Force." 
"By the Persistence of Force, we really mean the persistence 
of some Cause which transcends our knowledge and conception." 
To avoid the suspicion of having asserted of the Ultimate 
Cause more than existence, he explains (First Prin., §60) the 
meaning of "persistence." "The assertion of an existence 
beyond consciousness, is itself an assertion that there is some- 
thing beyond consciousness which persists; for persistence is noth- 
ing more than continued existence, and existence cannot be 
thought of as other than continued." This is not what we had a 
right to expect. The continued existence of an unknowable 
cause is not the denomination to which all truth belongs. We 
have not been made acquainted with a universal class. The 
cause is not to be assimilated to the effect. Mr. Spencer must 
have given up the relation of likeness as the fundamental aid 
to comprehension. In its stead he must have adopted the rela- 
tion of cause and effect. All effects are to be explained by the 
continued existence of the cause. A very meagre basis of ex- 
planation it would seem, on reflecting that we are denied a 
knowledge of the kind of existence which is continued. But 
it is something other than the sufficiency of the explanation 
which is to be here arraigned. The variance between what 
Mr. Spencer demanded and what he has produced is the subject 
of present animadversion. Formerly the highest degree of 
comprehension of facts was to be attained by classing them with 
the incomprehensible j latterly it is to be attained by attributing 
them to the incomprehensible. Mark, also, that they are to be 
made understandable by attributing them to that attribute of 
"The Unknowable" which is the only one known — its con- 
tinued existence. Through a known cause, not through 
Unknown doubles, are things to be understood. 

1 have no wish to hold Mr. Spencer to his professed theory 
of the process of comprehension. If he will, let him cling to 
the one implied. When we are called upon to oppose the 
proposition that all knowledge is through the relation of cau- 
sality, we -hall have no difficulty in meeting it. In the first 



110 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 

place, we may put in the claims of many other relations. Sec- 
ondly, we may show how little is really known through this 
relation. Thirdly, we may maintain that only a known cause 
will explain its effects. And fourthly, we may argue that the 
uncaused can sometimes (as indeed the caused may) be known 
through its effects; and that, as it exists independent of a cause, 
there is nothing in its nature which it requires a cause to ex- 
plain. A more abstract proposition — one that will 
apply to any and all relations — is more likely to be urged 
against us. Not many would think it absurd to insist that 
truth can be known only through other truth, and that, there- 
fore, the most important truth cannot be known. The present 
is a good occasion for disposing of an entire class of arguments 
which, alone and together, are fitted to annoy us. It is a priori 
absurd that a known truth should be derived from that which 
is unknown. The mutuality of relation suggests a better sup- 
position. A's being known through its relation to B, does not 
preclude B's being known through its relation to A. Distinction 
is a relation that illuminates both its terms. So do all others. 
Needless, then, is it to find a fact underlying all other facts. 
If, however, any seek it, they should expect to learn that it 
needs no explanation. That through which all else is realized, 
be it one truth or many, must itself be fitted for independent 
realization. 

§ 36. Special applications of the doctrine that a thing can 
be known only in so far as it is classed, must be duly examined. 
Of these there are two: one relating to the Substance of Mind, 
and one relating to " The Unknowable " in general. The latter 
will be discussed in the succeeding chapter; the former shall be 
considered here. 

Attempts to disprove an immediate knowledge of Mental 
Substance I pass over as, although questionable in method, at 
least laudable in aim. On denial of the conceivability of 
Mental Substance, however, I join issue. What is now to be 
cited opposes alike the perceptibility which I deny and the 
conceivability which I affirm. 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. Ill 

u Again, to know anything is to distinguish it as such or such 
— to class it as of this or that order. An object is said to be 
but little known, when it is alien to objects of which we have 
had experience; and it is said to be well known, when there is 
great community of attributes between it and objects of which 
we have had experience. Hence, by implication, an object is 
completely known when this recognized community is complete; 
and completely unknown when there is no recognized commu- 
nity at all. Manifestly, then, the smallest conceivable degree 
of knowledge implies at least two things between which some 
community is recognized. But if so, how can we know the 
substance of Mind ? To know the substance of Mind is to be con- 
scion- of some community between it and some other substance. 
If, with the Idealist, we say that there exists no other substance; 
then, necessarily, as there is nothing with which the substance 
of Mind can be even compared, much less assimilated, it remains 
unknown. While, if we hold with the Realist that Being is 
fundamentally divisible into that which is present to as as 
Mind, and that which, lying outside of it, is not Mind; then. 
as the proposition itself asserts a difference and not a likeness, 
anally clear that Mind remains unclassible, and therefore 
unknowable." ( Prin. of Pbv., § 59.) * 

As opposed to the Realist, the argument is that, since Sub- 
Btance of Mind must be contrasted with everything else, it is 
unknowable. For the same reason — lor the reason that there 
i< nothing else with which to class it — it follows that what is 
not Substance of .Mind i- unknowable, that nothing i< knowable. 
Sufficient a- this reduction to absurdity is, we do not depend 
on it alone. We have Been that everything we do know is 
contrasted with all and everything else within our know! 
We have .-ecu also that contrast is one of the greatest aids 
which struggling comprehension finds. We are not now to !«• 
persuaded that Substance of Mind i- unthinkable merely l>« <-;iu-<- 
it is unlike something, in that the latter is externa] to it- sphere. 

To these considerations may be added others not previously 
advanced. Mr. Spencer was bound to prove Mental Substance 
totally inconceivable. Granting hi- mode of reasoning sound, 



112 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 

it was not sufficient to point out a slight contrast : an absolute 
unlikeness was called for. But an absolute unlikeness was not 
to be shown. Mental Substance is supposed to be the sub- 
stratum of states of Mind, sustaining them in a manner at least 
analogous to that in which matter sustains very complicated 
systems of motion. Some go so far as to think that Substance 
of Mind is a kind of matter, and that consciousness is a kind 
of motion. Either view is exempt from Mr. Spencer's strict- 
ure, since either asserts the required resemblance. From his 
point of view, as well as our own, we may point out to him 
further analogy. As other substance is external to Mental 
Substance and internal to its own realm, so is Mental Substance 
external to other substance and internal to its own realm. 
Both present quantity, whole and part. Both present quality 
and relation. Both present change and permanence ; for each 
is substance. 

Though the argument proves bad in both premises, — though 
no ignorance of Mental Substance has been demonstrated, we 
should be ever ready to confess it in a comparative degree. 
While the Mind is wonderfully familiar with what lies beyond, 
it is wofully ignorant of its own constitution. Nevertheless, 
we must persist in retaining and employing the conception of 
Mental Substance which has grown up within us. Vague it 
is, but not void; lacking form, but not formless. Inchoate 
it may be, but promising great development. 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 113 



CHAPTER VIIL 

The Deductive Arguments Continued. 
The Unconditioned. 

§ 37. Tag next specimen of agnostic argumentation is rather 
three than one. But its components are so well co-ordinated 
that it shall be considered, what its propounder considered it, 
one composed of three parts. The last of these was, in the 
preceding chapter, partly disposed of. What familiarity with it 
wo have acquired will be of service when we meet it again. 

In stating the three-fold argument with which we are about 
to come face to face, Mr. Spencer has availed himself of con- 
siderable quotation from Hamilton and Mansel. This a courtesy 
to them, which is no kindness to the reader. To the reviewer, 
the circumstance is still less propitious. He must sift out for 
discussion only what is of the essence of the argument, reject- 
it only what Mr. Spencer afterwards expressly repudiates, 
but all that he is at liberty to repudiate. As he has summar- 
ized the argument, we have the advantage of knowing what he 
intended it- general character to be. With this recapitulation, 
he brings it to an end: "A thought involve.- rdati noe, 

Ukeness. Whatever does not present each of these doc- imt 
admit of cognition. And hence we may say that the Uncon- 
ditioned, a- presenting none of them, is trebly unthinkable." 
( First Prin., § 24.) 

3. First of difference. What on this subject is quoted 

from Sir William Hamilton is the following: "all that we 

know either of subject or object, either of mind or matter, is 

only a knowledge in each of the particular, of the plural, of 

the different^ of the modified, of the phenomenal." (First 
Prin., § 24.) 

b 



114 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

Erase the word "phenomenal/' or use it in a certain sense, 
and we shall have no reason for denying this. It certainly im- 
plies that "The Unconditioned" is unthinkable; but this is 
rather favorable to our view that nothing is unconditioned. In 
both the material and mental worlds, we expect to find partic- 
ularity, plurality, heterogeneity, and the quality of being modi- 
fied. They who hold a contrary opinion of the nature of 
realities are the only ones whom the above-quoted dictum 
does not favor. 

Let us hear what Mr. Mansel has to say for Mr. Spencer 
on the subject of difference. 

"The very conception of consciousness, in whatever mode it 
may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction between one 
object and another. To be conscious, we must be conscious of 
something; and that something can only be known, as that 
which it is, by being distinguished from that which it is not. 
But distinction is necessarily limitation; for, if one object is to 
be distinguished from another, it must possess some form of 
existence which the other has not, or it must not possess some 
form which the other has. But it is obvious the Infinite cannot 
be distinguished, as such, from the Finite, by the absence of 
any quality which the Finite possesses; for such absence would 
be a limitation. Nor yet can it be distinguished by the presence 
of an attribute which the Finite has not; for, as no finite part 
can be a constituent of an infinite whole, this differential char- 
acteristic must itself be infinite; and must at the same time 
have nothing in common with the finite. We are thus thrown 
back upon our former impossibility ; for this second infinite will 
be distinguished from the finite by the absence of qualities 
which the latter possesses. A consciousness of the Infinite as 
such thus necessarily involves a self-contradiction; for it im- 
plies the recognition, by limitation and difference, of that 
which can only be given as unlimited and indifferent." ( First 
Prim, §24.) 

The application of these remarks will be known when it is 
said that one of the supposed peculiarities of " The Uncon- 
ditioned," is infiniteness in respect of every attribute of every 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 115 

thing. Willingly will we predicate of it infiniteness in the 
number and degree of its absurdities. Unhesitatingly will we 
carry further Mr. Mansel's criticism. That is infinitely removed 
from possibility, which has contradictory attributes in an infi- 
nite number and degree. Stranger yet does it seem, when we 
reflect that this, which must have so many attributes, can have 
only one. Had it more, each would limit the other and limit 
the whole. Xor can it have both substance and attribute; for 
each, and their sum, would be limited by the other; yet not 
either can exist alone. Consciousness, too, has a word to say. 
We have immediate knowledge of finite things; and the existence 
of these implies the non-existence of the Infinitely Infinite. 

But the Infinite which thus proves to be unlimitedly ridic- 
ulous, is not identical with those external things of which we 
assert infiniteness. Space, we say, is infinite; meaning, not that 
it is infinite in every quality imaginable, nor even that it is in- 
finite in every quality belonging to itself, but that it is infinite 
in extent. Mr. Spencer, when in quest of evidence that infi- 
nite space is inconceivable, did not think it pertinent to suggest 
that we cannot conceive space as infinitely righteous, infinitely 
active, or infinitely hot. If, however, that which is infinitely 
something must be infinitely everything, such reasoning would 
be conclusive. It is as inconclusive as could well be, for the 
reason that there is no tendency to attribute to anything infi- 
niteness in respect of more than a very limited number of qual- 
ities. To Divinity even are ascribed but a few qualities unlim- 
ited in degree. The majority of attributes are not ascribed to 
Divinity at all. We conceive anything infinite to be in some 
way limited. This is true of the whole External Universe. 
Call it infinite, hut keep in view in what respects it is, and in 

what it is not infinite. Do not from infiniteness in spaouil or 

temporal extent drift to the conclusion that it is incongruous 

with the limitednesfi which contrast indicates. 

The part of the argument which relates to difference we 

have found to .-how the absurdities of something which we 

deem both unthinkable and Don-existent j hut t<> leave unaf- 
fected all that we consider existent and known. 



116 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

§ 39. Next of Relation — the relation between subject and 
object. This is the way Sir William Hamilton reasons from it. 
"Thought cannot transcend consciousness; consciousness is only 
possible under the antithesis of a subject and object of thought, 
known only in correlation, and mutually limiting each other." 
(First Prin., § 24.) 

By this, it is supposed, the Infinite is proved incognizable. 
As above it was contended that other objects limited it, so it is 
here contended that it is limited by the subject. The answer 
before given is efficient here. The Infinite in every respect 
cannot exist at all; the infinite in some respects can co-exist 
with other things. The subject is not exclusive of it. 

By the considerations last cited, the Absolute also is supposed 
to be proved incognizable. The reason of the attempt to estab- 
lish the incognoscibility of the Absolute is that it, like the 
Infinite, is presumed to be comprehended in "The Uncondi- 
tioned." Since an object of thought is "known only in corre- 
lation" with the subject, it is argued that the " Unrelated" or 
Absolute cannot be an object of thought. The argument would 
be relevant if we believed in the existence of something unre- 
lated; but we do not, and cannot. Everything we believe 
existent, we believe to be related to every other thing; though 
we consider some things not to be dependent upon the relation 
in which we find them, and for this reason call them absolute. 
Thought does not create its object, but the object exists before, 
after, and independent of the thought. Correlated, but inde- 
pendent of the correlation, is what we predicate of the Absolute. 

Further discussion of the Absolute will be necessary after we 
have listened to Mr. Mansel on the subject of relation. 

" A second characteristic of Consciousness is that it is only 
possible in the form of a relation. There must be a Subject, or 
person conscious, and an Object, or thing of which he is con- 
scious. There can be no consciousness without the union of 
these two factors; aud in that union each exists only as it is 
related to the other. The subject is a subject, only in so far as 
it is conscious of an object: the object is an object, only in so 
far as it is apprehended by a subject: and the destruction of 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 117 

either is a destruction of consciousness itself. It is thus mani- 
fest that a consciousness of the Absolute is equally self-contra- 
dictory with that of the Infinite. To be conscious of the 
Absolute as such, we must know that an object, which is given 
in relation to our consciousness, is identical with one which 
exists in its own nature, out of all relation to consciousness. 
But to know T this identity, we must be able to compare the two 
together; and such a comparison is itself a contradiction. We 
are in fact required to compare that of which we are conscious 
with that of which we are not conscious; the comparison itself 
being an act of consciousness, and only possible through the 
consciousness of both its objects. It is thus manifest that, even 
if we could be conscious of the absolute, we could not possibly 
know that it is the absolute : and, as we can be conscious of an 
object as such, only by knowing it to be what it is, this is 
equivalent to an admission that we cannot be conscious of the 
absolute at all. As an object of consciousness, everything is 
necessarily relative; and what a thing may be out of conscious- 
ness, no mode of consciousness can tell us." "An object of 
thought exists, as such, in and through its relation to a thinker; 
while the Absolute, as such, is independent of all relation." 
(First Prim, § 24.) 

What is the substance of that said about the Absolute? It 
has not been described, we must first observe, as that which is 
out of all relation, but merely as that which is ''independent 
of all relation." Being independent of relation, Mr. Manse] 
think- it cannot be known as it is. Assuredly it cannot be 
known out of relation to consciousness. Neither, reason- Air. 
Mansel, can it be known in BUCh relation; for "the object ifl an 

object, only in so far as it is apprehended by ;i subject;" "an 
object of thought exists, a- such, in and through its relation to 
a thinker. 1 ' Sere the fallacy emerges. How would those of 
Mi-. MansePe persuasion content themselves with the conclusion 
that an object of thought, as such, presents no attribute except 

that of Immimj: an object of thought? Not at all; yet tin- is 

the conclusion to which bis reasoning leads. In and through 

its relation to thought, an object of thought is an object oi 



118 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

thought and nothing more. But it is more; therefore, it is 
something independent of this relation. Did objects of thought 
present nothing but objectivity, nothing that is objective, they 
would be all alike: that they are unlike shows that they do 
present something besides objectivity. May not this some- 
thing be, in some cases, not dependent upon anything else? 
Undoubtedly, unless we imagine that what depends upon other 
things for one attribute depends upon them for all. This we 
cannot do. Though the Absolute depend upon a thinker for 
its being an object of thought, it does not depend upon a 
thinker, as such, for its being whatever it is more than this. 
So much of it is independent that we call it absolute. As the 
Absolute is further known than as a mere object of thought, 
there is no incongruity in saying that it is known as absolute. 
But is not a knowledge of its absoluteness a knowledge of it 
out of relation to the mind? By no means: while in such 
relation we can perceive that cognition depends upon its 
being, not its being upon cognition. To the objection that 
from this may be deduced the conclusion that it would exist 
even if it were not known, the reply is that this conclusion is 
legitimate. We can think of an object's co-existing with our 
utter ignorance of it. If I had not found a pretty pebble on 
the beach, I would never have given it a thought; yet it would 
have continued to exist as it existed before I found it. This 
is no difficult thought. The relation in which the object was 
once known seems, on contemplation, not to be the occasion of 
the object's existence. " Still," it may be said, " the object is even 
now in a relation fundamentally like the one contemplated." 
So much the better: the relation contemplated being essentially 
like the relation of contemplation, and in fact like all other 
relations of cognition, stands for them all. The object exist- 
ing independent of it, independent of its essence, exists inde- 
pendent of anything essentially like it. The conclusion is 
one which we cannot resist, and one which we can congruously 
conceive. Two ways of knowing that an object of thought is 
independent of cognition have been found. The knowledge is 
given immediately, in perception, and mediately, by conception. 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 119 

Not even by defining the Absolute as that which cannot exist 
in relation, can Mr. Mansel's argument be made effective. We 
have the best evidence which the nature of the case permits, 
that there exists nothing answering the description. It is a 
strange absolute that depends upon the absence of relation for 
the possibility of its existence. If the Absolute is independent, 
it can exist in relation ; and if it is not independent, it may as 
well depend upon relation as the want of it. Very much better, 
we may say, considering that it must exist in relation or not at 
all. Everything existing must be related in many ways to 
everything else. Relation does not conflict with independence. 
Space is independent of matter, though related to it. Within 
itself, too, it has, and must have, relations; but it is not in the 
ordinary sense dependent on them, nor they on it. The relation 
which the Absolute transcends is that of effect to cause. When- 
ever we find something which is not related to anything else as 
an effect to its cause, however it may be otherwise related, 
we may call it absolute. 

That part of the argument which concerns relation, is very 
conclusive, as opposed to what we deny; but very inefficient, 
as opposed to what we affirm. 

§ 40. Lastly of Likeness. On this subject, Mr. Spencer is 
the one who speaks. His theory of comprehension is presented 
in the conclusion, "that a thing is perfectly known only when 
it is in all respects like certain tilings previously observed ; that 
in proportion to the number of respects in which it is unlike 

them, ifl the extent to which it is unknown; and that hence 

when it has absolutely no attribute in common with anything 
else, it musl be absolutely beyond the hounds of knowledge.' 1 
Following this is the application. 

"Observe the corollary which here concerns as. A cogni- 
tion of the Real, as distinguished from the Phenomenal, must, 
if it exists, conform to this law of cognition in general. The 
Firei Cause, the In Unite, the Absolute, t<> l><- known at all, musl 
be clas>ed. To he positively thought of, it huh he thought of 
as such or such — as of this or that hind, ("an it he like in 



120 THE DEDUCTIVE AKGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

kind to anything of which we have had sensible experience? 
Obviously not. Between the creating and the created, there 
must be a distinction transcending any of the distinctions exist- 
ing between different divisions of the created. That which is 
uncaused cannot be assimilated to that which is caused : the two 
being, in the very naming, antithetically opposed. The Infi- 
nite cannot be grouped along with something that is finite; 
since, in being so grouped, it must be regarded as not-infinite. 
It is impossible to put the Absolute in the same category with 
anything relative, so long as the Absolute is defined as that of 
which no necessary relation can be predicated. Is it then that 
the Actual, though unthinkable by classification with the Ap- 
parent, is thinkable by classification with itself? This suppo- 
sition is equally absurd with the other. It implies the plurality 
of the First Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute; and this impli- 
cation is self-contradictory. There cannot be more than one 
First Cause; seeing that the existence of more than one would 
involve the existence of something necessitating more than one, 
which something would be the true First Cause. How self- 
destructive is the assumption of two or more Infinites, is 
manifest on remembering that such Infinites, by limiting each 
other would become finite. And similarly, an Absolute which 
existed not alone but along with other Absolutes, would no 
longer be an absolute but a relative. The Unconditioned, 
therefore, as classible neither with any form of the conditioned 
nor with any other Unconditioned, cannot be classed at all. 
And to admit that it cannot be known as of such or such kind, 
is to admit that it is unknowable." (First Prin., § 24.) 

The above calls for nothing in the nature of explanation 
except, perhaps, the remark that "The Unconditioned" is con- 
sidered to be the First Cause, " the Heal as distinguished from 
the Phenomenal," the Actual as contrasted with the Apparent, 
as well as the Infinite and the Absolute. Some distance back, 
we were given to understand that "The Unconditioned" can 
bear no relations of difference. Now comes out the implica- 
tion that it is not without them. "Between the creating and 
the created, there must be a distinction transcending any of the 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 121 

distinctions existing between different divisions of the created. 
That which is uncaused cannot be assimilated to that which is 
caused; the two being, in the very naming, antithetically 
opposed. The Infinite cannot be grouped along with something 
that is finite; since, in being so grouped, it must be regarded as 
not-infinite. It is imjjossible to put the Absolute in the same 
category with anything relative, so long as the Absolute is 
defined as that of which no necessaiy relation can be predi- 
cated." Why, then, the endeavor to show that a d^tingiiishable 
unconditioned is an absurdity? If "The Unconditioned" 
really is, to the extent which Mr Spencer claims, distinct from 
the Conditioned, to think of it as distinguished, is to think of 
it as it is. One of the two arguments must devour the other: 
if "The Unconditioned" transcends likeness, it is all distinction; 
if it transcends distinction, it is all likeness. Regard for Mr. 
Spencer would compel us to construe the arguments into an 
attempt to show the folly of trying to believe in the existence 
of an unconditioned, were it not that he actually believes that 
there is something without conditions, and believes that it is dis- 
tinguished from the Conditioned to the extent which he implies. 
Tin- argument from the necessity of distinguishing objects of 
thought is, therefore, the one which fails. Into the independent 
conclusiveness of the other we shall proceed to inrjuire. 

The premise that a thing is comprehended in direct propor- 
tion t«> the generality, and in inverse proportion to the particu- 
larity, of the class to which it is thought of as belonging, 
warrant- the oonclusiou that "The Unconditioned " is compre- 
hended. The First Cause, the Infinite, the Absolute, the 
Xoiimcnal, belong to the most genera] class; which, remember, 
includes whatever has existence. Even their distinctions belong 
to thifl class. To it all classes, Including itself, belong. Every 
thin- real belongstoit In it "The Unconditioned " is ■•! 
with the Conditioned. According, then, to Mr. Spencer** 
nothing is better known than "The Unconditioned." The 

above premise also warrant- the conclusion that the t londitioned 
cannot he known, and then-lore nothing can be known. The 
Conditioned, as much as "The Unconditioned," presents abso- 



122 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

lute particularity. It canuot be classed with any other Con- 
ditioned, because there is none; nor with any part, for between 
whole and part there must be an insuppressible distinction. 
For no portion, even, may an exact counterpart be found. 
There is nothing which is like everything else; nothing which 
is not unlike everything else. Point out all the resemblances 
you can find, and there will remain something which nothing 
resembles. Likeness upon likeness will not exhaust the un- 
likeness. Go back and examine any attribute which you have 
laid aside as matched. It cannot be completely likened to that 
which most resembles it. After all its similarities to other 
things have been noted, there will always remain a dissimilarity 
which can never be resolved into similarity. Begin again with 
any subdivision you may select, but you will end where you 
did before. There is no absolute similarity, and relative simi- 
larity proves to be only a less degree of dissimilarity. Analysis 
shows every thing and every attribute to be absolutely, though 
often not conspicuously, unique. That the mind cannot grasp 
the unique, means that it can grasp nothing. Besides 

reductiones ad absurdum, we have found a direct refutation 
possible. So far is distinction from being an impediment to 
comprehension, that it is to comprehension a most propitious 
circumstance. Were that which Mr. Spencer has called uncon- 
ditioned, without distinction it would baffle even our apprehen- 
sion. We should then be under the constant liability of 
confounding it with anything and everything, or we would take 
no cognizance of it at all. Fortunate for us that it is dis- 

o 

tinguishable. 

Mr. Spencer should have shown, but did not show, that 
"The Unconditioned" is entirely unclassible. Does "The Un- 
conditioned " consist of the peculiarities he has told us of, and 
nothing else? Unless we know it all, there is something more 
belonging to it. This, then, notwithstanding all said, may be 
capable of being classed. Giving Mr. Spencer's words the 
greatest weight Avhich he could think of claiming for them, 
they do not carry conviction that "The Unconditioned" is 
entirely unclassible. 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 123 

To other charges, may be added that of the argument's 
irrelevancy. It is not difficult to show that existences beyond 
consciousness may, without violating our conception of them, 
be classed with regard to the very attributes which have called 
forth so much discussion. The First Cause, we will con- 

cede, cannot be classed with any other. Why this concession? 
Because all things self-existent and productive of effects, are 
(in abstract speculation) grouped together and called "the 
First Cause;" leaving, of course, no like group. In the same 
way, phenomena may be grouped together and called " the Phe- 
nomenal World." In the first case, no less than in the. second, 
the problem is given ready solved. If the First Cause is a 
group, its components are already classed. Let us view this in 
the concrete. Time and Space are uncaused, or, if we prefer, 
perpetually self-caused. Either description gives us what we 
seek — the means of grouping components of the First Cause. 
Both Time and Space may be considered creating; since, besides 
perpetuating themselves, they are factors in the continual change 
of temporal and spacial relations: so we find a second attribute 
bv which components of the First Cause are grouped. But 
the strongest position accessible to us has not yet been reached. 
In addition to classing component with component, we may 
class the whole with its components. Its description is, that 
which is self-existent and creating; and this is the description 
of every part. There cannot, we must also concede be two 

things infinite in every regard; because, as Mr. Spencer says, 
"such Infinites, by limiting each other, would become finite." 
The concession is but a yielding of what we are anxious to 
repudiate Such infinites as we think we discern in the realm 
of realities, are no( supposed to have uo limitations of nature. 
The point is gained if infinite Time and Space are qoI exclusive 
of each other, and may be classed together as limitless, A class 
of absolutes may also be asserted. This remark is not supposed 
to be 'true of absolutes which cannot exist in relation. It is 
true bo long as the Absolute i- defined a- thai which depends on 
no relation to any other thing for its existence. There is no 
relation to any thing else from which Space or Substance derive 



124 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

their existence ; and in view of this likeness they may be classed 
together as absolutes. Already it is shown that there are 

various groupings of the Actual or Beal, as distinguished 
from the Phenomenal or Apparent ; for they include self-existent 
causes, infinites, and absolutes. Instances of other groupings 
of things believed to lie out of consciousness, are so numerous 
that the mention of one might suggest a thousand. While 
Horse may be classed with Dog, Mr. Spencer should not flatter 
himself that he has proved that there can be no assimilation of 
things in themselves. It is remarkable that his argument 
treats of those outward realites which are in the extreme 
minority. To mankind at large, the External Universe pre- 
sents little more than effects which are finite and relative : un- 
caused causes, infinites, and absolutes are in a high degree 
exceptional. 

Instead of the fallacious reasoning which he employed, Mr. 
Spencer might have premised that " The Unconditioned " must 
be like everything else even to its parts, because distinction is 
condition; and then pointed out that the First Cause, the Infi- 
nite, and the Absolute, components of "The Unconditioned," 
do present distinction. Thus, might the unthinkability of 
"The Unconditioned" have been demonstrated. But we 
require no demonstration. The want of distinction is, as well 
as distinction, a condition. Nothing, we believe, can transcend 
either; nothing, we are sure, can transcend both. "The Un- 
conditioned " is to us a non-existence, and we welcome anything 
which tends to banish it from thought. 

That part of the general argument which deals with likeness 
proves to be as inefficient as the rest. It may be so reformed as 
to oppose what we deny ; but it cannot be made to dispute what 
we proclaim. 

§ 41. And now let us take a glance at the argument as a 
whole. Besides objections peculiar to certain portions, there is 
one which is applicable to each of its three divisions, and con- 
sequently to it all. Admitting that it proves a conception of 
"The Unconditioned" self-destructive, the objection is never- 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 125 

theless sustainable that it does not attach to a certain realistic 
conception of the universe. Before we will admit that it proves 
something that exists unknowable, we must be satisfied that 
there exists an Unconditioned. And before admitting that it 
proves the Xoumenal World unknowable, it must appear that 
"The Unconditioned" and the world outside of consciousness 
are co-extensive and identical. How much Mr. Spencer does 
towards filling up these gaps in his argument, will be the next 
subject of investigation. 

§ 42. He will not agree with Hamilton that "the absolute 
is conceived merely by a negation of eonceivability," nor with 
Man>el that "the Absolute and the Infinite" are, "like the In- 
conceivable and the Imperceptible, names indicating, not an object 
of thought or consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the 
conditions under which consciousness is possible." What are 
his reasons? "Observe in the first place, that every one of the 
arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is demon- 
strated, distinctly postulates the positive existence of something 
beyond the relative. To say that we cannot know the Absolute, 
is, by implication, to affirm that there is an Absolute." (First 
Prim, § 26.) How so? Surely it will not be contended that 
proof of the impossibility of a certain conception, amounts to 
proof that there is something answering to such conception. 
To point out the contradictions involved in the thought of ;i 
round square, is not to assert, by implication, that there is a 

round Bquare. One very important proposition, of which we 

remarked the want of proof, is that there exists an absolute 
answering Mr. Spencer's description. The use which he made 
of certain arguments, assuredly assumed the existence of such 
an absolute; bul i- it not a justification of the assumption of 
which we are even now in search? We have interrupted 

the author in the middle of a paragraph, and must read further. 
"Tin' Noumenon, everywhere named a- the antithesis of tin 1 
Phenomenon, is throughout necessarily thought of a- an actu- 
ality. It i- rigorously impossible to conceive thai our knowledge 
is a knowledge of Appearances only, without at the same time 



126 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

conceiving a Reality of which they are appearances ; for appear- 
ance without reality is unthinkable." Again we must be 
guilty of interruption. We cannot suffer Mr. Spencer to omit 
proof that "The Unconditioned" and the Noumenal are the 
same. That they are, is the second proposition which we 
observed he had yet to establish. While they may be supposed 
to differ, belief in the reality of the last will not be accepted as 
equivalent to belief in the reality of the first. Now we 

will hear Mr. Spencer out. " Strike out from the argument the 
terms Unconditioned, Infinite, Absolute, with their equivalents, 
and in place of them write, i negation of conceivability/ or 
( absence of the conditions under which consciousness is pos- 
sible/ and you find that the argument becomes nonsense. 
Truly to realize in thought any one of the propositions of 
which the argument consists, the Unconditioned must be repre- 
sented as positive and not negative. • • • Clearly, then, the 
very demonstration that a definite consciousness of the Absolute 
is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an indefinite con- 
sciousness of it." Suppose that, with intent to demonstrate our 
inability to conceive intersecting parallel lines, we argue that 
the intersection of parallel lines is a contradiction in terms — 
that their intersection conflicts with their parallelism; their 
parallelism, with their intersection. If Mr. Spencer's prin- 
ciples are to be relied on, we have proved the reality of parallel 
lines which intersect. Strike out everything that stands for 
the subject of discussion; in its place write "an unreality;" and 
see if the argument does not lose its intelligibility. By like 
reasoning, every proof that something is inconceivable is a 
proof that it exists. The indefinite consciousness which Mr. 
Spencer remarks is not consciousness of that of which the con- 
ceivability is denied ; but the construing of several predicates 
without the power of affirming them of a single subject. In- 
somuch as there is a certain bond of union among them, they 
may be dealt with as an integer; in as much as they exclude 
each other, the union is incomplete. The denial of conceiv- 
ability does not exclude all predicates from the mind, but 
merely the co-affirmation of some of them. While they dis- 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 127 

place one another, there persists a sense of their kinship, and 
thus is formed the indefinite consciousness in question. This 
vague and protean mode may be contemplated in one relation 
and another, in this aspect and in that; but it cannot be said to 
represent any reality, since it is marked by absence of the very 
peculiarity essential to the supposed reality, — that is, the union 
of certain attributes. The indefinite consciousness which arises 
on mention of the name " Unconditioned," is no more the con- 
sciousness of a reality than that which responds to the mention 
of equidistant-crossing lines, or any other absurdity. 

§ 43. A second attempt to show that we have some conscious- 
ness of "The Unconditioned," follows the one just examined. 

"It is a doctrine called in question by none," premises the 
author, " that such antinomies of thought as "Whole and Part, 
Equal and Unequal, Singular and Plural, are necessarily con- 
ceived as correlatives: the conception of a part is impossible 
without the conception of a whole; there can be no idea of 
equality without one of inequality. And it is admitted that 
in the same manner, the Relative is itself conceivable as such, 
only by opposition to the Irrelative or Absolute." (First Prin., 
§ 26.) To carry on the argument to its conclusion, it was 
necessary to refute a doctrine expressed by Sir William I Iamilton 
as follows. "Correlatives' certainly suggest each other, but 
correlatives may, or may not, be equally real and positive. In 
thought contradictories necessarily imply each other, for the 
knowledge of contradictories is one. But the reality of one 
contradictory, so for from guaranteeing the reality of the other, 
is nothing else (nan its negation." Accordingly Mr. Spencer 
attempts the refutation. "In such correlatives as Equal and 
I Fnequal, it is obvious enough thai the negative concept contains 
something besides the negation of the positive one; for the 
things oi* which equality is denied are not abolished from 
consciousness by the denial. And the fed overlooked by Sir 

William I Iamilton, is, that the like holds even with those cor- 
relatives of which the negative is inconceivable, in the strid 
sense of the word. Take for example the Limited and the 



128 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

Unlimited. Our notion of the Limited is composed, firstly of a 
consciousness of some kind of being, and secondly of a conscious- 
ness of the limits under which it is known. In the antithetical 
notion of the Unlimited, the consciousness of limits is abolished • 
but not the consciousness of some kind of being. It is quite true 
that in the absence of conceived limits, this consciousness ceases to 
be a concept properly so called; but it is none the less true that 
it remains as a mode of consciousness. If, in such cases, the 
negative contradictory were, as alleged 'nothing else 7 than the 
negation of the other, and therefore a mere nonentity, then 
it would clearly follow that negative contradictories could be 
used interchangeably : the Unlimited might be thought of as 
antithetical to the Divisible; and the Indivisible as antithetical 
to the Limited. While the fact that they cannot be so used, 
proves that in consciousness the Unlimited and the Indivisible 
are qualitatively distinct, and therefore positive or real; since 
distinction cannot exist between nothings. The error, (very 
naturally fallen into by philosophers intent on demonstrating 
the limits and conditions of consciousness,) consists in assuming 
that consciousness contains nothing but limits and conditions; to 
the entire neglect of that which is limited and conditioned. It 
is forgotten that there is something which alike forms the raw 
material of definite thought and remains after the definiteness 
which thinking gave to it has been destroyed. Now all this 
applies by change of terms to the last and highest of these 
antinomies — that between the Relative and the Non-Relative*' 
I think, nevertheless, that there are unanswerable reasons for 
siding with Sir William Hamilton. Contradictories may, or may 
not be equally real and positive. In the instances which Mr. 
Spencer has cited, they are; in an infinite majority of instances 
which might be cited, they are not. For our examples we shall 
take such antinomies as Extent which is infinitely divisible, 
and Extent which is not infinitely divisible; Motion which is 
communicated gradually, and Motion which is communicated 
suddenly; Force, operating through a medium, and Force oper- 
ating through no medium. Or if these are not sufficient, we 
will mention Mental Effects which are caused, and Mental 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 129 

Effects which are uncaused; Phenomena of which we are con- 
scious, and Phenomena of which we are unconscious; Appear- 
ances known as internal to consciousness, and Appearances 
known as external to consciousness. AVill Mr. Spencer admit 
that both terms of each of these contradictions are true ? Nay, 
is he ready to embrace the conclusion that the consciousness of 
every possibility, to which there is a correlative impossibility, 
carries with it a consciousness of the latter which proves its 
reality? Absurd though it is, he comes near expressly affirm- 
ing this very conclusion. Speaking of the correlatives Equal 
and Unequal, he says tiiat "the things of which equality is 
denied arc not abolished from consciousness by the denial ; " and 
follow- this remark with the assertion that "the like holds 
even with those correlatives of which the negative is inconceiv- 
able, in the strict sense of the word." If Mr. Spencer will 
say that it holds with all of them, and that therefore their con- 
traries are as real as they, it will be unnecessary to make 
further comment. He would say nothing so self-evidcntly 
ridiculous; hence we may argue that "The Unconditioned V 
being a correlative does not imply a consciousness of it. AYe 
demand some other (latum. 

It has been given. The Unlimited cannot be thought of as 
antithetical to the Divisible; whence it is inferred that there is 
a mode of consciousness answering to something unlimited. 
We should have been pleased to have .Mr. Spencer tell as this 
when tin- subject was unlimited Space and unlimited Time. 
Though they are not interchangeable, he struggled hard to con- 
vince ih that our thoughts of them in no manner correspond 
to realities. We -hall not be a- inconsistent a- he, — we will Dot 
one word to prove that there is no positive consciousm — of 
the Unlimited. That we can prove there is such consciousm 
by a method satisfactory to Mr. Spencer, is a matter of con- 
gratulation. Our present concern i- with that which exists 
out ol* relation. This, we maintain, we are not conscious of. 
The argument opposed to as is substantially this: the I rrelativeis 
antithetical to the Relative, and to no other correlative; but if* it 
were not positively thought of, it would be ;i~ much antithetical 

9 



130 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

to one thing as to another; therefore there is consciousness 
of the Irrelative. An analogous case will furnish complete 
refutation. To portions of matter which are not co-extensive, 
there is the verbally intelligible correlative, — portions of 
matter which are co-extensive. Try to make this correlative 
seem the antithetical correlative of two twos which do not 
make five. The effort must be unavailing, because portions of 
matter occupying the same space and two twos which make five 
are more to consciousness than zeros; proving a genuine con- 
sciousness of them both, or proving Mr. Spencer's mode of 
reasoning unreliable. 

His aberration is undoubtedly attributable to a misunder- 
standing of the indefinite consciousness which is, so to speak, the 
symbol of the inconceivable. If he had reflected that in different 
cases it consists of different groups of incompatible affirmations, 
he would not have thought that if it has various forms, it 
must, in each of them be a consciousness of a reality. The 
same reflection might have saved him from a gross inconsistency. 
He describes consciousness of the Absolute as "something which 
alike forms the raw material of definite thought and remains 
after the definiteness which thinking gave to it has been de- 
stroyed ; " and, further on, speaks of the impossibility of giving 
"to this consciousness any qualitative or quantitative expression 
whatever." This can scarcely be thought to consist with the 
argument that consciousness of the Absolute and consciousness 
of other correlatives "are qualitatively distinct, and therefore 
positive or real." Being distinguishable, they are qualified; 
or being unqualified, they are indistinguishable, and therefore 
interchangeable. The former position is preferable. In sup- 
port of it, we have Mr. Spencer's proof that inconceivable 
correlatives are distinct from one another. In further support 
of it, we have the fact that the "raw material" of thought 
would not support the antithesis which exists between the Ab- 
solute and the Relative. What has no qualities cannot support 
the antithesis issuing from the quality of being out of relation. 
There is no escape from the conclusion, once urged by Mr. 
Spencer, that the indefinite consciousness which is antithetical 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 131 

to consciousness of the Related, is more than unmodified material 
of definite thought. As before explained, it is a collection of 
definite materials, but incapable of proper combination. The 
impossibility of constructing from its components a congruous 
idea, is its mark of spuriousness. It will not avail Mr. Spencer 
to reject this explanation ; for consciousness of the Unrelated, 
being distinguished from other consciousness, is not uncondi- 
tioned consciousness — is much less consciousness of "The 
Unconditioned." 

§ 44. A third endeavor to prove that we have consciousness 
of "The Unconditioned" remains. 

"Still more manifest will this truth become when it is ob- 
served that our conception of the Relative itself disappears, if 
our conception of the Absolute is a pure negation. It is 
admitted, or rather it is contended, by the writers I have quoted 
above, that contradictories can be known only in relation to 
each other — that Equality, for instance, is unthinkable apart 
from its correlative, Inequality; and that thus the Relative can 
itself be conceived only by opposition to the Non-relative. It 
is also admitted, or rather contended, that the consciousness of 
a relation implies a consciousness of both the related members," 
"If the Non -relative or Absolute, is present in thought only 
as a mere negation, then the relation between it and the Relative 
becomes unthinkable, because one of the terms of the relation 
IS absent from consciousness. And if this relation is unthink- 
able, then i- the Relative itself unthinkable, for want of its 
antithesis: whence results the disappearance of all thought 
whatever." (First Prin., § 2G.) 

Before us is an attack upon consciousness of the Belated 

which, it is supposed, may he repelled only by asserting <■<)])- 

sciousness of the Unrelated. Many other way.-- of accomplish- 
ing the defence are available. 

Were nothing necessary to make the Relative thinkable, Ian 

to find it an antithesis, there- would be no occasion to call in the 

Absolute. To something related, anything differently related 

is antithetical. That which exists in certain relations ifi 



132 THE DEDUCTIVE AKGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

sufficiently contrasted with that which exists out of these 
relations, though it exist in others. For the sum of things 
related there is a similar antithesis. It is related differently 
from its components, and they from it. But Mr. Spencer's 
demands are not to be so easily appeased. He must have the 
strongest antithesis verbally expressible. Nothing but absolute 
contradiction is enough for him. As the Relative is a sphere 
of reality sustaining relations, he will not grant that anything 
is so strongly contrasted with it as to exhibit its relationship, 
except a sphere of reality sustaining no relation. 

With equal propriety, might we claim that Extended Space 
is inconceivable apart from the consciousness of Unextended 
Space. With equal propriety, indeed, might we claim that 
nothing having a contradictory can be known unless in connec- 
tion with consciousness of the latter. What knowledge is there 
that would not be swept away by the requirement? Grant 

us a license to use his mode of reasoning, and we will sub- 
stantiate a set of conclusions still less agreeable to Mr. Spencer. 
How easy, for instance, to prove that the External Universe is 
self-existent. Other things are knowm as not self-existent ; but 
that which is not self-existent cannot be known independent of 
a consciousness of that which is self-existent; therefore we are 
conscious of something self-existent. How easy to prove, in 
the next breath, that the External Universe is self-created. 
This last proposition manifestly conflicts with its predecessor. 
It also conflicts with the doctrine that the External Universe is 
unrelated; for, as self-creation can only be in time, the self- 
created must sustain temporal relations. Causal relations are 
likewise to be predicated of it. Sufficiently refuted is the 
argument by its reduction to absurdity. Next comes the ex- 
posure of an inconsistency. 

While the subject of the relations of the Unrelated is before 
us, let it be noted, that the passage last quoted proclaims that 
the Absolute is related, and known as related. Something 
having no relation, bears a relation of contrariety to something 
that has relations. Mr. Spencer argues that the something 
which is related, cannot be known out of relation to the some- 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 133 

thing which is not related ; and that their relation is unthinkable 
unless both its terms are present in thought. Both terms being 
present in thought, the Unrelated is known as a term of a 
relation. The explanation that the Irrelative is present merely 
as raw material of thought, is entirely unsatisfactory. How- 
ever symbolized, the Irrelative is symbolized as related, so far 
as it is symbolized at all. By Mr. Spencer's admission, the raw 
material and its relations, stand for the Irrelative and its rela- 
tions. Could anything be more remarkable than the position, 
that "The Unconditioned" is known, and is, so far as it is 
known, known as conditioned? If the imagined correlative of 
the Related, is itself related, what is there antithetical to the 
quality of relativcness? 

Towards finding the required antithesis, we can do more 
than Mr. Spencer. Here again must be introduced the correc- 
tion, that the thought corresponding to the word " Unrelated" 
is far more than unmodified thought. The predications which 
it contains, although incapable of complete union, present much 
that is positive. Their union itself, far as it must stop Bnort of 
completion, is not entirely negative. Such being the case, it is 
legitimate for us to claim that the thought of the Unrelated, 
spurious though it is, is more strongly antithetical than any 
Other mental mode, to the thought of the Belated. Something 
very aearly meeting Mr. Spencer's requirement may, it seems, 
thus l»e pointed out without prejudice to ourselves. Hence 
tiny may, who choose, speak of the antithesis between the 
Relative and the 1 rrelativr, with immunity from the chai 
asserting the latter'- existence. 

Finding an antithesis for the Relative i-> t«> some extent a 
work of supererogation. I think that philosophers are prone to 
too much prominence t<> certain relations. Being con- 
ditions of the object, these relations are mistaken for conditions 
of the subject, because they modify cognition. Being general, 
they are deemed universal. Being auxiliary t<> comprehension, 
they are regarded a- essential t<> it. That "contradictories can 
be known only in relation t<> each other/ 1 is doI a deduction 
from any knowledge in our possession, and multiplicity of facts 



134 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

prevents its being anything like a complete induction. Nor is 
it unopposed by facts. Experience is rarely, very rarely, 
appealed to in order to decide the point in dispute, because, 
among other reasons, of the difficulty of obtaining and inter- 
preting the answer. Whenever an appeal is made, instances 
are chosen which are most favorable to the appellant. Thus it 
is that the majority of instances are never subjected to the 
slightest examination. Those selected are, moreover, seldom, 
if ever, examined to ascertain whether the things which occur 
together are dependent or merely concomitant. Contraries, 
instead of being simultaneously recognized usually only suggest 
each other. Some do not even do this. When we read of the 
quiet path, the green grass, the running brook, we find some- 
thing which the mind would ordinarily grasp without a thought 
of contradiction. 

The conception which has been defended is of the Relative 
as such. Perhaps it may be better to describe it as still less 
comprehensive. It is of the Relative in the extreme sense in 
which the latter is said to be the correlative of the Unrelated. 
It might consequently have been given up without parting 
with any attribute of the Relative, but its contrast with the 
Irrelative. The Related as the antithesis of the Unrelated, in 
the latter's absence from the universe, we do not need to know. 

§ 45. Mr. Spencer has more to say about consciousness of 
"The Unconditioned," but by way of description rather than 
substantiation. What he sometimes considers the character of 
such consciousness to be, may be gathered from the following. 

"One of the arguments used to prove the relativity of our 
knowledge, is that we cannot conceive Space or Time as either 
limited or unlimited. It is pointed out that when we imagine a 
limit, there simultaneously arises the consciousness of a space or 
time existing beyond the limit. This remoter space or time, 
though not contemplated as definite, is yet contemplated as real. 
Though we do not form of it a conception proper, since wo do 
not bring it within bounds, there is yet in our minds the un- 
shaped material of a conception. Similarly with our conscious- 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 135 

ness of Cause. We are no more able to form a circumscribed 
idea of Cause than of Space or Time; and we are consequently 
obliged to think of the Cause which transcends the limits of 
our thought as positive though indefinite. Just in the same 
manner that on conceiving any bounded space, there ari 
nascent consciousness of a space outside the bounds; so when 
we think of any definite cause, there arises a nascent conscious- 
- >f a cause behind it: and in the one case as in the other, 
this nascent consciousness is in substance like that which 
3ts it, though without form. The momentum of thought 
inevitably carries us beyond conditioned existence to uncondi- 
tioned existence; and this ever persists in us as the body of a 
thought to which we can give no shape." (First Prin., § 26.) 
The analogy which Mr. Spencer uses is one exceedingly 
hostile to his purpose. From the very peculiarities of the 
conceptions of Space and Time which renders them analogous 
to the conception of Causation, was drawn support for the 
conclusion that they do not represent anything outside of con- 
sciousness. Suppose the same rule be applied to the conception 
ibed as consciousness of the External Cause. It will then 
result, if the rule be valid, that this conception correspond- to 
n<> reality — is no consciousness of "The Unconditioned." An 
alternative stricture will suit US better. Conception of tlie 
Can-- being held to answer, as far as it goes, to reality, the 
author i> unable to resist the conviction that the same is true 

of the conceptions of Space and Time. 

It i- granted that there [g a conception which Mi - . Spencer 
very wel] describes. Bui he describes it a.- more than raw 
material of thought, which i- what he has told as consciousness 
of "The Unconditioned" is. Consciousness of a can 
Mich, i- not unmodified consciousness. Again; he has told us 
that we are conscious of "The Unconditioned" a- antith 
to the Relative in being Non-relative. What n<>w does be 
mean by saying that we are conscious of "The Unconditioned" 
as a cause? — that i-, a- bearing relations of causation? 

According t«> the author's last account, the consciou 
of an unconditioned cause follows from the con.-cimi.-ne.— of 



136 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

conditioned causes. Does he contemplate these causes as phe- 
nomena? If he does, his argument is that if we retrace their 
lineage we shall arrive at unconditioned phenomena. This is 
evidently not what he wishes to establish. An unconditioned 
noumenon is to be the ultimate object of contemplation. Con- 
sciousness of "The Unconditioned," not merely unconditioned 
consciousness, is to be the ultimatum. To direct Mr. Spencer's 
argument against his opponents and not against himself, it is 
necessary to understand the proximate "definite cause/' of 
which he speaks, to be something external to consciousness. 
Yet by doing this we do not help him. If the supposed con- 
sciousness of the first definite cause is a pseudo-consciousness, 
the consciousness derived from it — the consciousness of "The 
Unconditioned" — is probably the same. Supposing, on the 
other hand, the latter consciousness genuine, is an implied con- 
cession that it is possible to conceive the proximate end of 
the chain of noumenal causation. Effects wrought on con- 
sciousness are, then, not all that we know. We know causes; 
even causes external to consciousness. "The Unconditioned" 
is not all beyond consciousness: only a remote portion of it. 
There are many Realists who hold this view. 

As Mr. Spencer observes, the conception of a definite cause 
raises a "nascent consciousness of a cause beyond it." His 
mistake is in supposing that the remote cause is as unshapen as 
our conception of it. The constant observation of causes 
becoming more definitely known, should be sufficient to teach 
that the modifications of consciousness are usually less numerous 
and less marked than its object. Though equally absurd, there 
is a vast difference between unconditioned consciousness and 
consciousness of something unconditioned. Conceptions Hke 
the one in question are so common that we need not look far 
for an analogy. One thinking of the line of his ancestors, 
can picture definitely his father's appearance. His grand- 
father's appearance he is unable to represent with so much 
definiteness. Of his great-grandfather, and an endless line of 
predecessors, he can probably call to mind neither form nor 
feature. Shall he then say that he can trace his pedigree back 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 137 

to ancestors devoid of form and featnre ? To do so, is no more 
preposterous than to declare that tracing back the chain of 
causation brings us to a cause without form, because its repre- 
sentation is so far from completely formed. 

" When we think of any definite cause there arises a nascent 
consciousness of a cause behind it," says Mr. Spencer. This 
is true of those causes which are most likely to come to mind 
on mention of the name; but is far from being universally 
true. Space is a cause; yet we think of no cause, other than 
its former self, back of it. The same is true of Time and of 
the essence of both Substance and Activity. For nothing, but 
evanescent modes of Substance and Activity, and evanescent 
spacial and temporal relations, do we seek causes that are not 
quite as definitely conceived as their effects, being identical with 
them. The External Cause, we see, does not appear half so 
indefinite when we cease to contemplate exclusively its indefinite 
modes. Its vaguest forms, we may add, are presented with 
some definiteness. Very remote causes, which Mr. Spencer 
thinks must be regarded without any definiteness whatever, 
may be, and in fact are, looked upon as some Activity of Sub- 
stance taking place somewhere in Space and Time. The; 
"momentum of thought" can never carry us into the presence 
of what is less than this. 

§ 4G. Still another description of consciousness of "The 
Unconditioned" is given by the author. Very pertinently he 
asks: "How can there possibly be constituted a consciousness 
of the unformed and unlimited, when, by its very nature, con- 
sciousness is possible only under forms and limits? If every 
consciousness of existence is a consciousness of existence as 
conditioned, then how, after the negation of conditions, can there 

be any residuum?" And he answers — 

"Such consciousness is not, and cannot be, constituted by any 
single mental act; but is the product of many mental acts. In 
each concept there is an element which persists. Ii i< alike 
impossible for tin- element t<> be absent from consciousness, and 

lor it to he present in consciousness alone: either alternative 



138 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

involves unconsciousness — the one from the want of the sub- 
stance; the other from the want of the form. But the per- 
sistence of this element under successive conditions, necessitates 
a sense of it as distinguished from the conditions, and 
independent of them. The sense of a something that is 
conditioned in every thought, cannot be got rid of, because 
the something cannot be got rid of. How then must the 
sense of this something be constituted? Evidently by com- 
bining successive concepts deprived of their limits and condi- 
tions. • * * By fusing a series of states of consciousness, in 
each of which, as it arises the limitations and conditions are 
abolished, there is produced a consciousness of something un- 
conditioned. To speak more rigorously: — this con- 
sciousness is not the abstract of any one group of thoughts, 
ideas or conceptions ; but it is the abstract of all thoughts, ideas 
or conceptions. That which is common to them all, and can- 
not be got rid of, is what we predicate by the word existence. 
Dissociated as this becomes from each of its modes by the perpetual 
change of those modes, it remains as an indefinite consciousness 
of something constant under all modes — of being apart from its 
appearances." "Our consciousness of the unconditioned being 
literally the unconditioned consciousness, or raw material of 
thought to which in thinking we give definite forms, it follows 
that an ever-present sense of real existence is the very basis of 
our intelligence. As we can in successive mental acts get rid 
of all particular conditions, and replace them by others, but 
cannot get rid of that undifferentiated substance of conscious- 
ness which is conditioned anew in every thought; there ever 
remains with us a sense of that which exists persistently and 
independently of conditions." (First Prin., § 26.) 

Mr. Spencer has the power of bestowing on error a force of 
expression which few men can give to the truth. "Raw 
material of thought" would be an admirable phrase, were there 
anything answering to it; but there is not, at least in Mr. 
Spencer's sense. There is no consciousness, or material of con- 
sciousness, without form, any more than there is raw material 
of any thing else, without form. Consciousness devoid of 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 139 

form, would be consciousness of nothing. Marvelous is it that 
a sense of existence should be mistaken for unconditioned con- 
sciousness. Existence has its modifications, its attributes. It 
has the attribute of being; it is distinguishable from what is 
not existence; it is some particular existence; it is known in 
the cognitive relation. Demonstrably, then, consciousness of 
existence is, after all, consciousness of the Conditioned, and not 
consciousness of "The Unconditioned." 

Although Mr. Spencer calls consciousness of "The Uncon- 
ditioned"' a "sense of real existence," he, in another place, 
calls it "a sense of that which exists persistently and indepen- 
dently of conditions." By what right he treats these descriptions 
as equivalent la not disclosed. They are so far from equivalent 
Bfi to be conflicting. The latter is more comprehensive than the 
former. Which will he retain? Consideration reveals little 
preference. Recently it has appeared that a sense of existence 
is not consciousness of anything unconditioned. The same 
remark will apply, even more extensively, to a sense of that 
which exists thus and bo. The existence of "that which exists" 
as described, is conditioned; and, moreover, so is whatever is 
presented besides existence. This last is conditioned in being 
related to the subject, in being joined to existence, in differing 
from existence, in differing from other things existing. Strive 
a- we may, we can be conscious of the ( Sonditioned only. Both 
descriptions of consciousness of "The Unconditioned," represent 
it as consciousness of something conditioned. In respect 

of their other absurdities tiny are about equal. A Bense of 
existence merely (supposing it possible) is a sense of the 
existence of nothing in particular. There is no possibility of 
determining to what the existence belongs — po way of knowing 
it to If the existence, not of this or thai which is conditioned, 
but <»f something else which i- unconditioned. Unless it- 
existence' he all there is of "The Unconditioned," we have, 
then, no consciousness of anything unconditioned. If it be, 
however, all of "The Unconditioned" is within the grasp of 
thought. Sincerely as he would repudiate it, this very absurd 
proposition, that "The Unconditioned" comprises oothing luit 



140 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

existence, seems implied in the author's reasoning. He calls 
" The Unconditioned " " the unformed ; " thereby implying that 
it is an existence having no attribute except existence. Indeed 
he is obliged to think it unformed, if he would believe it un- 
conditioned; for that which has modifications is conditioned. 
Thus it appears that he is driven to the admission, that in 
knowing " The Unconditioned " as a pure existence, we know it 
all. We shall find an equivalent objection to the 

description of consciousness of "The Unconditioned" as "a 
sense of that which exists persistently and independently of 
conditions." This affirms something besides existence, it is true ; 
but it affirms as well a knowledge of the something additional. 
Such affirmation is a direct denial of the author's doctrine, that 
nothing noumenal but existence is knowable. There is a way 
of avoiding this difficulty. It is by returning to the preceding 
one. Mr. Spencer might explain, that in speaking of "that 
which exists persistently and independently of conditions," he 
had reference to something which is unmodified existence. 
Existence may, of course, be alluded to as something which 
exists. Using this explanation is a return to the position, that 
the entire "Unconditioned" is within our knowledge. 

AY hatever attributes it may enable us to contemplate, con- 
sciousness of "The Unconditioned" is said to be an abstraction. 
"In each concept there is an element which persists," and 
" the persistence of this element under successive conditions, 
necessitates a sense of it as distinguished from the conditions, 
and independent of them." Has not Mr. Spencer fallen into 
the error of supposing that because elements can be separately 
named, and separately contemplated, they can be disconnected 
in fact? The notion of hardness in the abstract is not con- 
stituted by a single mental act. By attending to the hardness 
of a number of objects of various shapes, there is formed a 
notion of hardness as distinguished from shape, and independ- 
ent of any particular shape. Following the example set us, 
we might assert a consciousness of something hard but shape- 
less. To do this would be absurd. So also is it to say that 
because an element is uniform under all conditions, it is hide- 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 141 

pendent of condition. One important peculiarity of the uni- 
versal element is that in the concrete it is invariably subject to 
some conditions. In the abstraction, therefore, this peculiarity 
should find expression. Mr. Spencer takes into his abstraction 
an element (existence) fitted for his use, but leaves out an 
equally persistent element (conditionally | which will not con- 
form to his necessity. When this element has found due 
recognition, it will be perceived that the sense of general exist- 
ence is a sense of it as conditioned. Now another 
consideration is equally important. Having formed the notion 
of existence, it is obligatory upon us to consider how far the 
notion corresponds to reality, reality to the notion. In other 

. we do not imagine that there is an entity answering to 
the concept. The most that we do imagine is that there are 
attributes which the concept connotes. A proposal to consider 

attributes as composing a separate existence, instead of 
belonging to the concrete things from which they were theoret- 
ically taken, would in other cases be disposed of by a summary 
exercise of the prerogative to smile. Mr. Spei 

anomaly of abstraction will be only prejudiced by further illu- 
mination. What we contemplate in perceptions and conceptions 
are, he thinks, phenomena. The element, then, which is recog- 
nized as common to them all must, we should think, be phe- 
nomenal. But according to hi- account, we abstract its existence 
from each, and, when we have fused the abstractions, we have a 
notion of the existence of something lying back of all, back of 
even their existence. 

§ 47. All advanced in proof that there exists something 
unconditioned has been noticed, and its inadequacy, it i- hoped, 
made sufficiently manifest. That it may not be thought tint 
the arguments examined are remediable or capable of efficient 
substitution, a lew word- more are uecessaiy. 

Mi-. Spencer's method of proving the existence of "The 
Unconditioned" i- t<> prove consciousness of it. Such oon- 
sciousness as he alleged, observe, is not in strictni rious- 

ness of the object; but is no more, though it may be less, than an 



142 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

idea of the object. Proof of immediate knowledge of a thing 
is proof that it exists; but proof that an idea of it exists does 
not remove all doubt of its existence. It is not enough that 
the idea is necessarily formed, unless the necessity is of a 
peculiar kind. The necessity of forming an abstraction does 
not, as we have lately seen, bespeak an abstract entity, but 
rather favors the reverse. The necessity of forming vague 
ideas of remote causes does not vouch for the existence of 
causes that are as vague as their symbols. Inability to think 
of a conceived existence without thinking of its correlative, 
does not, if real, evidence the actuality, but only the think- 
ability, of this correlative. If it be true that arguments to 
prove the inconceivability of an alleged existence become mean- 
iugless if all thought of this existence be suppressed, it may 
nevertheless be true that to the thought there is nothing corre- 
sponding. There are many ideas which we cannot but form, 
but upon which we cannot rely. We demand, besides proof 
that we are obliged to conceive an unconditioned, proof that we 
are compelled to believe that it exists. Neither has been given. 

Some reliance on a very strange method of proving a con- 
sciousness of "The Unconditioned" is evinced by Mr. Spencer. 
It is by proving an unconditioned consciousness. One objection 
is, that unconditioned consciousness cannot disclose that there is 
something beyond consciousness of which it is the consciousness. 
Known merely as a state of mind, it cannot be known as a 
representative state. To know vicariously that it is consciousness 
of something, is to have some other consciousness of that some- 
thing. Another objection is, that there is no consciousness 
which is unconditioned: in no state of mind is there recognized 
an unmodified element. It could be distinguished only by its 
peculiarities; and peculiarities are peculiar modifications. 

Apropos of the present criticism, are a few words which 
appear in one of the author's quotations from Mansel: "we 
can be conscious of an object, as such, only by knowing it to 
be what it is." Mr. Spencer would have us conscious of "The 
Unconditioned," as unconditioned; and yet not conscious of the 
quality of being unconditioned, but only of the quality of 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 143 

existence. Either we*are not conscious of " The Unconditioned " 
as such (and if we are not, we have no knowledge of its being 
unconditioned); or we are conscious of the very attribute which 
is the only one said to be beyond the bounds of knowledge. 
No matter that the consciousness is called indefinite: if it is so 
indefinite as not to be a realization of the quality of being un- 
conditioned, it is not the consciousness in question. Xo matter 
that there persists in us a sense of something more than we 
deliuitely know: unless it is a sense of something as being 
unconditioned, it is not sufficient. The consciousness is spurious, 
if it is not consciousness of "The Unconditioned" as it is. 

Because he attempted the impossible, Mr. Spencer failed. 
To reason about anything, \< to bring it into relation. To 
reason about //, is to give it distinction. To reason about it, 
is to view it in more than one relation, and therefore to give it 
likeness. The product of Mr. Spencer's speculations is as bad 
as the process. It is the conclusion that we know something 
unconditioned. Yet, by implication, this something is related 
to tie- subject; and at the same time assimilated to, and cou- 
■d with, other things which are objects. 

Would it not be well tor philosophers to refrain from the 
attempt to prove that there exists an unconditioned? Nayj 
would it not be well lor all to repudiate belief in such an 
entity? The answer has been given and confirmed. Acqui- 
escing in reductions to absurdity of all pretended knowledge 
of "The Unconditioned," the effort was to carry them -till 
farther, it would be easy to protraci the criticism but t<> no 
purpose; for, to those who can adopt a myriad of absurdities, 
absurdity i- a recommendation. Whoever decides in accordance 
with the best evidence procurable, will decide againsl the 
existence of anything unconditioned. I think that even Mr. 
Spencer would deny that External Reality is any such thin-, i.' 
bis reasonings in regard t<> it would permit. They will not, 
however. If a thing is not in every particular infinite, the 
ity of contemplating it as not in every particular infinite, 
does not preclude knowing it a- it i-. If it is not entirely 
lacking in relativity, knowing it a- related, i- uol necessarily 



144 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

knowing it as it is not. If it is not absolutely unmodified, the 
conditions under which it is presented, or some of them, may 
belong to itself. Mr. Spencer must maintain belief in some- 
thing which is in itself unconditioned, accepting its absurdities, 
or abandon the argument. The alleged incongruities of 
ultimate religious and ultimate scientific ideas were thought to 
show the non-existence of objects corresponding. Let the 
same rule be applied to the belief in " The Unconditioned." 

§ 48. Had the existence of "The Unconditioned" been 
established, Mr. Spencer's argument would still be wanting. 
No more than assertion has been advanced to show that all 
outside of consciousness is unconditioned. Consciousness of 
"The Unconditioned" has not been described as consciousness 
of " The Unconditioned " as all external to consciousness. It 
was not considered as consciousness of so much. So much, 
however, it must be shown to be, in order to complete the 
argument. The requirement is impossible to meet. Exter- 
nality is a condition. Aside from this, it is impossible, Avhile 
ignorant of things, to know that all are this or all are that. 
The consequence is that the Theistic Realist may affirm con- 
sciousness of an unconditioned God, together with a conscious- 
ness of certain of his conditioned works; believing both to be 
external to the mind. A further consequence is that an Athe- 
istic Realist may imagine that he discerns in the external world 
both qualified material things and an unqualified substratum. 
Both might affirm with Mr. Spencer the existence of an Un- 
conditioned, and nevertheless maintain, without conflict with 
his argument, that some noumena are conditioned. In as 
much as the argument fails to establish that all noumena are 
unconditioned, it fails to establish that all are unknowable. 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 145 



CHAPTER IX. 
The Deductive Arguments Continued. 

The Nature of Life. 

§ 49. There is an important deductive argument yet to be 
investigated. From his conception of Life, Mr. Spencer de- 
duces, as follows, the unknowableness of things outside of 
consciousness. 

"Divesting this conception of all superfluities, and reducing 
it to its most abstract shape, we see that Life is definable as the 
continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations. 
And when we so define it, we discover that the physical and 
the psychical life are equally comprehended by the definition. 
We perceive that this which we call Intelligence, shows itself 
when the external relations to which the internal ones are 
adjusted, begin to be numerous, complex, and remote in time 
or space; that every advance in Intelligence essentially consists 
in the establishment of more varied, more complete, and more 
involved adjustments; and that even the highest achievements 
of science are resolvable into mental relations of co-existence 
and sequence, so co-ordinated as exactly to tally with certain 
relation- of co-existence and sequence that occur externally, 
A caterpillar, wandering at random and at Length finding its 
way on to a plant having a certain odor, begins to cat — has 
inside of it an organic relation between a particular impression 
and a particular set of actions, answering to the relation outside 
of it, between scent and nutriment The sparrow, guided by 
the more complex correlation of impression which the color, 
form, and movement- of the caterpillar gave it; and guided 
also by other correlations which measure the position and dis- 
tance of the caterpillar; adjusts certain correlated muscular 
movement- in such way as to Beize the caterpillar. ' • • And 

10 



146 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

lastly, let it be noted that what we call truth, guiding us to 
successful action and the consequent maintenance of life, is 
simply the accurate correspondence of subjective to objective 
relations ; while error, leading to failure, and therefore towards 
death, is the absence of such accurate correspondence. 

" If, then, Life, in all its manifestations, inclusive of Intelli- 
gence in its highest forms, consists in the continuous adjustment 
of internal relations to external relations, the necessarily rela- 
tive character of our knowledge becomes obvious. The 
simplest cognition being the establishment of some connection 
between subjective states, answering to some connection between 
objective agencies; and each successively more complex cog- 
nition being the establishment of some more involved connection 
of such states, answering to some more involved connection of 
such agencies ; it is clear that the process, no matter how far it 
be carried, can never bring within the reach of Intelligence 
either the states themselves or the agencies themselves. Ascer- 
taining which things occur along with which, and what things 
follow what, supposing it to be pursued exhaustively, must still 
leave us with co-existences aud sequences only. If every act 
of knowing is the formation of a relation in consciousness par- 
allel to a relation in the environment, then the relativity of 
knowledge is self-evident — becomes indeed a truism. Think- 
ing being relationing, no thought can ever express more than 
relations. 

" And here let us not omit to mark how that to which our 
intelligence is confined, is that with which alone our intelli- 
gence is concerned. The knowledge within our reach, is the 
only knowledge that can be of service to us. This maintenance 
of a correspondence between internal actions and external 
actions, which both constitutes our life at each moment and is 
the means whereby life is continued through subsequent mo- 
ments, merely requires that the agencies acting upon us shall 
be known in their co-existences and sequences, and not that 
they shall be known in themselves. If x and y are two uni- 
formly connected properties in some outer object, while a and b 
are the effects they produce in our consciousness; and if while 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 147 

the property x produces in us the indifferent mental state a, the 
property y produces in us the painful mental state b (answering 
to a physical injury); then, all that is requisite for our guidance, 
is, that x being the uniform accompaniment of y externally, 
a shall be the uniform accompaniment of b internally; so 
that when by the presence of x, a is produced in conscious- 
lies.-, b, or rather the idea of b, shall follow it and excite the 
motions by which the effect of y may be escaped. The sole 
need is that a and b and the relation between them, shall always 
answer to x and y and the relation between them. It matters 
nothing to us if a and b are like x and y or not. Could they 
be exactly identical with them, w T e should not be one whit the 
better off; and their total dissimilarity is no disadvantage to us. 
"Deep down in the very nature of Life, the relativity of our 
knowledge is discernible. The analysis of vital actions in 
general, leads not only to the conclusion that things in them- 
selves cannot be known to us; but also to the conclusion that 
knowledge of them, were it possible, would be useless." (First 
Prin., §25.) 

§ 50. Let us be careful to understand the author. Does he 
mean to say that intellection is the establishment of relation- in 
the mind parallel to relations in "The Unknowable?" lie 
cannot mean this. Throughout those chapters in his Biology 

and Psychology which exhibit Life as correspondence, there is 

no intimation that the environment, SO often mentioned, is 
other than phenomenal. Indeed his view- will not permit 
BUch an intimation. Wen; he to grant that light, heat, air, 
earth, water, and Other element- of a plant'.- environment 

are aoumena, he could not conceive them save at the expense of 
his theory of knowledge, should he concede thai any of the 
multitudinous objects, properties, activities, relations, to which, 
as he shows us, animal life corresponds, is an extra-mental 

reality, he would thereby concede to ug a knowledge of auch a 
reality. If lie will maintain the impossibility of knowing 

things beyond the mind, he musl consider the mind'- environ- 
ment, including the bodily organism, a.- lying wholly within the 



148 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

mind's circumference. What, then, is the portent of his defi- 
nition of intelligence? It must be that every act of intellec- 
tion is the establishment of relations in one (the subjective ) 
order of mental states, so as to correspond with relations which 
establish themselves in another (the objective) order of mental 
states. Such being its interpretation, the definition will not 
support the deduction Mr. Spencer would make, without an 
identification which he would not make — an identification of 
"The Unknowable" with objective appearances. For what is 
it that cannot be transcended but relations among states belong- 
ing to the subjective order of mental affections? This brings 
the objective order into that- relation to the subjective order 
which " The Unknowable " was to be proved to bear. To re- 
tain the objective order as objects of cognition — and, as they 
are said to lie within consciousness, they must be so retained — it 
must be admitted that relations among states of the subjective 
order are transcended by thought. But this again, leaves room 
for the supposition that "The Unknowable" may be an object 
of thought. The argument from the nature of life, as we have 
interpreted it, means nothing, unless objective appearances are 
(as far as they go) to be identified with "The Unknowable." 
It seems that unless we adopt the interpretation which at 
first we rejected, Mr. Spencer's reasoning must appear unintelli- 
gible. We will do so. We will suppose that he means to 
define intellectual life as the establishment of mental relations 
correspondent to the relations of things in themselves. The 
definition before us is not the one which he has in so many 
places taken so much pains to establish. Declaring, arguing, 
reiterating, again and again, that life, including mind, is 
correspondence, he has not advanced one word to prove that 
mental activity corresponds to more than mental affectability. 
Wisely so, it would seem on inquiring what could be said to 
the purpose. Induction can bear no testimony while experience 
of things in themselves is denied. Deduction is equally mute, 
unless the nature of things out of consciousness be drawn into 
the reasoning process. What brings us intelligence that " The 
Unknowable" is not an entirely homogeneous and inert entity, 






THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 149 

by acting upon which in various ways, the mind induces, as 
reactions, what are called "The Unknowable's" effects? If 
unmodified, external reality is homogeneous. If homogeneous, 
it is inert; for activity, being different from its substance, is 
inconsistent with absolute homogeneity. To illustrate: when 
percipient of hardness, none can readily decide whether he 
perceives the force of something external acting upon the mind, 
or the mind's activity reflected back upon itself. We have 
readied a conception of mental activity which, besides not 
being fitted for Mr. Spencer's deduction, supports, as we shall 
see, an opposite one. The mind being all that is modified or 
active; "The Unknowable" being homogeneous and inert; 
there are no forms or activities belonging to " The Unknowable." 
One attribute is all there is to know about it: this attribute we 
know: there is no other to which our activities correspond, but 
which we do not know. If Mr. Spencer's argument is to be 
revived, this conception of "The Unknowable" must be 
abolished, and another established in its stead. Primarily it 
must be rendered evident that "The Unknowable" is the 
environment of the mind. This cannot be done without 
assimilating "The Unknowable" to that mass of appcaran< 
the External World. Here we must take away something of 
which we have long suffered Mr. Spencer to hold unlawful 
possession. He has no right to conceive "The Unknowable" 
a- surrounding the mind in the same way that objective things 
seem to surround it, or, in fact, as surrounding it at all. lie 
has no righl to make use of Spacial externality, fur lie denies of 
it more than apparent existence; QOT "I' temporal externality, 
for he all< ws no time to noumena. There is a kind of ex- 
ternality which he may better employ. Love IS external 1 
hate; pain, to pleasure; belief, to disbelief : lei him think that 
in something like the same manner, "The Unknowable n is 
externa] to the mind. Bui it' he does this, his conception of 
correspondence will lade from thought. No: he must, as he 
doe-, give to "The Unknowable" spacia] and temporal exter- 
nality. This assimilation of the reality beyond conscdousn 
to objective appearances, musl necessarily !><• carried much 



150 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

further. The alleged correspondence remains to be manifested. 
It is a correspondence of internal to external activities. But 
the outward activities cannot be conceived except as activities 
of some substance, nor except as taking place in space and time. 
Mr. Spencer's definition of intelligence, then, is realized bv 
picturing, inter alia, extra-mental substance acting in time and 
space. What is this but the abstract of all appearances? The 
second interpretation, as well as the first, makes Mr. Spencer's 
argument concern appearances, but nothing else. Any attempt 
to make it concern something else must be futile so long as the 
something else is beyond our ken; and, to complete the circle, 
success would be an assimilation of "The Unknowable " to the 
known — an identification of "The Unknowable" with objec- 
tive appearances. 

Which of the two interpretations Mr. Spencer would have 
us put upon his definition, we care not. In his own mind, I 
think it not unjust to say, there was a confusion of both. He 
evidently did not remark that it makes a vast difference 
whether we assert Intelligence to be a mental correspondence 
with mental affections, or with modifications of the reality 
outside. Putting phenomena only into the premises, he cer- 
tainly expected to obtain only noumena in the conclusion. The 
reason that he and others fail to observe how sophistical is the 
argument, appears to be that when following it in thought they 
identify external appearances with the reality which is to be 
proved unknowable. That doing this should not be perceived 
to conflict with the conclusion, I cannot explain. 

§ 51. For the purpose of further testing Mr. Spencer's 
reasoning, let us lose sight of the distinction which he has not 
observed, while we entertain the reflections which are to follow. 

Cognizance of things in themselves is, in many eases at 
least, resolvable into relations in consciousness parallel to rela- 
tions in the environment. If this is so, Mr. Spencer's definition 
is as agreeable to our views as to his own. And is it not so? 
The correspondence asserted between internal and external 
relations is merely such an adaptation of internal modes to 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 151 

external influences as is promotive of life. When internal 
relations are such that external relations preventive of life are 
counterbalanced, and external relations promotive of life are 
taken advantage of, the correspondence is said to exist. An 
internal relation through which an external relation is properly 
met, either co-operatively or adversely, by internal activity, 
corresponds to such external relation. Now, the knowledge 
that a harmless must be followed by a harmful external mode, 
contains a relation that will prompt an avoidance of the first to 
escape the baneful effect of the second. The relation between 
the ideas of the two modes corresponds to the relation between 
the mode-. And this can be none the less true if the ideas are 
genuine representations. Knowledge of things certainly should 
lead as t<> respond to their relations as intelligently as knowl- 
edge of merely their effects. AVe have reason to consider 
cognitions of things in themselves to be the most valuable 
links in that chain of internal causation which best answers 
to the chain of external causation. 

Mr. Spencer has -aid nothing antagonistic to this except that, 
a knowledge of externalities would be no more useful than an 
acquaintance with nothing more than the co-existences and 
Bequences of their internal correlatives. lie does not deny the 
former kind of comprehension to be at least as useful a- the 
latter; which is a fact of some significance. To the assertion 
that, given the knowledge which he allows, there i- no need 
for the knowledge which he denies, the first reply i-, that a 
converse assertion would put him to proof that possession of 
absolute knowledge would not obviate the necessity for a large 
quantity of relative knowledge otherwise Invaluable, The 
second reply is that nature d<.<^ not usually choose a Bingle 
course; that among her ways and means there are many super- 
numeraries. Co-existences and sequences of mental effects are 
doubtless at one stage of it- development all, or nearly all, the 
data intelligence ha- by which to guide it- conduct in relation 
to the nniverse beyond; but this is evidence that Evolution. 
which is a universal advancement, has brought us into possession 
of a better guide. 



152 THE DEDUCTIVE AKGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

But Mr. Spencer has advanced the dogma that an under- 
standing of the nature of things is not a better guide. Proof 
before assertion is in order. What proof is possible? None, 
so long as things in themselves are inscrutable. While, how- 
ever, no proof is possible, much is demandable. It must be 
shown that internal to "The Unknowable" the same anteced- 
ents are followed by the same consequents, and that the same 
agencies outside of consciousness always work the same effects 
within. This is not necessarily true, if "The Unknowable" 
be unconditioned, or if it be absolutely unrestricted in potenti- 
ality. With proof in regard to externalities, there 
must come proof in regard to internalities. It must be shown 
that conceptions built of co-existences and sequences form as 
good symbols as would true ideas of things. I think this can- 
not be shown because the contrary is true. The representation 
of a thing as it is, would enable us to lay aside many of its 
relations to other things; whereas, in as far as ideas deviate 
from genuineness, they are involved with relations which, being 
numerous, are cumbersome. Qualities of things are relatively 
simple in comparison with their important co-existences and 
sequences. Symbols which are easiest to frame, which can co- 
exist in the mind in the greatest number and diversity, which 
are most readily separated and combined, are the best. They 
render truth obtainable by shortest process, and they bring 
within our reach truth which, but for their perfection, would 
be inaccessible. But waiving the question of superiority, sym- 
bols resembling things are, if we have the capacity for con- 
structing them, capable of being developed by fewer experiences 
than symbols not resembling things. The difference is between 
a mere construction, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
preparing the materials and doing the work. How well is 
this exemplified in the case of our fellow beings. If I had no 
true realization of another's emotions, but depended upon their 
sensible manifestations for my knowledge of how to act in relation 
to them, more experience than I could ever have would be 
required to keep me out of errors which I constantly avoid. 
That a word should produce a blow, would be an inexplicable 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 153 

mystery to me. Experiences sufficient, to teach me so little as 
an understanding of what words are likely to call forth blows, 
would be so multitudinous as to overwhelm any mind with 
confusion. It cannot be improbable that in other cases simi- 
larities, and capabilities of similarity, between internalities and 
externalities, greatly advance the development of symbols. 
Improbable or not, likeness of thoughts to tilings would 
be a blessing; its impossibility, a curse: and this is the 
reverse of what Mr. Spencer is secondarily called upon to 
prove. To proof he must add disproof. Some 

troublesome facts are for him to explain away. Pie should 
not be unmindful that mankind is, and long has been, 
Struggling to comprehend the great Noumenon. In the effort 
we recognize a kind of life. This should correspond with 
Life's conditions, and, if to be ultimately successful, certainly 
does so. Success would make an end of unsuccessful effort; 
which is the benefit Mr. Spencer is striving to confer. It 
would do far more. Though fruitless effort may develop, 
fruitful effort develops most. Perpetual defeat would drive 
noble minds disheartened from the field of speculation; slight 
success would encourage them to try new conquests. There is 
exultation in propitious search for truth; and, could it ever 
exhaust reality, it would leave us with a valuable acquisition. 
"Man shall not live by bread alone." Mental food exhilarates 
the mind, prolonging life. Truth is a possession in which 
[. is a perpetual delight independent of its usefulness, being 
in strictness a most useful product. It does seem, therefore, that 
a comprehension of things beyond the ego would answer 
urgenl requirements of life. 

Were absolute knowledge incapable of being brought under 

Mi*. Spencer's definition of life, and were it entirely a super- 
fluity, it might -till be classed with a kind of life to which the 

definition does not extend. Life varies from COITespondi D 

far ;i- to he in Borne cases absolute Don-correspondence, No 
one can deny this who recognizee an effort to grasp the «-\t« rnal, 
and endeavors to dissuade us from it. Numerous other illus- 
trations might be mentioned. The struggles of one assailed, to 



154 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

evade the assassin's steel, are no more a part of life than are 
the movements by which a suicide severs his j ugular vein. Since, 
therefore, life presents all degrees from correspondence to non- 
correspondence, it was not imperative to show that absolute 
knowledge comes within Mr. Spencer's 'definition of life, or is 
fitted to respond to life's necessities. Though it be unquestion- 
able that the correspondence promotive of life could be as well, 
or even better, carried on without absolute knowledge, such 
knowledge may nevertheless be a kind of intellectual life. 

§ 52. Here must be entered an important complaint against 
the definition of life advanced by the author. The definition 
is, at best, only proximate. For many purposes it is very 
available; for our purposes, far too narrow. In Kfe we find 
correspondence of internal to external relations; but this very 
assertion implies that we find more. Correspondence of in- 
ternal relations to relations that are external, involves also an 
internal correspondence to the connections between these two 
sets of relations — that is, with the relations between externalities 
and internalities. A correspondence more important 

than this kind has been slighted. I mean the correspondence 
of internal relations to internal relations. Is not consciousness 
itself to be considered when the problem is what will best conduce 
to its own welfare? Does not correspondence with the same 
external objects vary according to the nature of the life for 
whose benefit the correspondence exists? Does not the mind 
often banish thoughts which tend to disturb it; and otherwise 
perform operations which have no relevancy to things outside, 
or, at least, have preponderating relevancy to things within? 
Supposing that these questions carry satisfactory answers, we 
pass to a third defect in the definition. The correspon- 

dence which life exhibits, is not merely between relations, but 
between things. Relations must have terms. If these terms, 
in some instances, be themselves relations, they still imply ulti- 
mate terms which are not relations. All relations take every 
vestige of their natures from the natures of these ultimate 
terms. A correspondence, therefore, of relations to relations, 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 155 

is fundamentally a correspondence of things to things. Xo 
doubt can be entertained that Mr. Spencer conceives life to be 
in reality a correspondence of the latter kind ; but he does not 
always reason in conformity with such view. He admits 
(Prin. of Biology, § 30) that to say that his definition includes 
"those structural arrangements which enable the organism to 
adapt its actions to actions in the environment, may perhaps be 
going too far;" and he must admit that it is going too far to 
say that the definition includes those forms of consciousness 
which compose the structure and sustain the relations of 
thought. There is a way of avoiding the three faults 

noticed; namely, by saying that life manifests an effort to 
correspond with the conditions to which it is subject. Then, 
besides external relations, we include those of which one term 
is internal, and those of which both terms are internal. Then, 
besides relations, we include things. 

To what purpose the correction is made, will be appreciated 
if the reader will once more reflect that absolute knowledge of 
anything would constitute a link in the chain of correspondence 
to it. Knowledge of connections between external and internal 
conditions, would facilitate correspondence to such connections; 
and the like may be said with regard to conditions purely in- 
ternal. In short: a knowledge of all the conditions, both 
without and within, to which we are Subject, would i'all under 
a proper description of the correspondence of life. Absolute 

knowledge of the subject proves to be, as well as absolute 

knowledge of the object, a kind of correspondence well fitted 
for life's requirements. 

To what purpose the correction IS made, may he better 

appreciated by bringing it to bear upon the assertion, that 
"thinking being relationing, no thought can ever express more 
than relation-." The sounder doctrine i- that thinking being 
relationing of things, expresses things as well a- th< ir relations 
— expresses, besides co-existences and sequences, the things 
which co-exist with and follow one another. States <>f mind are 
known in consciousness. If this is nut too obvious t.» require 
proof, it can be established by adverting to the truism, sometimes 



156 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 

employed by the author, that consciousness of relation implies 
consciousness of both its terms. But states are things, not rela- 
tions: if expressed in consciousness, more than relations are 
there expressed. Suppose the internal things expressed tell us 
of external things: then external things are expressed in thought. 
Knowledge of things, as well as knowledge of relations, would 
fall properly under a description of life's correspondences. 

§ 53. Once more we shall turn to Mr. Spencer's definition 
to find fault with it. After the corrections which were found 
necessary, life would be defined as the correspondence of internal 
conditions to conditions both external and internal. But 
the definition still calls up a very erroneous conception of life. 
When we view life, its correspondences are very conspicuous; 
but we cannot repress the feeling that life essentially consists of 
more than correspondence. The end of the correspondence is 
to perpetuate life. Plow differently it sounds to say that the 
end of the correspondence is to perpetuate the correspondence. 
It is not the correspondence which is to be perpetuated. That 
which is to be perpetuated is some form, some activity, which 
struggles to persist; the correspondence is only ancillary. What 
the essence of life is, what in every case distinguishes that mode 
of existence which forms the beneficiary term of the corre- 
spondence, I shall not surmise; but I will remark that among 
its manifestations are considerable self-preservation, a repug- 
nance to loss of identity by deterioration, a tendency to attain 
higher forms. In these interests correspondence is employed ; to 
these interests it is subservient. In as far as knowledge of things 
is not resolvable into correspondence, it may be one of those 
higher modes of life which it is the function of correspondence 
to produce and to prolong. As all life is not correspondence, 
something not correspondence may be a mode of life. 

§ 54. So many ways of depriving Mr. Spencer of his de- 
duction have been discovered tliat a recapitulation will not be 
amiss. From a definition which expresses nothing but phe- 
nomena, the deduction cannot be drawn, because it is to concern 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONTINUED. 157 

noumena. It cannot be drawn from the natures of noumena. 



because they are professedly inscrutable. Aside from this 
fundamental difficulty, are considerations equally conclusive. 
Absolute knowledge may be brought under the definition 
supposed to preclude it. Instead of being superfluous, it is 
Indispensable. Had we found it as unlike correspondence as 
non-correspondence is, there would have been no difficulty in 
finding modes of life with which to class it. Upon unavoidable 
correction, we learned that the definition extends to absolute 
knowledge of the subject as well as the object; and that it 
covers a knowledge of things no less than relations. Lastly, 
it appeared that correspondence is not life, but for life — that 
there is something in life worth preserving besides correspond- 
ence; and it was intimated that absolute knowledge might be 
claimed to fall to some extent under this description. 



158 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 



CHAPTER X. 

The Deductive Arguments Concluded. 

The Power of Thought to Transcend Consciousness. 

§ 55. How can the mind have cognizance of what lies 
beyond its confines? is a question which has doubtless at many 
points presented itself to the reader, awakening in him a sus- 
picion that Mr. Spencer's conclusion must be valid, though his 
arguments be void. The difficulty of imagining the process 
by which thought can deal with objects outside of consciousness, 
often has been, and often will be, the potent reason for rejecting 
Realism. Of this difficulty Mr. Spencer does not fail to take 
advantage. The advantage, though indirect, is great. It is 
advantage issuing from constant suggestion of the difficulty. 
The difficulty is suggested by mere expression of the nescience 
theory, and by all the arguments in its behalf; particularly by 
the deductive arguments, and most particularly by the deduc- 
tive argument last under consideration. Independent of its 
suggestiveness, there is little power of conviction in such an 
argument as the following. " If every act of knowing is the 
formation of a relation in consciousness parallel to a relation in 
the environment, then the relativity of knowledge is self-evi- 
dent — becomes indeed a truism." When this is understood to 
mean that "thinking; being; relationing, no thought can ever 
express more than relations," it is easy to refute by pointing 
out that, as relations imply terms, terms, no less than relations, 
are expressed in thought. But there is difficulty in dis- 
abusing the mind of the impression which the argument 
raises, that thought taking place wholly within consciousness, 
cannot, for this reason, transcend consciousness. To prove this 
a false impression — to show the possibility of realizing the 
external, is the object of the present chapter. 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 159 

§ 56. The mystery seems to be that the thought should ex- 
press more thau the thought contaius. By those who propound 
it as destructive of Realism, it is overlooked that a like mystery 
is presented in every act of memory or anticipation. What I 
experienced yesterday, and what I will experience to-morrow, 
are present in thought, though absent in reality. It is the same 
with all imagination ; it is the same with all conception. Concede 
that a thought may express more than itself, or believe nothing 
that you do not find in present consciousness; for only when 
conscious of a thing, are the thing and the thought the same. 

No better than the Realist, can Mr. Spencer escape the 
problem of how thought can transcend consciousness. He 
divides -tares of consciousness into two orders — the subjective 
order, and the objective order; the latter being what the Realist 
is said to mistake for things beyond the mind. But observe 
the implication: knowledge of the objective order, both pre- 
sentative and representative, belongs to the subjective order — ■ 
lie- outside, we might say this side, of the order distinguished 
as objective, Thought, then, does transcend the consciou>ne>s 
of which it consists, and the question remains — How? 

The concession which, in view of these considerations, all 
must make, amounts to this: that no <i priori improbability 
that a fact can be construed in thought, arises from the circum- 
stance that it is external to thought. 

§ 57. Catholicity of a belief is much in its favor. It is doI 
everything; it may not always be sufficient \ it may sometimes 
be overcome by contravening circumstances ; yd it is much, very 
much. Our author .-ays that "the convictions entertained by 

many mind- in eonmion are the mo.-t Likely t<> have BOme 

foundation." (Firsl IVin., ^ 1.) What belief is nearer uni- 
versal than that things external to the mind are cognizable by it '.' 
All persons during a considerable portion of life, raoel through- 
out Life, never think of rejecting it; and, from the actions of 
inferior animals, it is evident thai they possess it t<>". 

Spontaneity, no Less than catholicity, is significant With 
metaphysicians Mr. Spencer finds great fault, because they rely 



160 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

more on long chains of reasoning than upon a single link. 
Very justly he charges them with employing extended ratiocina- 
tion to abolish intuition. Would that he had avoided their 
error. Belief in knowledge of things extra-mental is assuredly 
an intuition. How inferior would have been its claims, if it 
had been the tardy product of reasoning as elaborate as that 
which is expected to drive it from our minds. Had it been 
such, we would have been reminded that the farther a belief 
varies from a pure intuition the less reliance should be placed 
upon it. I cannot insist on this as an invariable rule, but 
only on its applicability to the particular case in which we 
are now interested. Did Mr. Spencer's reasoning contain con- 
tiguous intuitions, it would, as a whole, be no weaker than the 
weakest; and might, because of convergence, be much stronger. 
But there is a presumption to the contrary difficult to rebut. 
In the very extended process of reasoning in question, error 
may have crept in through misinterpretation of intuitions, 
through the suppression of intuitions, through the introduction 
of something not intuitional. Where there were the most 
errors to be avoided, there is the greatest likelihood that some 
have been committed. We have witnessed many indications 
that a host of aberrations would be driven from philosophy, if 
each of the many judgments forming the basis of Agnosticism 
should be subjected to as severe a test as that which Mr. Spen- 
cer has applied to the single judgment which forms the basis of 
Realism. A general deficiency must be particularly remarked. 
What, in his arguments, Mr. Spencer would claim as intuitions, 
are in many instances exceedingly lacking in spontaneity. It 
requires an effort of the mind to produce them, instead (as in 
the case of the conviction they are supposed to exclude) of an 
unavailing effort to suppress. So much more likely is it that 
some of them are not intuitions ; so much more likely is it that 
error accompanies them if they are. The product of the pro- 
cess is more lacking in spontaneity than any step of the process 
itself. Mr. Spencer's arguments, where they produce conviction, 
do not leave such a powerful belief as the one they are intended 
to remove. The conditions of the latter being presented, it 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 161 

wells up in consciousness with a power that is irresistible The 
conditions of the former — that is, the fullest realization of 
Mr. Spencer's arguments — being presented, it conies, when it 
does come, the ghost of a belief which the mere crowimr of a 
cock will dispel like other phantoms. I will not say that 
Mr. Spencer even endeavored to raise his peculiar nescience 
doctrine to the status of an intuition. All that I dwell upon 
i- the probability that he ha- not done so. But if he ha-, he 
has done no more for his cause than nature had already done 
for ours. 

These arguments from catholicity and spontaneity are very 
important. If they were not so clearly and firmly grasped by 
the mind as to find concise statement, they would receive more 
consfderation than has been, or is likely to be, devoted to them. 
Their very strength is the cause of their usual argumentative 
inefficiency. Mr. Spencer has not given to them that attention 
which their importance calls for. By drawing a distinction, he 
thinks to dispose of them. The existence of an external reality 
he admit- we know; more of it than it> existence he contends 
we do not know. The intuition of something external i- to be 
relied on as far a- it i- an intuition of existence, and no 
farther. VThere is the justification of the distinction? It is 
not to be found in any want of persistence in the rejected 
elements of the intuition. As strenuously as "common 
asserts the existence of a reality," i\<n- it a— en other attributes 
of tin- reality — its spaciaJ extension, for instance. It i- a- 
easy to banish the reality from the mind, a- n<>t t<> think of 
it a- spacially extended. We can go further towards con- 
ceiving impressions as produced within the subject by the 
subject, than towards conceiving the subject a- not surrounded 
by space. The verdict, or rather the testimony, of common 
sense is not in favor of Mr. Spencer's views. It derides that 
something exists, and partially how it i 
the weight of its authority, so great is it- opposition n> Trans- 
figured Realism. Every portion of the verdict is spontaneous 
and catholic This consideration i- urged, i:"t a- one that i- 

decisive, but as one that i- vr\ 

ii 



162 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

§ 58. That there is some kind of process by which the 
mind can take cognizance of more than itself, is clearly asserted 
by declaring that the existence of something absolutely exter- 
nal is cognizable. When once it is conceded that the mind can 
look out beyond itself and discern existence, the cry that it is 
impossible for intelligence to contemplate other qualities, merely 
because they are external to it, must be hushed. " Thinking 
being relationing, no thought can ever express more than rela- 
tions/ 7 says the author. How is it with the thought of external 
existence? If this expresses no more than relation, why call 
the thought of qualities other than existence illusive, even if it 
does express no more than relation? The fact, however, is 
that the thought of noumenal existence expresses more than 
this ; for existence is neither a relation nor an aggregate of rela- 
tions. There is, therefore, no absurdity in the belief that thought 
expresses other external things which are not resolvable into re- 
lations. When Mr. Spencer professed to know that " The Un- 
knowable" exists, he destroyed the argument from its externality. 

In light of these remarks, the implications commented on in 
Chapter II. are seen to have an importance which did not there 
appear. The whole inductive argument is based on the sup- 
position that things in themselves are congruous. By what 
power of thought is extra-mental congruity ascertained and 
realized? Whatever the power it matters not: it is of the kind 
whose possibility is here contended for. Looking out beyond 
itself, intelligence sees, besides existence, congruity; and con- 
gruity of the external can be realized only by means of some 
modification of thought which expresses more than the in- 
ternal. One deductive argument rests on the postulate 
that "The Unknowable" is unconditioned. The use of this 
argument is an assertion in still another form that there is a 
process by which intelligence brings externalities within its 
ken; that there is a mode of thought that expresses reality 
beyond. The mind's ability to look out beyond itself and 
perceive unconditionally, is, if real, the power of thought to 
transcend consciousness. In the attempted deduction 
from the nature of life, the same intellectual feat is affirmed. 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 163 

An evidence that "The Unknowable" is unknowable, was 
thought to be that it is the mind's environment. Looking out- 
ward, the mind observes that something lies outside around 
about it. The process by which it sees so much, is one truly 
analogous to seeing; one by which intellectual sight is brought 
to bear upon external things. That external reality is 

a universal cause, is a proposition, on the truth of which an 
important argument depends. The amount of knowledge of 
the external which this implies is very considerable. Looking 
beyond the mind, something is perceived to be the cause of all 
that is external, and of all impressions of externality. Look- 
ing back of the mind, the same thing is seen to underlie and 
support all states of consciousness. Truly, then, the mind is 
believed to by some process obtain, and by some mode express, 
more fact than is contained within itself. Even the 

belief that noumena are unknowable, is an assertion that mind 
can contemplate more than mental affections. Viewed in one 
Light, onknowableness is the inability of something to assume 
Buch a character that our faculties for knowing can be brought 
to bear upon it. If we know this of noumena, we know what 
is not in consciousness. , After what has been said, all 

of Mr. Spencer's persuasion must allow- that intelligence i- of 
such a nature that it can transcend relation- in eonscioufi 
fbr the knowledge which their theory assumes i- not confined 
to such relation-. Farewell, then, t<> the deduction from the 
nature of life; farewell to any argument from externality. 

We must not overlook the most conspicuous and Important In- 
stance in which the intellect is believed by all n» grasp more than 
the internal. Any one who agrees or disagrees with my views 
concerning knowledge, does bo on tin' supposition that, in what 
is to him the environment, are mind- essentially like big ,,\ Vr ,. 
It' the Gad is otherwise, he may indeed trace the limit- of his 
own intellectual capabilities; but in no case can he, without 
penetrating his environment, set a limit t<> the capabiliti 
other intelligence. It i- not n> be supposed, however, thai any 
one will be perverse enough to deny that hi- environment eon- 
tains mind- similar to hi- own. Mr. Spencer in part ieular 



164 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

cannot deny it; for his theory of nescience is a theory 
concerning all minds, and was published for the instruction of 
human minds that they might learn their essential impotence. 
"With what credibility, then, comes the assertion that no mind 
can perform the operation of intellection with respect to aught 
beyond relations within itself. With less than none; since the 
assertion implies that the operation has already been performed. 

Glad to extend this confutation to all forms of anti-Realism, 
and not unwilling to give further evidence of Mr. Spencer's 
conviction that to transcend consciousness is to some extent pos- 
sible, I cite the following. " Among the many contradictions 
which anti-Realistic hypotheses involve, is the contradiction 
between the assertion that consciousness cannot be transcended 
and the assertion that there exists nothing beyond consciousness. 
For if we can in no way be aware of anything beyond con- 
sciousness, what can suggest either the affirmation or the denial 
of it? and how can even denial of it be framed in thought? 
The very proposition that consciousness cannot be transcended 
admits of being put together only by representing a limit, and 
consequently implies some kind of consciousness of something 
beyond the limit." (Prin. of Psy., § 442.) 

From all orders of philosophers, it seems, may be wrung the 
admission, implied when not expressed, that cognizance of ex- 
ternality in some shape or manner is a fact. Whoever makes 
the admission thereby deprives himself of the argument that 
there is or may be something which cannot be known, because 
to know it would be to transcend consciousness. 

§ 59. Several separate arguments, ranging from strong to irre- 
sistible, converge in the doctrine that knowledge of the mind's 
environment is not a psychological impossibility. How the 
mind can, as we say, grasp that which is not contained within 
itself is still a mystery; but that it does so has been shown to be 
ad mitted. By Mr. Spencer the mystery is accepted as a fact, with- 
out an explanation. An explanation of the mystery he cannot, 
therefore, require of us. As, however, it would greatly 
strengthen Realism, a solution shall be attempted. 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 165 

§ 60. The Philosophy of The Unknowable presents many 
aspects. Some are but slightly intimated here and then 
Mr. Spencer, and some can scarcely be said to be intimated at 
all. Each aspect has implications peculiar to itself, which, if 
definitely wrought out, would terminate in a vindication of 
Realism. One such aspect is to be here applied to our pui 
Mr. Spencer is favorable to the doctrine, "that it is alike our 
highest wisdom and our highest duty to regard that through 
which all things exist as Tin* Unknowable." (First Prim. ^ 31. ) 
By Buch expressions, often repeated, he trie- to impress on us 
the propriety of contemplating "The Unknowable" a- "the 
Cause of all things." Suppose we follow his direction. The 
Cause of all things produced mint}. Plow are we t<» conceive 
this? Undoubtedly as Mr. Spencer in fact conceives it: pre- 
viously there existed an active substance, which occupied -pace 
and consumed time; from certain activities of this substance, 
resulted certain modes called states of mind. The conception 
is fundamentally like that of Materialism, and that of extreme 
Spiritualism. Each of the three theories postulates a funda- 
mental something, and regards states of mind as among its 
modes. From this point there is divergence. These evolved 
modes Mr. Spencer proposes to consider t<> be, excepting in 
respect of the quality of existence, absolutely unlike any other 
modes of that of which they are mud.-. There never was a 
arranted presumption. At hand there is Che means <»t" 
driving him from it. Not enlarging upon the probabilities «•<" 

accidental similarity, it ifl certain that that which is a mode i^ 

essentially like anything else whicb is a mode. The hi 

must be still greater where the compared modes are i I< - of 

the same thing. There are, therefore, Mr. Spencer being wit- 
ness, similarities between mind and not-mind. 

Bui this conclusion, from which there is for Mr. Spencer do 
complete escapei is one thai be will oo4 accept In hi- work 
on Psychology (§§77—95) he devotes two chapters to the 
prop- .-it i<-n that feelings and the relations between feelings are 
qualitatively and quantitatively absolutely unlike thin- I 
relations between things. Tu<> considerations operate in 



166 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

of a brief attempt at refutation: one, that unlikeness of 
thoughts to things is not to the majority the equivalent of the 
latter's unknowableness ; the other, that the dissertations to be 
refuted consist (not improperly) in manifold repetition of the 
same thing. 

Mr. Spencer's proof consists principally in an enumeration 
of cases in which the same cause produces various effects in 
consciousness. For example: "The quality and the quantity 
of the sensation produced by a given amount of a given ex- 
terual force, vary not only with the structure of the organism, 
specific and individual, as well as the structure of the part 
affected, but also with the age, the constitutional state, the state 
of the part as modified by temperature, circulation, and pre- 
vious use, and even with the relative motion of subject and 
object." (Prin. of Psy., § 86.) 

The fundamental fallacy of this kind of reasoning is, of course, 
that it posits knowledge of that of which all knowledge is denied. 
But in this particular case, the knowledge presupposed is that 
the unknown cause is unlike its effects; which is the proposition 
to be established, and which cannot be realized unless it be 
untrue. The unlikeness which is presupposed is 

the antithesis between constancy and variability. It is assumed 
that the cause is constant while the effect varies with subjective 
conditions; whence it is inferred that the cause and the effect are 
absolutely unlike. How, it must be asked, may it be ascer- 
tained that the cause is the same while the effect is different? 
In no way, it must be answered, unless there is some manner 
of learning the constancy of the cause. That he assumes 1 the 
constancy of the cause, Mr. Spencer admits: "the validity 
of the argument depends wholly on the existence of the com- 
mon antecedent as something that has remained unchanged 
while consciousness has been changing." ( Prin. of Psy., § 88. ) 
He can allege no warrant for such assumption ; since contin- 
uance of existence (all that he professes to know of noumena) 
is continuance of existence only — not continuance of any par- 
ticular state. Persistence of the cause does not amount to 
persistence of any one of its possible modes. He admits that 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 167 

the cause is capable of activity: "the inference is valid onlv 
supposing the activity to which these different sensations are 
referred, is an activity out of ourselves which has not been mod- 
ified by our own activities." (Prill. Psy., § 88.) Capable of 
activity, the cause may be supposed to vary with the variations in 
the effect, unless we know it far enough to be able to decide that it 
does not. To know so much is as essential as it is fatal to the 
conclusion sought. What, besides a suicidal begging of the 
question docs it involve? It will not take us long to 

learn that it involves abolition of the conclusion. The most 
general, as well as one of the most persistent, of internal effects of 
an external cause is the idea of such cause. Our warrant for, 
and our means of, thinking that the cause is constant is the 
constancy of an idea. This brings us to a dilemma. If we 
say that the idea and the thing are similar in respect of con- 
stancy, we must reject the conclusion that there is no resemblance 
between ideas and things. On the other hand, if we say that 
the idea and the thing bear no resemblance in respect of con- 
Btancy; then, since the idea of external being is constant, 
external being is not constant; which deprives us of the 
ground- on which the conclusion is founded. Were the con- 
stancy in question persistence of existence, instead of persistence 
of mod.-, this consequence mighl be escaped; but in such < 
th<- conclusion could not be established, since it depends <>n 
constancy of state in tin- cause answering to inconstancy of 
state in the effect. Tim- we are led back n> the starting 

point. The argument presupposes knowledge that the cause 
i- constant in corresponding respects, and in the same degree, as 
its effects are inconstant. And when we try to think of the 
cause as thus proved to be unlike it- effects in thought, we find 
we are proceeding on the assumption thai it i- like one of the 
mosl important of them; that is, our idea of it. 

Mr. Spencer's failure t<> observe that the idea of a cause 
must be constant in such wise as we think of the cause as con- 
stant, introduces t«> as a second order ->!" fallacies. In do 
instance which has been cited, or could have been cited, i- th< 
any means <>i' determining that the cause ha- not varied, exo pt 



168 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

the fact that its effects present some degree, and a considerable 
degree, of invariability. Take this example: "when the Sun 
is seen in the midst of the sky, with none but great angular 
spaces between it and the horizon, it looks very much less than 
it does when close to the horizon, where the angular space it 
subtends is comparable side by side with small angular spaces." 
(Prin. of Psy., § 90.) Nevertheless we decide that the same 
cause affects us, merely because there is, on the ivhole, a persist- 
ence of the same effects. The sun sinks below the horizon and 
the moon appears : now we may say a different cause affects us, 
for no other reason than because a set of effects has, on the 
whole, been altered. It is only by persistence of some effects, 
of the most important effects, of a cause, that we ascertain the 
variability of its other effects. Where the effects are entirely 
different, we assert an entirely different cause. But 

it is not of relatively uniform effects only that invariability is 
to be predicated. It is to be in some degree predicated of 
effects liable to great variations. To run through the whole 
scale of variations relative to its size, the sun must present 
successively all sizes, and no size. In so far as it is incapable 
of so great variation it is constant in size. For purposes of 
present criticism, Mr. Spencer has named instances perhaps 
better than the last. " Months to the old man appear no longer 
than weeks to the young man. " (Prin. Psy., § 91. ) "Distances 
which seemed great to the boy seem moderate to the man ; and 
buildings once thought to be imposing in height and mass, 
dwindle into insignificance." (Prin. Psy., § 90.) But do 
months and weeks appear to the aged without distinction of 
length? and have they usurped in thought each other's places? 
Does the distance from earth to some remote celestial orb, so 
marvelously great to the boy, seem but a step to the man ? Do 
houses, by acquaintance with larger, lose their height and mass? 
If these questions are not to be answered affirmatively, and 
they evidently are not, we find constancy in elements that are 
variable. A third consideration must be joined to 

the last two. It cannot be denied, as a matter of fact, that 
effects, liable to variation do not always vary, and that when 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 169 

they do vary they do not always vary as extensively as they 
mi^ht. In other words, sensations which sometimes change arc 
sometimes relatively permanent. In this, then, they resemble 
their causes, — that is, if Mr. Spencer is to be credited. He 
has, in a very brief and dubious manner, recognized the impli- 
cation. "Only while all the conditions remain constant," he 
ventures to say, "is there something like a constant ratio be- 
tween the physical antecedent and the psychical consequent." 
(Prin. of Psy., § 78.) Sometimes, then, according to the im- 
plied admission, there is Likeness between the physical antecedent 
and the psychical consequent We are glad of the admission, 
though it has not been consistently acted upon. Like other 
thinkers, although perhaps least so, Mr. Spencer sometimes 
considers the mention of a difficulty as a License lor thereafter 
ignoring it. He, of all, should have the most vivid realization 
that the very basis of Evolution, and in fact of all scien 
the persistence of not only the existence, but the quantities and 
qualities of phenomena. It is a grave question which really 
preponderates — the dynamics or the statics of the uni- 
verse. By way of summary, it must now be Baid 
that in effects which arc almost absolutely constant, in effects 
which arc not absolutely without constancy, and in effects which 
mporarily constant, we discern in consciousness the p<— i- 
bility of a representative correspondence with what \\c believe 

to be without. 

That Mr. Spencer is possessed of a remarkable powei 
heaping before the mind instances favorable to himself, to the 
entire concealment of all others, is a remark justified by what 
has just preceded, and well exemplified by what is now to 
follow. Mosl of his examples are like the following. "8 
dons which to others seem strongly contrasted, as red and 
seem" to some the same. "Vibrations exceeding thirty thou- 
sand per second, are inaudible through certain ears; while 
through other em-- thai are, as we may suppose, of somewhat 
unlike structure, these rapid vibrations are known as an • 
sively acute sound." "The Bushman is impressible by ch 
in the held df view which do not impress the European*" 



170 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

(Prin. of Psy.,^ 80.) "A whiff of ammonia coming in contact 
with the eyes, produces a smart; getting into the nostrils, excites 
the consciousness we describe as an intolerably strong odor; 
being condensed on the tongue, generates an acrid taste; while 
ammonia applied in solution to a tender part of the skin makes 
it burn, as Ave say." "The Sun's rays falling on the hand 
cause a sensation of heat, but no sensation of light; and falling 
on the retina cause a sensation of light but no sensation of heat/' 
"When drinking a liquid the heat of which is quite bearable 
by that part of the upper lip usually immersed, it may be 
observed that if the lip is accidentally dipped deeper, so as to 
immerse a little of the outer skin, a sensation of scalding 
results." (Prin. of Psy., § 82.) 

Instances like these, following each other in great numbers, 
are very impressive in fact, while intrinsically they are of little 
worth. We do not need to be told that Pain and Pleasure are 
about as unlike their external stimuli as it is possible for any- 
thing to be. It would have been more in accord with logical 
requirement to say less about the sensations of Light and Heat; 
for they are not supposed to be other than very unlike the 
agencies by which they are wrought upon the mind. That 
Color, Odor, Taste, and Sound are respectively less like their 
causes than they are like each other, all are ready to admit. 
No one thinks of asserting that for every object, and every 
distinction of objects, outside of consciousness, there must be a 
representative phase of consciousness: so variations of sensi- 
bility to things and their distinctions is rather irrelevant. The 
senses of Touch, Taste, Smell and Hearing, being, for purposes 
of perception, less used and less perfected than Sight, have 
furnished by far the more examples; whereas, for the same 
reason, they should have been by far the less discussed. Simi- 
larly, secondary qualities have been contemplated almost 
exclusively; whereas primary qualities are the ones of the most 
importance. What is the meaning of Mr. Spencer's 

bias of selection? Is it not evidence that primary qualities — 
the qualities with which we have the most frequent communion, 
are the best construed in thought? We have already seen that 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 171 

extension is a quality of which he finds it difficult to dispose. 
Is not his impropriety of choice also evidence that the higher 
the development of a sense, the more it can reveal of the cause 
of a sensation? He not only deals with Sight less than the 
other senses, but, as we have seen, less satisfactorily to him- 
self. Here must be said, what was not observed before, 
that while sensations have been the chief objects of consider- 
ation, ideas and perceptions more than they, and thoughts more 
than all these are the subjects of contention. The sensation 
is the nucleus of the idea, and the idea is the nucleus of 
an indefinite bodv of thought which clusters about it. Taking: 
the least advantageous examples, we may argue that although a 
sensation of touch, an odor, a taste, a sound, a color, is dissimilar 
to its cause, yet the perception of which it is a part is to some ex- 
tent a genuine representation of externality. In illustration, we 
may say that the constant reference of color to an extended object 
seems to point to an association in consciousness arising from 
some association in fact. The argument we may cany further, 
by maintaining that this, which is true of perception, is, in a 
greater degree, true of thought in general. The place which 
color occupies in the universe of thought, must have some 
general correspondence with the place its cause occupies in the 
universe of reality. Again criticism leads us to the conviction 
that there must be some likeness between the internal and the 
externa] worlds. 

After the discussion of the List two paragraphs, we arc well 
prepared to advert to a second fallacy lying at the very base of 
.Mr. Spencer's reasoning. Of certain relations he says: "as 
we cannol fix on any one of these relations in obnsciousn 
rather than any other, a- like the reality beyond consciousness, 
we must infer that there is no likeness between any one of them 

and the reality beyond consciousness." | I'rin. of Pay, § '.'L'. ) 

This mode of reasoning is not confined to relations. Though 
nut throughout expressed, it is throughout i : 1 1 ( » ! i < •« 1 , thai becaue • 
we cannol fix upon any of a set of subjective effects a- like 
their common cause, we may he assured thai do one of th< 

is like it. Because we do not know which object in a room is 



172 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

most like that which wrought them, no one is most like it, no 
one is more like it, no one is at all like it. The weakness of 
such an argument is too great to excuse further comment. 

We must return to an assumption which was passed without 
notice. It is not true that we cannot fix upon one mental im- 
pression as more than another like that which makes them. 
Differences in degrees of persistence in thought signify like 
differences of degrees of correspondence. Primary qualities 
are more persistent in thought than secondary ones; impres- 
sions through higher sense, more persistent than impressions 
through lower sense. Notions are more persistent than the 
experiences which evolve them ; and propositions, more persist- 
ent than the notions which converge to form them. That 
which, as a representation, has the most persistence, is doubtless 
the best representation. We must then presume that if non- 
persistent representations are unlike things, persistent represen- 
tations are less so. Besides this distinction between 
the least and the most variable modes of representative con- 
sciousness, we have to note a distinction between the different 
states of the latter — of the most variable modes. If these are 
continually vacillating between wide extremes, they are likely 
to represent more truly the nearer they approach the mean. 
Being in the extreme states unlike the represented reality, they 
should, in the mean state, be less unlike it. This is the state 
which they are constantly drawn towards; which is merely 
saying that it is the most persistent. 

The force of some of Mr. Spencer's examples is capable of 
being explained away. This for instance. "Take two objects 
sufficiently far apart to give standing room between them. 
Having contemplated their relation of position from a distance, 
contemplate it afresh, after having so placed the body that one 
of them is in front and one of them is behind. It will be found 
that what is conceived as a single relation in the one case cannot 
be so conceived in the other." (Prin. Psy., § 90.) The change 
in the contemplation is so very slight that, without much 
detriment, all that it can be held to imply might be conceded: 
a fact well illustrating the constancy of visual ideas. But the 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 173 

concession, if made, would be a pure gratuity. It should not, 
as it is likely to, be forgotten that, whereas before the objects 
were the extremes of a simple relation, now they are, as they 
seem to be, the extremes of a relation whose menu is self. 
Change in the effect seems, in this case, to answer to change in 
the cause. Take another. " The facts that the co- 

existent positions forming a circle become to perception an 
ellipse when viewed obliquely, and a straight line when viewed 
edgeways, illustrate the truth that compound relations of Co- 
existence undergo a species of qualitative variation as the place 
of the percipient varies." (Prin. Psy., § 90.) Suppose the 
facts otherwise. Suppose the hoop, which a child is rolling 
past, did not appear as it recedes first an ellipse, and at last very 
like a line, but still continued circular. In such case we should 
be compelled to decide that what we seem to see is not what we 
really see: the phenomenon would be a splendid exemplification 
of Mr. Spencer's views. What is the explanation of the contra- 
diction that has so unexpectedly arisen? In the first place the 
hoop does not, as Mr. Spencer thinks, "become to perception" 
anything different from what it was at first: a fact showing how 
much more stable perceptions are than sensations. Moreover 
when looking upon a circle obliquely, it is usually perceived to he 
circular: usually an effort of the mind is required to make it look 
like an ellipse. Perception makes allowance for deviations of 
sensation. But the real explanation is that the circle has many 
aspects. That which affects us when we see the circle i- nol 
that which affects us when we see the line. It i< for this reason 
that if it should seem to present a circle when the circular -Me 
is turned away, we should be deluded. The growing, and at 
la- 1 complete, coincidence of certain lines, drawn in imagination 
from the extremities of the object to the point of sensation, is 
a- real as it is apparent. There may be in the phenomenon a 
liability to delusiveness, jusi as a stump i- Liable t<» be mistaken 
for a highwayman j bul it isnoi essentially, nor even commonly, 
delusive. All in all, the example is far more repugnant, than 
favorable, to the views of .Mr. Spencer. They who 

mos1 accord consequence t«> relativity to self, are continually 



174 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

acting on the supposition that it is not a fact but a delusion. 
We have lately found Mr. Spencer reasoning as though an 
object should remain absolutely the same to cognition, while 
its relation thereto undergoes great change. Here is the same , 
error in another form. "Animals having great locomotive 
powers are not likely to have the same conceptions of given 
spaces as animals whose locomotive powers are very small. To 
a creature so constructed that its experiences of the larger spaces 
around have been gained by long and quick bounds, distances can 
scarcely present the aspects they do to a creature which traverses 
them by slow and many steps." (Prin. of Psy., § 90.) In 
common speech the propriety of this discrepancy of estimation 
is recognized by such sayings as that a distance which is short 
to an antelope is long to a snail. It is a fact, as well as an 
impression, that, though the distance, abstractly viewed, does 
not vary, its relations to different things are various. A short 
distance bears very much the same relation to the snail, as a 
long distance does to the antelope. If a foot should seem 
longer than a yard to the one, and a yard should seem shorter 
than a foot to the other, both would be deluded ; but as it is, 
neither is in error. With this example may be 

classed another. "A grain and half-a-grain are hardly dis- 
tinguishable by their pressures on the finger; but if successively 
borne by an animal not more than a grain in weight, a difference 
divisible into many degrees would doubtless be perceptible be- 
tween them. Conversely a man cannot perceive the contrast 
in weight between a ton and half-a-ton, for he fails to put forth 
a force sufficient to lift either; but it can scarcely be questioned 
that in the consciousness of an elephant, now loaded with one 
and now with the other, the feelings produced would have an 
unlikeness that might be graduated." ( Prin. Psy., § 92. ) The 
explanation is in both cases very simple. Relatively to their 
strength, there is to a tiny animal more difference between sus- 
taining a grain and half-a-grain than there is to a human 
creature. It is absolutely true that one puts forth more effort 
than the other. Similarly, and more obviously, to the unavail- 
ing effort of the man, the ton and the half-ton which he tries 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CCOs'CLLDED. 175 

to lift bear the same relation, while they bear different relations 
to the exertions of the elephant. In neither of the cases is the 
variance a delusion. Criticism has been necessary to 

turn the foregoing illustrations against the author; but there 
are some so manifestly adverse to him that it is difficult to 
understand how he mistook their tendency. This is one. "A 
greater chill is felt by those who, instead of standing still, are 
exposed in a carriage to the 'wind of their own speed.'" | Prin. 
of 1\\\, $ 84.) I do not know whether it is or is not necessary 
to point to the fact that, in this instance, the intensity of the 
effect varies in exact proportion to the varying intensity of 
the cause. Again we find, as Ave have so frequently found before, 
evidence of likeness between extra-mental things and their 
mental representatives. 

It may have occurred to the reader, that Mr. Spencer's error 
is that of one who adopts an extreme position. Certain it is 
that had he contented himself with the thesis, that there is a 
great, instead of an absolute, unlikeness of nature between mind 
and not-mind, he would not be amenable to mosl of the 
criticisms made and to be made. But such moderation of view 
was not congenial to him; and the consequence is thai lie has 
carried his reasonings to an extremity that is surprising. If 
hifl obligation to do so had occurred to him, he would probably 
have tried t<» show thai there is beyond consciousness nothing 
answering to the abstractions, "things" and "attributes." My 

reason for thinking this is th;it he has attempted to do a- much 

in the case of relations. The relations with which he concerns 
himself are relations of co-existence, relations of sequence, and 
relations of difference. ( )f these he questions as follow -. " lint 
now what are we to say about the pure relations of' tence, 

of Sequence, and of Difference; considered apart from amounts 
of Space, of Time, and of Contrast? ('an we say that the 
relation of Co-existence, conceived Bimply a- implying two 
terms that exist at the same time, but are doI specified in their 
relative positions, ha- anything answering t<» it beyond con- 
sciousness? Can we say that oul of ourselves there is such a 
thing a- Succession, corresponding \<> the conception we have 



176 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

of one thing coming after another, without reference to the time 
between them? And can we say that what we know as Differ- 
ence, apart from any particular degree of it, has objective un- 
likeness as its cause ?" In answer to these questions, he says: 
"The reply is that we cannot frame ideas of Co-existence, of 
Sequence, and of Difference, without there entering into them 
ideas of quantity. • • • • Co-existence cannot be thought of 
without some amount of space. Sequence cannot be thought 
of without some interval of time. Difference cannot be 
thought of without some degree of contrast. Hence what has 
been said above respecting these relations in their definitely- 
compound forms, applies to them under those forms which by 
a fiction, we regard as simple." ( Prin. of Psy., § 93. ) This allu- 
sion, to "what has been said above," has reference to the 
examples of the variability of the appearances, Space, Time, 
and Contrast; of which the most important have been ex- 
amined, with result contrary to what Mr. Spencer is here 
making the basis of his argument. Space, Time, and Contrast 
in the concrete are not delusive; but if they were it would not 
follow that in the abstract they would not be less so. Abstrac- 
tion, being an exclusion of inconstant elements, and an intensi- 
fication of those that are constant, should operate as a process 
of purification. Mr. Spencer felt the necessity of giving further 
proof of his "apparently-incredible proposition." By a 

more than questionable process, he comes to the conclusion that 
"the whole question of the relativity of relations among 
feelings is reducible to the question of the relativity of the 
relation of Difference." Then he explains that "the relation 
of Difference, as present in consciousness, is nothing more than 
a change in consciousness;" and proceeds thus: "How, then, 
can it resemble, or be in any way akin to, its source beyond 
consciousness? Here are two colors which we call unlike. As 
they exist objectively, the two colors are quite independent — 
there is nothing between them answering to the change which 
results in us from contemplating first one and then the other. 
Apart from our consciousness they are not linked as arc the two 
feelings they produce in us. Their relation as we think it. 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 177 

being nothing else than a change of our state, cannot possibly be 
parallel to anything between them, when they have both re- 
mained unchanged." (Prin. of Psy., § 93.) So patent is 
it here, that we can not fail to note an assumption which at once 
begs the question for our opponent, but decides it in our favor. 
That "as they exist objectively, the two colors are quite inde- 
pendent;" that "there is nothing between them answering to 
the change which results in us from contemplating first one and 
then the other," is an entirely gratuitous assumption. That 
"apart from our consciousness they are not linked as are the 
two feelings they produce in us," is the very proposition to be 
proved. But proved or assumed, Mr. Spencer has uo right 
to any such proposition : it cannot be construed unless connections 
out of consciousness can be known through unlike relations in 
consciousness, or there are in consciou inectiona like 
those beyond. .Moreover, what can Mr. Spencer claim to know 
about things "as they exist objectively" — as they exist "apart 
from our consciousness"? Unless he will give up the con- 
tent, nothing! To him, the two colors can be no more than 
effects in consciousness. When thus considered, the fact 
which ha- so impressed him, that they are not connected by trans- 
ition, abolishes bis first premise. Here we have a difference in 
consciousness which doe- not consist in transition. It may be 
that primordially it did involve transition, and that the element 
of transition has not been, and never will be, completely 
elided; but to the fact that it is not transition, we have Mi'. 
Spencer's testimony. From our point of view, there is no 
difficulty in explaining the representation of difference by 
change. Admitting tint consciousness is made up of cha 
would not be an acknowledgment that there are no such things 
as states of consciousness. What we call a state of oonscious- 
fu>88 may consist of infinite minute ch ingty without 
persistence, yet, as a body, persistent, [f this !><• true, a state 
of consciousness is as much a state as an activity, and may thus 
represent a Btate, And if there are in consciousm 38 boi 
neousstates, may there not !>•• heterogeneous Btates, states in 
which difference is statical? It' bo, but not otherwise, we have 



178 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

an explanation of the fact that the contrast of contiguous colors 
does not seem to involve a conscious change. But suppose 

this explanation wanting. There is, we will say, between the 
two colors, a spacial difference, and this difference is represented 
by the change in consciousness which takes place when we pass 
from the contemplation of the one to the contemplation of the 
other. Who can fail to see that there is a likeness between the 
thing and the representation? Does not the change intervene 
between subjective states as the space does between objective 
things ? Is not the extent of the change determined by the spacial 
distance for which it stands ? Leaving the reader to answer 

these questions and such others like them as may arise, I must, 
in this connection, make one other charge. As is usual, Mr. 
Spencer has chosen one of the most favorable examples he could 
find. Why did he not choose a case in which the objective 
difference accompanies change of one thing from state to state? 
An apple falling to the ground changes its state ; and by follow- 
ing out the change in thought, we realize the difference. This 
leads to a more general remark. If we had been driven to the 
conclusion that there can be in consciousness nothing resembling 
the difference of objective states which are not connected by 
change, we could have set up the counter proposition that in 
consciousness are resemblances to difference of objective states 
which are connected by change. 

It remains to be shown that Mr. Spencer is not entirely 
satisfied with his proof that there are no objective relations 
answering to relations within the subject, and that he does not 
long adhere to this conclusion. He manifests a weakening of 
conviction by saying, that " Concerning compound relations of 
Sequence, as concerning compound relations of Co-existence, 
we must say that probably they are not qualitatively like the 
connections to which they answer. • • •" (Prin. of Psy., § 91.) 
A further step in the same direction is the recognition of "the 
assumption made throughout, and inevitably made in all 
reasoning used to prove the relativity of relations, that there 
exists beyond consciousness, conditions of objective manifesta- 
tion, which are symbolized by relations as we conceive them." 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 179 

(Prin. of Psy., § 95.) The "conditions" which belong to "The 
Unconditioned" must be things, attributes, relations, or a com- 
pound thereof; and, since of plurality, must present difference. 
The implication comes out more concretely in the following: 
"The very proposition that what we know as a relation is qual- 
itatively and quantitatively determined by our own nature, and 
does not resemble any order or nexus beyond consciousness, 
implies that there exists some such order or nexus beyond con- 
sciousness; and every step in every argument by which this 
proposition is established, distinctly posits this order or nexus, 
and cannot be taken on any other condition." (Prin. of 
Psy., § 95.) This use of the phrase, "order or nexus/' is 
nothing else than a recalling under one name what had been 
banished under another. If "order or nexus" means anything, 
it implies some kind of co-existence or sequence. Any linger- 
ing doubt of this will be removed by the following: "There 
is some ontological order whence arises the phenomenal order 
we know as Space; there is some ontoUxjical order, whence arises 
the phenomenal order we know as Time; and there i< some 
ontological nexus whence arises the phenomena] relation we 
know as Difference." (Prin. of Psy., § 95.) This seems to be 
an admission that, beyond consciousness, there are two orders 
of something called for ambiguity's sake, a "nexus." Ajb 
"nexus" may mean anything from a substance to a mere rela- 
tion, it is impossible to say what it Implies, except that it Implies 
as much, at least, as a relation; but "order" is fraught willi 
meaning. Unless, which is not supposable, Mr. Spencer will 
name a third kind of order a- poss ibly existing out of con- 
sciousness, the orders which he has recognized in the objective 
world must be those of co-existence and sequence. However 
tlii- may be, the assertion of two objective orders is the assertion 

of some objective difference. That Mr. Spencer does assert 

both unlike objective orders and their necessary concomitant 
objective difference, is evidenced by the admission that his 
"argument assumes, and is obliged t<> assume, fundamental 
differences of objective order which are symbolized l>v funds 
mental differences of subjective order." | Prin, of l'-\. 



180 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

This, after the conclusion that there is nothing objective answer- 
ing to our conception of pure order or pure difference, is 
astounding. It may be well to say that no quibbling over the 
meaning of "order" and "difference," as he uses them, would, 
even if Mr. Spencer were capable of it, extricate him from 
difficulty. They mean more than continued existence; for 
continued existence would not produce the spacial and temporal 
orders and their differences. Aside from this, continued ex- 
istence is sequence, and sequence implies difference; so we are 
not, in any case, to be deprived of the "pure relations" of 
sequence and difference. More than this, objective activity is 
admitted; activity implies sequence, and it implies a difference 
additional to that which sequence implies : again we see that 
sequence and difference in consciousness have counterparts out- 
side. If, according to Mr. Spencer's rule, difference of time or 
sequence implies its correlative, likeness of time or co-exist- 
ence, we may claim the latter too. 

There is a kind of argument which, in justice to Mr. Spencer, 
must be duly noticed'. In addition to the arguments considered, 
he propounds the following. 

"A nerve is a thread of unstable nitrogenous substance 
running from periphery to centre or from centre to periphery, 
along which, when one of its ends is disturbed, there runs a 
wave of molecular change to the other. The wave of change 
set up by a peripheral disturbance is not like the action which 
causes it; and the waves of change set up in different nerves by 
different peripheral disturbances have no such unlikeness as 
have the disturbances themselves. Hence being obliged to 
concede that the kind of feeling depends either on the character 
of the nerve-centre, or on the way in which the molecular dis- 
turbance is brought to the nerve-centre, or both; it becomes 
inconceivable that any resemblance exists between the subjective 
effect and the objective cause which arouses it through the inter- 
mediation of changes resembling neither." ( Prin. of Psy. § 87.) 

" Indeed it needs but to think for an instant of a brain as a 
seat of nervous discharges, intermediate between actions in the 
outer world and actions in the world of thought, to be impressed 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 181 

with the absurdity of supposing that the connections anions 
outer actions, after being transferred through the medium of 
nervous discharges, can re-appear in the world of thought in 
the forms they originally had." (Prin. of Psy., § 94.) 

AYhen will those who deny knowledge of noumena, cease fco 
employ the supposition that they can contemplate things in 
themselves? To Transfigured Realism, external agents, nerve- 
fibres, and nerve-centres are phenomena; and if they are but 
phenomena, the underlying noumena are not revealed. How, 
on this theory, is it possible to know that the effect known 
subjectively is not like the cause which appears objectively? 
To know this, it is necessary to know more than mere manifes- 
tations; and more than manifestations, therefore, Mr. Spencer 
professes to know. The Realist is not at all perplexed 

by the implication that a psychical effect is in a considerable 
degree like its physical cause. He is .not at all abashed by the 
appearance of dissimilarity between external agencies and 
nerve-activities. Considering that these activities are extremely 
minute, numerous, and capable of infinite combinations, he 
deems them very good material for representations. Finding 
that he has the vaguest and most mobile conception of what 
they really are on their objective side, he is not surprised at 
anything they may appear to be on their subjective side. Tie' 
production of likeness through nerve-fibres is no more incon- 
ceivable than is the transmission of sounds and pictures through a 
wire. Analogies are. plenty. Take an example which has been 
hackneyed by repeated use forpurposesof Agnosticism, [mar- 
ine a blind man poking objects with the end of hi- walking-stick. 
He touches one and then another, and two effects are produced 
upon his hand. Now the -tick is pushed againsl a resisting 
surface, now againsl a yielding surface; and upon the hand are 
exerted successively greater and less resistance. Somethii 
pulls the -tick, and the stick pulls the hand. The stick I" 
held against a stationary object, the hand Is stationary ; the stick 
being held againsl a moving object, the hand i- made f<- move. 
Sensible vibration- might he communicated from the remote to 
die near end; ;i.- might heat, if the stick were of metallic sub- 



182 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

stance. In all these cases, the correspondence of degree is too 
obvious to require more than mention. But we need not resort 
to analogy. In communication through nerve-fibers there is 
undoubted equivalence of intensity; and, as is exemplified 
by temporal distinctions, equivalence of kind. If we were not 
so profoundly ignorant of the details of neural action and 
mental action, we should probably be overwhelmed by exem- 
plifications. The reader's attention must now be called 
to what Mr. Spencer is trying to prove. He is laboring with 
all his might to prove that nothing like what we call the objec- 
tive world can be produced in consciousness. Pointing out the 
great unlikeness between the external world and nerve-struct- 
ures and functions within, he thinks we should be convinced 
that the former cannot be in the least resembled by any phase 
of consciousness. But we must ask him to hold to his belief 
that the external world, as we know it, lies completely in con- 
sciousness. He points to something and says, this cannot be 
represented in consciousness; whereas he should have pointed 
to it as a representation, and then shown us that there is nothing 
which it truly represents. All that he said about the organ of 
mind or its medium of communication with the external is 
irrelevant. Mind he holds to be not unlike the external world 
but in part identical with it : the external world is to him but 
a mass of phenomena. No matter then what mind, objectively 
considered, may appear to be, it is furnished with the represen- 
tations which he has been trying to show it cannot frame. 
Thus is the Realist relieved of the burden of showing that 
ideas of external things are possible. Mr. Spencer admits the 
possession of just such ideas: all he denies is that there are 
corresponding things. We hold firmly to the admission that 
the disputed elements are within the mind, since it destroys ail 
arguments from our impotencies of conception. 

We come now to an error at which all the group of argu- 
ments above discussed converge; it is the reductla ad absurd am 
of them all. Says the author : " subjective consciousness deter- 
mined as it is wholly by subjective mature, date, and circumstances, 
is no measure of objective existence." (Prim of Psy., § 86.) 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 183 

The proposition, that consciousness is determined "wholly by- 
subjective nature, state, and circumstances," is what he has, with 
such poor success, been endeavoring to establish. If the effect 
is not entirely determined by the nature of the affected, the 
cause may determine some of its ingredients, which will be 
unlike those determined by the affected. Yet if Mr. Spencer 
has proved as much as he desires, he has proved something more 
than he believes, and very much more than we can believe. 
What does he mean by saying that "every argument proving 
that our conceptions of Time are relative, falls to pieces on 
withdrawing the assumption that there exists some form of 
Things from which Time, as a form of Thought, is derived"? 
What did he mean by previously saying something similar to 
this concerning Space, phenomenal and noumenal? And what 
did lie mean by adding that "the assumption of an objective 
source for the subjective relation of Difference, is implied in the 
last two assumptions"? (Prin. of Psy., § 95.) He meant some- 
thing implying that modifications of consciousness are not 
wholly determined a by subjective nature, state, and circum- 
stances." Known to furnish some of the ingredients of con- 
sciousness, external being may be supposed to furnish many of 
them. Leaving Mr. Spencer's admissions, and passing to con- 
siderations of a more positive character, we shall find that 
externa] agency is the controlling factor in the production of 
that order of affections called by Mr. Spencer objective. Their 
chief peculiarity is that their "conditions are often not present, 
but lie somewhere outside of the series." (First Prin., § 13.) 
The thought that the characters of these are entirely controlled 
by the subject is not to be entertained. We cannot think that the 

same external cause lies back of an ant-hill and a VolcSUOj or 

that the difference between the experiences of lying upon a bed 
of sickness, and Eying pasl landscapes at an exhilarating rate of 
speed, is determined wholly by subjective change. To imagine 
Buch absurdities would be to supposititiously introduce into the 
subject a mass of complicated mid cumbersome machinery, and 
to reduce the object to entire and Impotenl homogeneity. This 
ban implication repugnant to Mr. Spencer's views, 



184 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

Before changing the point of view, I must call to the reader's 
attention that each criticism upon what Mr. Spencer has said 
contrary to the existence of similarities between mind and not- 
nrind, has led us more or less directly to the conclusion that 
there probably are such similarities. 

§ 61. Without qualification, it would seem that too much 
stress has been laid upon primordial likeness between the in- 
ternal and the external. Knowledge of things wrought out of 
contrast, is a very large share of all knowledge. What the 
reader is particularly desired to realize is that the greatest 
fundamental dissimilarity between the mental and the extra- 
mental would not preclude an original and increasing likeness 
between them. This is true if the only attribute common to 
an external and an internal mode is that they both differ from 
some other internal mode. Let their manner of difference be 
as contrasted as you please, still one mode resembles the other 
in differing from a third. As the number of modes with 
which they differ increase, so will their mutual likeness in- 
crease. What is true of single modes, is true of sets. If one 
set of internal modes becomes transcendently distinguished 
from another set of internal modes (as the subjective and 
objective sets have done), one set or the other will probably be 
extremely like external modes. And this, which holds of 
general contrasts, holds more completely of intenser special 
contrasts. Primordial unlikeness, as well as primordial likeness, 
between mind and not-mind, forms, therefore, a good basis for 
knowledge of external things. 

Without qualification, it would seem that too much stress 
has been laid upon ultimate likeness between ideas and their 
outward correlatives. The positive advantage of unlikeness 
must be insisted upon. It is commonly supposed that it is 
desirable to have conceptions as nearly like things as possible. 
This is true after other purposes are subserved; but untrue 
in so far as it ignores their claims. Regard must be had to 
the nature of mind. Some modes the mind sustains with ease; 
some, with difficulty ; and some, scarcely at all. Ideas should 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 185 

be produced without effort, and prolonged without fatigue. 
They should be definite, yet easily modified. Such requisites 
are cheap at the expense of slight similarity. Regard should 
also be had to the natures of things. Their demands for 
exact representation are not equally urgent. It is possible 
that representative accuracy may be most judiciously distributed 
while the greatest quantity thereof is not attained. Again; 
regard should be had to the nature of ideas themselves. They 
are symbols ; and symbols are often valuable in proportion as 
they vary in certain respects from what they symbolize. For 
purposes of felicitous separation and combination, thev may be 
suffered to lack properties by which separation and combination 
would be unduly antagonized. The numerals furnish an apt 
illustration. Their only conspicuous resemblance to things is 
their difference from each other. This bein^ maintained, other 
characters, if as easily handled, would do as well. Substituting 
one for another will not affect their completeness. One class 
of things they represent as accurately as another. Notwith- 
standing the extreme unlikeness which all this implies, to 
increase their resemblance to things would, in a progressing 
ratio, decrease their usefulness. Now let us turn to the resem- 
blance of numerals to things, and observe how it produces in 
the end a greater quantity of similarity than a more complete 
primary resemblance could produce. The fundamental idea 
underlying mathematics is that of equality and inequality — 
that is, likeness and unlikeness in respect of quantity. Num- 
bers, in their various combinations, arc capable of exhibiting 
various likenesses and iinlikenesses to cadi other. So far, and 
not much farther, do they resemble the things for which they 
stand. Wonderfully much, nevertheless, may they express. 
Beginning with a few marks on a surface and adding to their 
number^ according to rules of combination, I at lasl produce 
two numerals, or sets of numerals, as near alike as my hand 
can make them, and kn<»w from this that two celestial events 
will coincide. Or I produce unlike scratches, and read that 
the coincidence will not take place; and, from the < ; 
of numerical unlikeness, know how much the variance from 



186 THE DEDUCTIVE AEGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

coincidence will be. It is evident that in this case the produc- 
tion of the ultimate representative correspondence is contingent 
upon the employment of symbols extremely unlike the symbol- 
ized realities. How circumscribed Avould be mathematical 
calculations if we should employ symbols very much resembling 
the objects which the calculations concern, is readily appreciable. 
We should have more similarity in the first instance, but far 
less in the end. To apply the analogy, ideas must not be too 
much like things. If we put overmuch resemblance into the 
process of thought, the latter will be clogged, and we shall 
obtain so much less resemblance in the shape of products. To 
resemble much, is to simulate seldom, and to simulate the most 
important things never at all. Still less than before, therefore, 
does it appear that mind is so unlike not-mind as to have no 
realization of its nature. 

§ 62. Mere resemblances between modes within consciousness 
and modes without, would not amount to knowledge of the 
latter. But they would form the basis of such knowledge. 
Given internal counterparts of external modes, and that con- 
sciousness can figure to itself exterior reality, is no transcendent 
mystery. Its only perplexity is that the symbol should not be 
contrasted with the thing. The reason that we do not seem 
to look through the symbol is obvious enough : ideas are but 
affections of the mind; and as such are not distinguishable, as 
they are not distinct, from the act of cognizing them. But 
when we come to the fact that the idea is not distinguishable 
from its external counterpart, we arrive at a real perplexity. 
While from the certainty that the sun, for instance, is beyond con- 
sciousness, we infer that knowledge of it must be representative, 
we marvel that in perception the representation should not stand 
opposed to what it represents. Some have indeed thought that 
contemplation of externality does involve a duality of objects, — 
the representation present to consciousness, and the thing 
brought before consciousness by reference; but their supposition, 
extremely unscientific in method, is negatived by both con- 
sciousness and reflection. The reference, of which many so 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 187 

glibly speak, is but a name for concrete ignorance; a verbal 
substitute for rational explanation. In neither memory, im- 
agination, nor perception, is there recognition that what is before 
the mind is a mere representation of something else. All that 
we contemplate we seem to look upon directly. The contem- 
plation is not consciousness of something, plus a reference to a 
second something beyond. We are aware of no such reference; 
and if it did exist, it would be consciousness of the kind to 
which it is supposed to be auxiliary, even to the requiring of a 
reference auxiliary to itself. To escape the difficulties which 
are thus started, many adopt belief in consciousness of. exter- 
nalities; by doing which, they rush into a denser maze. Ob- 
jective considerations necessitate the separation of outside things 
from the sphere of consciousness. Introspection does the same; 
for objects do not seem to be within consciousness, as subjective 
things are, but to be beyond consciousness while affecting it. 
There is no avoidance of the paradox, that we seem to be im- 
mediately aware of the thing as something out of consciousness, 
Question the least philosophical, and you will learn that he 
believes himself conscious of externalities. Question him from 
another point of view, and you will learn that lie believes them 
to be distant from the mind, and therefore out of consciousness. 
In consecutive breaths he will say virtually, that the mind is 
the environment of the things contemplated, and that the things 
are the environment of the mind. Is there a possible recon- 
ciliation? Unwilling to question the veracity of consciousness, 
we are unable to believe that we are conscious of the thing as 
not in consciousness, nor even in contact with consciousness, 
To decide that we are conscious of the thing only as an exist- 
ence, is to convict consciousness of a lie, without cancelling the 
present suspicion of an inconsistency. For consciousness pro- 
claims its communion with more external than existence, and if 
it so far falsifies, it is under the additional imputation of testify- 
ing that it grasps existence which is beyond its sphere. Thus we 
are forced back upon the problem with which we set out [fwe 
will not give the lie to consciousness, we dolus! find congruity in 
the circumstance that the symbol is uol contrasted with the thing. 



188 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

Though two things cannot be absolutely the same, they can 
be relatively, that is, approximately the same. When we con- 
sider that intrinsically a state of consciousness is but a portion 
of a mode — when we consider that in the exclusions and pre- 
sentations of consciousness, essentials are divided from essen- 
tials; it will not seem impossible, or even incredible, that highly 
evolved ideas should present only that aspect in which they are 
one with the objective things they represent. If they do this, 
observe, consciousness would err if it should discriminate be- 
tween the mode presented and the mode represented: by the 
hypothesis, as far as the former is presented, it is not in reality 
contrasted with the latter; and as far as the latter is represented, 
it is not in reality contrasted with the former. Consciousness 
may, therefore, be entirely right in not contrasting the symbol 
with the object symbolized. Mark that the supposition is not 
that consciousness pronounces judgment that the symbol is like 
the thing, to do which, would require other symbols ; but that 
consciousness fails to observe distinction between the symbol 
and the thing — compares them no farther than they are alike, 
which is not to distinguish them at all. The manner in which 
consciousness became possessed of the happy bias towards iden- 
tification, to the exclusion of distinction, will be subsequently 
considered. What is before us now is the legitimacy of ignor- 
ing the distinction ; and we have found that in as far as the 
idea is presented, or the thing truly represented, there is no 
basis of distinction, because no difference. But while we are 
thus able to justify consciousness in its negative deliverance, 
we think strange that it does not disclose the whole truth by a 
complemental positive deliverauce. Though not distinguish- 
able in perception, we know that upon reflection the idea and the 
thing are made to differentiate into a duality of things, — alike, 
it may be true, so far as one stands for the other, yet in other par- 
ticulars very unlike. It is the duality which perplexes us. 

Perhaps the sense in which consciousness should be largely 
understood is analogous to the one employed when I say that the 
considerations before us should extend the acceptance of Realism. 
I do not mean the modes of consciousness which obtain in any 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 189 

mind while it entertains the considerations; because the con- 
siderations do nor change identity upon traveling from mind to 
mind, and are even capable of being present to two or more 
minds simultaneously. So may consciousness be understood to 
decide that a form presented is the form to which a sens 
is attributable. In so far as ideas are mere forms of being, 
and in so far as a form here and a form there are identical, 
consciousness is justified in positively identifying present and 
absent things. Still, as we cannot suppress distinction be- 
external being and the consciousness by which it is 
known, we are puzzled by the fact that a unity should appear 
where a duality exists. 

Suppose instead of viewing the likeness of nature between 
the idea and the thing, we turn to their nearness <»f relation. 
Some thinkers have considered the thing to be the objective 
correlate of the idea; and the idea, the objective correlate of 
th<- state in which it is contemplated. Other.-, recognizing that 
tin- idea and it- contemplation are identical, have considered 
the thing as the objective correlate of the contemplation. The 
implication i-, that one party has mi-taken the relation which 
the object bears to the contemplation, for that borne by the 
idea; or the other party has mistaken the relation which the 
idea bears to the contemplation, for that borne by the object. 
In other word-, some have | not in perception, but in objective 
speculation) put the idea in the place belonging to the object, 
or other- have put the object in the place belonging t<> the idea. 
Going a step tart her, it will appear thai neither party is entirely 

wrong. It is maniie-t that the object is not the sole correlate 

of the contemplation; because, a- the contemplation is con- 
sciousness, something known in consciousness must be it- 
corn late. But it is equally manifest that the contemplation i- 
oot alone it- own correlative; for, ii it were, it would ooi be a 
thought of something other than itself. The thing ami the 
idea bear the same kind of relation to the contemplation; the 
idea and the contemplation are •; the thing and the contem- 
plation bear the same kind of relation to the latter. Here 
again, we seem to have found only an analogy, not an identity. 



190 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

Our several efforts to identify ideas with things, though only 
relatively successful, have taught us how surprisingly near they 
may approach towards a community of nature. The necessity 
of stopping here, were it obvious, would not preclude the claim 
of having proved consciousness to be practically reliable, if not 
theoretically so. But it is easy, with the insight attained, to do 
much more by way of justification. Consciousness does not tes- 
tify that Ave are conscious of outside objects; its testimony, even in 
perceiving such, is that the mind is construing to itself objects 
extra-mental. So far our endeavor has mainly been to identify 
ideas with things as objects of consciousness; let us now try to 
identify them as objects of contemplation. Very likely an 
analogy will aid us. Instances of things standing for each other 
as objects of contemplation are numerous, though little liable to 
be observed. Take one appropriate by reason of its simplicity. 
I imagine myself to be viewing a landscape through the win- 
dow ; but you draw me nearer to the window, and show me 
that the landscape is exactly pictured on the pane. Neverthe- 
less I was contemplating the landscape, because I thought I 
was — the thought being part of the contemplation. If to- 
morrow, the window being raised, I look upon the landscape, 
thinking it to be the picture; the picture, more than the land- 
scape, will be the object of my contemplation. The case is one 
in which faith is the determining circumstance. The fact which 
it is its function to illustrate, is that the relation which an object 
shall bear to thought may be determined by the thought. We 
do not realize the extensive faculty of control we have. By 
the slightest movement of the body, can we change the relation 
which everything in the universe bears to it. The tiniest ani- 
malcule has some power of influencing all that is. Carry the 
impressions which these reflections make, to the consideration 
of the act called thinking. It needs only an operation of the 
mind to make anything the correlative of a thought. If in 
the thought two objects are identified, they are thereby made 
alike correlative of that thought. Which is the more inti- 
mately related to the thinker in other respects is a matter of 
utter indifference: we are considering them as objects of thought; 






THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 191 

and as such, one is the correlative just as the other is. Though 
one be present to, and the other absent from, consciousness; 
this does not matter if the internality of the former is suppi 
from the contemplation. Though the contemplation of one be 
consciousness thereof; this is of no moment if we discard from 
our consideration every element of the act in excess of mere 
contemplation. As far as the act of thinking of two objects is 
one, they bear one relation to it. We have found more than an 
analogy. While it is true that the thing and its representation 
are not identical, we perceive that they exist in the same relation 
to the thought. Each is the correlative of the contemplation — 
each its object. This is true of the whole, SO far as they are 
similar; and true of any part, down to the limits of similarity : 
as far as there is dissimilarity, the outer correlative is wanting: and 
the mind deceived. Theoneness of relation has been represented 
as depending on the act of unification, because if the object- were 
separately thought of they would be correlative- of separate 
thoughts, and if only one were contemplated it alene would be 
tli • object of contemplation. When thought identifies objects, 
it gives them not like relations, but the same relation, one 
relation, to itself. It will be observed that the idea, a- well as 
the thing, is represented a- correlative to the contemplation. 
The reason of this is that we undoubtedly look upon the idea 

when we look upon tin; thing; for otherwise the idea would be 

a mode of consciousness of which we are unconscious. Though 
in respect of its peculiarity of being within consciousness, the 
idea is not employed as a representation; yet there is ever a 
consciousness of something, and this consciousness is so inti- 
mately involved with all we contemplate that it i- sometimes 

construed into consciousness of the thing. The doctrine which 

both reason and intuition sanction is, that we are conscious of 

the idea only; but contemplate in one concrete BCt both the 

idea and the thing | the thing, however, more than the idea |. 
That this is the explanation of our cognizance of exterior 
existence, Mr. Spencer would probably admit; and if the ad- 
mission be made in the case of existence, it Cannot "ii any <i 

priori grounds be denied in the case of other attributes. 



192 THE DEDUCTIVE AEGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

§ 63. The knowledge which criticism and analysis have shown 
to be probable, synthesis will show to be inevitable. On the 
part of Mr. Spencer, it is admitted that Evolution has made 
the mind aware of an outward cause of its own modifications. 
For the convincing of others only, is it necessary to discuss 
the process so far as it relates to existence of the cause. 

In the dawnings of consciousness, we should look in vain for 
more than the germs of present ideas. If we find these we 
shall find enough. The first hint at causation probably pre- 
sents itself in the shape of invariability. In the sequenee of 
primitive states of consciousness, variability is in many in- 
stances broken by constancy. Somp. sequences are more or less 
invariable; some are absolutely so. Moreover, there is con- 
spicuous persistence and recurrence of the same states. Expe- 
riences of uniformity, continued throughout ages, would leave, 
as a cumulative product, a mental habit expressive of more 
than concrete uniformity. This incipient abstract of uniformity, 
employed to construe each concrete uniformity, would be the 
germinal appreciation of causation. 

Here be it said, once for all, that kindred ideas do not appear 
in absolute lineal succession; but that whole families are brought 
forth in one generation, and developed concurrently. As soon 
as the slightest appreciation of a concrete uniformity has appeared, 
the way is open for the advent of another constituent of the 
idea of causation. Uniformities lead to anticipations. Antici- 
pation at first amounts to the feeling that something will be; and 
this contains the faintest sensibility that something must be. 

The transition from fact to necessity can be, however, only 
initiatory until other ingredients of the idea of causation have 
been obtained. Sequences, originally mere successions of 
occurrences, repeatedly exhibit instances of something more. 
Soon the least variable and least remote of them are dis- 
tinguished as antecedent and consequent. While a is always 
immediately followed by b, it is never immediately followed by 
e: therefore a and 6 gradually become cemented in a relation 
closer than exists between a and e. The class of antecedents 
and consequents, once germinated, is rapidly increased, until 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 193 

perhaps a rudimentary abstraction is formed. Dissociation, as 
well as association, plays an important part. Seldom, and then 
only distantly and at random, dees b follow c, d, or e. Its 
not being sequent from them is, after many experiences, ap- 
preciated, and the appreciation strengthens its association with a. 
In this way is the mind prepared for in a measure realizing 
the dependence of the consequent upon the happening of the 
antecedent, A nearly allied appreciation probably carries for- 
ward the suggestion of dependence A, B, and C, occur 
independently of the happening of a and its consequents, and 
build up an impression of so doing; b, c, d, e, etc., never do, and 
so build up, with regard to themselves, a contrary impression. 
From infinite repetition the respective abstracts follow, heighten- 
ich other. The dependence recognized as yet, i- not 
that of effect upon its cause. It is only the want of dis- 
connection. 

Experience of one thing influencing another is most likely 
a prerequisite to a further grasp of causation. The experience 
is proximately had in consciousness of mental affections inducing, 
modifying, abolishing each other. A sensation awakens a 

:id sensation changes it to another fear, a third lessens, and 
a fourth dispels it. Emotion, being the cumulative incident of 
experiences, give- a very strong impression of being ar 
and sustained by every experience which excites it. 

Influence is one -hade Less than power. The power <>f an 
edent to produce its consequent derives at once a further 
and a complete realization from a certain oft-recurring and 
comparatively definite experience. In volitioD is expert* I 
both Bides of the exercise of power. The exertion of p 
by the antecedent i- fit in the consciousness of effort In the 
direct product of volition, a- far ;i- it lies within consciousness, 
and in the sense of resistance to it- efforts, is experienced the 
production of the consequent by antecedent power. Together, 
I* " two kind- of experience constitute an experience of causa- 
tion. The antecedents of volition, in connection therewith, 
are, we must add. experiences uext in importance to volition 
itself. Willing was uot formerly what it is at present; but bo 

l:; 



194 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

much the better: it exhibited relatively much less of intelli- 
gence, prompting and directive, and much more of exertion, 
causing and affected. Whether volition alone would have been 
sufficiently suggestive of causation, is of no particular moment; 
since it appears not to have been unaided. Other experiences, 
such as those named, were valuable as developing forms to be 
subsequently employed; and especially valuable as bringing 
under the category of causation internal changes which volition 
does not control. While to volition we are indebted for 
strengthening and integrating these experiences; to them we 
must accord the merit of having strengthened and extended 
the implications of volition. 

All the elements of a vague realization of causation being 
supplied and integrated, there would rapidly develop a certain 
mental formula in which each experience would immediately 
upon production be enveloped. In some instances the formula 
would be filled by a reproduced experience ; in others, the com- 
plemental experience not being reproducible, there would be 
left in the formula a blank to which the mind could not be 
completely oblivious. The blank — the unfilled locus of a 
cause — there would be an effort to fill up with an appropriate 
reproduction. Experiences being so much more readily and 
completely realized by means of the formula, there would be a 
growing tendency to employ it in the case of every experience. 
Such tendency would be greatly augmented by the experience of 
new cases in which the formula is presented filled, and of cases 
in which the void at first appearing is afterwards occupied. 
The progressing recognition of the invariability of the connec- 
tion between effect and cause would produce a feeling of the 
universality of this connection. The mind would ultimately 
exhibit a groping for the cause of every affection. Made 
sensible, by instance upon instance, that when sensations are 
contemplated there is a blank in the formula, and that when 
other modes are contemplated there is at best a partial blank,, 
which no re-presentation of its experiences can fill; it is 
gradually guided to the formation of a representation of some- 
thing not among its experiences. 












THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 195 

We have been moving too hastily, and must now turn back 
to the beginnings of a parallel development. The apprehen- 
sion of something external is not likely to appear until 
externality has become to some extent familiar to the mind. 
For this to take place, is more than possible. Qualitative ex- 
ternality is continually present to consciousness. Pain 
external to pleasure; one pain or pleasure, to another. In 
short, every contrast is a double instance of externality. Ex- 
ternality is also presented as appertaining to quantity; as when 
a loud sound or a severe pain seems ideally divisible into like 
portions not co-incident. The notion of quantitative divisi- 
bility probably result* from experience of sounds, pains and 
the like, in various degrees of intensity. Increase and decre 
of intensity would itself have the same tendency; and would 
even directly suggest externality appertaining to quantity as 
such. Temporal externality has something in common with 
the others, but much peculiar to itself. Mental affections are 
observed to occupy different sections of time, lying external to 
each other in an indefinite series. It may well be, that th 
is something in mental experiences still more nearly approach- 
ing to local externality. Those which are simultaneous are not 
looked upon as coinciding, but as laterally dispersed. The 
accumulation of memory is doubtless the mosl important -tore 
from which are drawn material- for a conception of externality. 
On the one hand, memory discloses that mode- now present 
were once not within consciousness; on the other, that modes 
once present are within consciousness no Longer. Anticipation, 
too, is belief that modes now absent will hereafter be present, 
From the apprehension of modes a- not internal, the transition 
i- short to the apprehension of modes a- external Especially 
is this so because former and future modes are pictured as 
ternal to present consciousness. There being no dearth of 
materials out of which to construct the symbol of a new kind 
of externality, we clearly understand how it fa that when the 
mind seeks to lill up a partly blank form of causation, it is 
enabled to provide a representation of somethu 
to itself 



196 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

The materials being furnished by experience, what induces 
the construction? We have seen why the mind struggles to 
conceive a proper cause; but have not yet learned how it is 
determined to conceive a cause which is external. Conceiving 
at random, it might sometime form the right conception, which 
would be approved as soon as formed ; or it might by random 
conception obtain only a hint, which would be a guide to subse- 
quent trials, each resulting in a further hint, and so on to 
ultimate success. Such process has doubtless been an aid 
throughout the whole progress of the development under view. 
I am not disposed, however, to name chance as the chief factor 
in production of the conception of externality. Examining 
the mind, I find a more efficient in necessity. The mental 
modification to be accounted for is, after all, not very elaborate. 
A cause is necessarily conceived as next to completely external 
to the mind. There has been no experience of coincidence of 
cause and effect: in all instances each has been external to the 
other. In almost all experience, when an effect was contem- 
plated the cause has seemed to be external to present con- 
sciousness. In almost all experience, the cause has also seemed 
to be in a manner external to preceding consciousness; for, 
being external to all modes contemporaneous with itself, is 
being so far external to the mind. As so far external, im- 
agination would immediately picture the hidden cause. Then 
must begin a process of exclusion. Memory, which would be 
more than at any subsequent stage relied on, would testify that 
the cause occupied no place in preceding consciousness. Yet in 
preceding consciousness uniform experience would indicate the 
cause to be. Present consciousness would enforce experience by 
excluding the cause from its own limits. Here is a direct con- 
flict of tendencies: imagination endeavoring to locate the cause 
in prior consciousness; memory excluding it therefrom. There 
could have been but one resultant. Observe that memory does 
not exclude the cause from all parts of immediately past con- 
sciousness with equal power and effect. Lateral to the phases 
which are remembered most vividly and persistently, arc other 
phases the memory of which is indefinite and unstable. The 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 197 

first effort of imagination would be to locate the cause at the 
most vivid point in preceding consciousness. This being the 
point of greatest resistance, the attempt would be deflected to 
points of less and less resistance' until a point would be reached 
where, both memory and resistance being absent, the proper 
location would be found. To the past, but not to past con- 
sciousness, the cause must at last be relegated. 

It is not thought that the process just described is, or has been, 
carried on from beginning to consummation in single individuals; 
much less that it involve- but a single experience. It has 
probably been transmitted from parent to offspring throughout 
many generations, as an hereditary mental bias absorbing 
growth from each sensation. Neither is it supposed that the 
first cognizance of external cause is more than a vague and 
momentary suggestion. Nay: only by slow accretion- could it 
become bo much. If the breaking in upon placid consciousness 
by a violent nervous -hock, faintly implies the operation of an 
antecedent not in consciousness, it is only by virtue of the 
same thing having been partly suggested numberless times 
before. Infinitely -lower than language can depict is the 
process, and less tangible the product 

Before tracing the process of further development, let as dwell 
awhile on the evolving product. That which we are obliged t<> 
treat a- tic earliest idea of external cause is, strictly speaking, a 
feeling rather than an idea; sensibility largely predominating 
over sensibility to definite forma Still, the feeling must have 
some representative qualities; else it is a feeling of nothing bat 

itself. Afi the mind inclines to old forms, it i- likely that the 

first representation of an externality is substantially some old 

form, located out of vivid consciousness. The mode which 

serves as a representation, doubtless varies with the individual 

and the occasion, and i- while [| lasts but a series of pro- 
visional substitutions. While we thus admit the inadequa! 
of the representative mode, we most observe that it is not as 
inadequate a- high abstraction makes it appear. There are 
qualities besides externality which it always portrays. All 

experience- of CaUSatiOD within COnSClOUSneSS, have prea Qted 



198 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

the cause as exercising power; that is, as acting on something: 
any conception of causation by the external must do the same. 
Necessarily the cause will be, from the start represented as in a 
state of action. Another characteristic of the cause to 

which the earliest portrayal must extend, is temporal relation- 
ship. Familiarity with time is long anterior to acquaintance 
with causation. Time has been given in every sequence. In 
relations of sequence every experience of internal causation 
has been presented. To leave time out of a representation of 
causation by the external, would not be natural, nor, we may 
add, possible. The representative mode would of necessity be 
temporally qualified. Of necessity, the represented activity of 
the cause would be activity in .time. Experience and 

necessity unite in determining that the first representation of 
external cause shall portray it as something acting in time. 
Eventually the conception becomes a representation of substance 
acting in space and time. Before inquiring into the trans- 
formation, let us remark how like the last is the first conception. 
A something acting in time, if we but add occupancy of space, 
becomes a substance acting in time and space. Our problem, 
then, is how to account for the representation of space-occupancy 
by external cause. 

A review of the materials at hand will go far towards the 
required solution. Direction is within the sphere of experi- 
ence. Prospection acquaints the mind with one direction; 
memory, with one extremely opposite; and every approach to ex- 
ternal location, with a third. Extension in two directions 
and occupancy thereof is given among subjective experiences. 
In present consciousness-, modes are arranged laterally, and in 
the field of past consciousness they are arranged both laterally 
and lineally. They seem, when viewed in mass, to fill up 
extension of two dimensions. As bearing upon the 
question of what things consciousness may symbolize, we shall 
consider some of the things by which consciousness is symbol- 
ized. Consciousness is for many purposes symbolized by a line. 
Though such symbolization is posterior to, and dependent upon, 
some acquaintance with spacial extension; nevertheless, that 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 199 

it is ever available, proves something in conseiousness bearing 
resemblance to a line. In this instance the likeness consists in 
a series of modes. Yet it is only by very high abstraction 
that we can speak of the line of consciousness. It would be 
nearer the truth to look upon consciousness as a field stretched 
out before the mental view. Accordingly, for many purposes 
we do this, and with good effect; proving that consciousness 
does bear some resemblance to a plane. The resemblance, in 
this instance, consists in a series of co-existences. Still 
there is too much abstraction to answer many purposes. With 
great advantage, and therefore with great propriety, conscious- 
ness is figured as a current flowing past relatively per- 
manent modes of mind, and gradually wearing them away. It 
is also, with good result, represented as like a flow in present- 
ing depth as well as length and breadth. The semblance to 
depth is recognized in the impression of' closer proximity of 
modes than would be allowed by superficial arrangement. 
Severally they seem to have depth as much as they seem to 
have length or breadth; and collectively they seem to roll, and 
tumble, and wind about each other almost indiscriminately. A 
further approach to concrcteness brings us to the very useful 
conception of consciousness as an ambiguous compromise be- 
tween a point and a sphere — as an expanding, contracting 
sphere, irregular in outline and heterogeneous in composition. 
This conception results from, and is justified by, the fad that 
co-existenl states an- huddled together in the mind, it never 

knows how; while those that preceded have I' It the record of 

having occupied the same general locality. Axe we authorized 
lo assert that consciousness presente the three Bpacial dimensions 
because a Line, a plane, a flow and a sphere correctly symbolize 
it? I think we can go no farther than to affirm that there are 
in consciousness elements bo much resembling the Bpacial dimen- 
sions that either Bel may be used a- Bjmbols Of the Other. 

Material being shown, the process of adding Bpacial qualifi- 
cations to the primitive conception of external agency da 
seem so mysterious. Of the same effed will !>'• tic disclosure 
that something of such qualifications i- connate with tic con- 



200 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

ception itself. The moment a cause is located as lateral to past 
consciousness, it presents more than temporal externality, 
though less than spacial externality. To apprehend this 
clearly, it is necessary to advert again to the process of location. 
The region in which the mind first seeks to locate an unknown 
cause, is that where all known causes of past and present mod- 
ifications are located; that is, the field of retrospection. But 
memory resists location in this field ; completely along the line 
directly before the view, and with decreasing completeness 
towards the lateral limits. The effort must be continued; and, 
as it necessarily follows the line of least resistance, a point is 
at last found where there is no resistance. The outness which 
is at this stage recognized is a little more than temporal. It is 
an outness that existed w T hen, a moment ago, the cause and then- 
existing consciousness were temporally coincident. It is spacial 
outness in one direction. Simultaneously outness in many 
directions is recognized : for a single outward cause cannot find 
complete location until many have been almost located. In its 
efforts to locate the hidden causes which conspicuous experiences 
suggest, the mind does not reiterate its efforts against the same- 
points, nor even in the same general direction. Now a cause is 
almost placed on one side of consciousness, now a cause, often 
the same cause, is almost placed on the opposite side — develop- 
ing, simultaneously with the complete location of causes out of 
consciousness, the idea of a system of causes bounding con- 
sciousness on every side. As the language here used is very 
figurative, a word must be said about direction. The only 
direction which is usually remarked as being presented in 
consciousness is temporal. Less obvious, but of no less present 
importance, is a kind of direction common to both time and 
space; namely, that which is involved in lateral connections of 
co-existent modes. This is introduced by time, but afterwards 
almost exclusively appropriated to space. Now as to the 
application. The cause which is first located out of conscious- 
ness is necessarily given something like direction as related to 
consciousness. Such relation is overwhelmingly temporal ; but 
it is noticeable that in as far as the direction is lateral it is both 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 201 

spacial and temporal, and that in as far as it exceeds lateral 
direction in consciousness it is spacial. The same conclusion 
may be reached by shorter process: outness from conscionsD 
whatever else it may be, is spacial outness, and spacial outa 
can only be in some direction. But then, at first the direction 
is in no case fixed and determinate. By a colligation of ex- 
periences, however, are permanent distinctions of outward 
direction obtained. While spacial externality is closely in- 
volved with temporal externality, one cause is located here, 
another there, around the flow of consciousness, according to 
vacillation- in the point of least resistance. This experience of 
course develops a tendency to give each can-" a separate 
location. A tendency so acquired is not, it must he remarked, 
the only, nor even the important, factor in the case. The can 
which environ consciousness are looked apon a- modes very 
much resembling certain remembered modes. In particular, 
they are conceived to he laterally arranged, Bince not in oon- 
osness, around about it. Such arrangement is according t.» 
the experienc • of consciousness that mode- are exclusive of each 
other, filling up extension. Whether to these mod 
anything like depth, need not he determined, a- it i- <>!»\ ;<>n- 
that other modes are, as experiences accumulate, necessarily 
imagined back of them. The necessity which compels the 
conception of modes just outside of consciousness, likewi 
compels the conception of modes still farther outside. ( 
ceptual reproduction of a cause is almost a- much in requisirj 
in the case of external modes a- in the case of modes not 

external; and every increase of familiarity with external:' 
augments the necessity. Sometimes theai ight ap- 

pears to have- been an internal mode; :i- where a volition, by 
changing tin- circumstances of the organism, reflects ne^ sensa- 
tional Impressions upon the mind. In other instano -. because 
of prior uniformities of sequence, tin me t«» have 

been some external mode which previously affected « -< »i »-. f. »i 1 ~- 
ness. In the majority of instances, however, the antecedent i- 
not discoverable among internal modes, nor y. t among ill 
externa] modes that immediately affect consciousness, and i- 



202 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

therefore relegated to a region outlying both consciousness and 
its immediate surroundings. As causes seem to lie back of 
sensations, so do other causes seem to lie back of these. 

We have traced the notion of external cause from the begin- 
ning of its evolution to the point where it represents external 
substance acting in space and time, upon the mind and upon 
itself. Both material for the construction and the construction 
itself have been accounted for. To the very critical, there may 
seem to be a great difference between the raw materials fur- 
nished by experience and the elements of which the structure 
is ultimately composed. Indeed it may be remarked that there 
are elements in the complete idea which experience, in its nar- 
row sense, did not provide. We have seen, I think, how all 
the elements are wrought into ultimate shape by the mind's 
operation upon itself. If the mind has contributed some ma- 
terial, it has done no more than it always does when, out of 
primary forms, it constructs derivative ones. To the 

very critical, it may also occur that all the factors of the process 
of construction have not been named. The truth of the objec- 
tion is very favorable to the views above promulgated. Great 
advantage might have been derived from a more exhaustive 
exposition. I shall illustrate. When dealing with the earliest 
representation of an externality, we noticed how it was bettered 
by adding to it modifications which it lacked at first ; but did 
not remark how it was perfected by depriving it of modifica- 
tions which at first it had. Thus we are chargeable with 
omission. Externality being first represented by a mode very 
unlike anything external, misrepresentation would be rapidly 
eliminated. Every recognition that something internal is not 
the external cause represented, would remove a resemblance of 
the representation to this thing internal. The exclusion of 
qualifications from the representation would be both a sub- 
traction of error and an addition of truth. This process of 
exclusion, however, although continuous throughout the evolu- 
tion of ideas, is too subtle for detail, and is not sufficiently 
prominent to require it. The concurrent process of direct 
inclusion very properly received our entire attention. 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 203 

To protract our review much further is needless. Likeness 
after likeness, between the world of phenomena and the world 
of nournena, has been incidentally disclosed in exhibiting the 
synthesis of symbols, which was the subject of investigation. 
Pages back it would have been competent to stop and claim a 
sufficient positive refutation of Mr. Spencer's doctrine, that 
between mind and not-mind there is an absolute dissimilarity 
of nature. Yet, lest it be not obvious that consciousness can 
symbolically simulate something more definite than the abstrac- 
tion, "substance acting in space and time," it is advisable not 
to omit a few suggestions illustrative of the fact. That 

Figure is portrayed as belonging to outside agencies should not 
be perplexing after the foregoing explanation-. Form is given 
in every state of consciousness. This is true of both form- of 
being and forms of activity. Difference, Likeness, and Iden- 
tity, which things outside of consciousness present, have coun- 
terparts inside. As to Number, Homogeneity and Heteroge- 
neity, Whole and Part, any reader may be trusted to make 
appropriate reflections. Size is relative extension. This is 
constantly presented in consciousness; as are also Separability, 
Inseparability, and Ideal Divisibility. Of Mobility and Immo- 
bility we may say the same. In the abstract, [ncompressibility 
is an exclusion, and Coherence, a cohesion of mode-; and when 
so regarded, consciousness is remarked to present numberless 
instances of each. Rich in materials, it isnol surprising 

if' the mind i- felicitous in construction. The process beyond 
the point to which it has been carried must be left to the reader's 
imagination, aided by the last exhibition of materials. .My aim 
wastoaocount for the idea of Bubstance acting in space and time. 

I wish to preclade a probable criticism by observing, tint 
ideas pre-logically developed are ;»t leasl as reliable a- ideas 
Logically developed. It may be said that I have been arguing 
on the supposition that the disputed attributes are poss — d by 
that which is called "The Unknowable Cau .'" [f 1 had 
done this, I could claim to have shown the Belf-consisten 
Realism; but I claim to have done much more. Empl 
only necessary mental modes, the effort was to show how these 



204 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

are constructed into ideas of noumena. If this has been done, 
such ideas of noumena as have been accounted for, guarantee 
the existence of noumena possessing the qualities which these 
ideas represent; for the ideas, being necessitated by facts within 
the mind, must, even to their aspect of identity with noumena, 
be consistent with facts without the mind. But if it 

were necessary to rely upon logical process, we should not be 
without rational support. For instance, when b follows a in 
consciousness, we may conclude by a logical process that the 
immediate cause of b did not precede the immediate cause of a 
outside. Given the present affections of consciousness, and we 
can logically justify the preponderance of our beliefs in regard 
to noumena. To them the rules of logic apply with good effect. 
Logical, as well as pre-logical, conclusions, then, evidence a com- 
munity of nature between the outside world and our ideas of it. 

§ 64. A congruity, greater than might have been anticipated, 
remains to be pointed out. Before attempting to explain how 
thought can transcend consciousness, it was said, " that a like mys- 
tery is presented in every act of memory and anticipation." To 
have found that one explanation is sufficient to clear up the several 
varieties of the mystery, would have been a significant coinci- 
dence; but to have found that cognizance of the external in space 
is actually evolved from cognizance of the external in time, brings 
our detached speculations into remarkably complete congruity. 

The symbol of a remembered cause is, to a certain extent, a 
reproduction thereof — is a reproduction of the cause to the 
exact extent to which the cause is before the mind. The 
reproduction is not only like the cause, but, in a degree, is the 
cause. Just as the posture which the body assumes to-day 
may be identical with one which it has had before; so may a 
form of mind be, more or less, no other than a form before 
obtaining The periods may be two, while the form is one. 
A wntclTdoes not change its identity by being taken apart and 
put toother again; nor by the substitution of a few old parts 
bv new ones. It is obvious, then, why the state employed in 
the act of memory is identified with the state remembered. 



THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. L' 1 >fi 

The habit of identifying the symbol and the tiling is Dot 
laid aside when the mind arises to the contemplation of thi 
never within experience, because there is nothing in the 
distinction between temporal and spacial externality requiring 
that it should be. The first impression of an externality is that it 
was some prior state of mind — some state again existing through 
reproduction. While it is gradually excluded from actual 
experience, the impression is not lost that it was a state now 
within experience. The region of unconsciousness is not at first 
recognized as differing from consciousness in anything except 
that it is not within the field of memory. There was no mani- 
fest incongruity in identifying a state of mind with a state 
not rememberable. Xor was there manifest incongruity in 
identifying something within experience with something be- 
fore not within experience. Necessarily there would be a 
confirmed habit of identifying the internal with the ex- 
terna] long before the development of adequate ideas of 
externality. 

Thus it would result that the idea must ever be identified 
with the external object, unless something should intervene to 
differentiate perception of the one from perception of the other. 
But there could Ik.' no such differentiation; for the only means 
of apprehending the object is to identify it with it- representa- 
tion. To distinguish the object from the idea, a new idea must 
be introduced, which, in turn, culls for identification or a third 
idea a- objectionable as itself. Moreover, there is no experience 
demanding the differentiation. The mode produced may l'" 
found not to consist with experiences; l»iit in such cases the im- 
pression i-, not thai an interna] mode has been mistaken for a 
mode external, hut that an imaginary external mode has been 
mistaken for a real one Even speculation does no! demand 
that the differentiation should take place. When it divides the 
symbol from it- object, it is obliged t<» confess that it contem- 
plates the object by identification with a duplicate Bymbol. It 
is bound to find, and it does find, propriety in the identification 
of the sign with the signified. The differentiation would require 
judgment that the thing within and the thin- without differ in 



206 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

this, and this, and this; whereas, in as far as the thing is before 
the mind, they do not differ, but are the same. The differentia- 
tion would require judgment that the form within the mind is 
not the form without; whereas identity of form is largely in 
excess of substantial diversity. The differentiation would 
require the complicating of perception with the distinction 
between the thing and the idea as the correlatives of an impres- 
sion; whereas their likeness in this respect is of all-absorbing 
importance. The differentiation would require judgment that 
the thing contemplated in perception and conception is not the 
cause of the sensation; whereas it is the cause of the sensation 
which the mind has chiefly in contemplation, whatever else 
may be identified with it — the contemplation itself, not specu- 
lation about it, determining its correlative. There is, we see, 
neither possibility nor necessity of contrasting ( except in specu- 
lation ) the things of which we are conscious with the things of 
which we think. They bear the same relation to the act which 
identifies them. Besides other points of identity, they are one 
as related to the act (or part-act) of contemplating them as one. 

§ 65. As with the world outside, so is consciousness acquainted 
with more of mind than consciousness contains. This we all 
spontaneously believe. This Mr. Spencer admits so far as exist- 
ence is concerned. This is probable in view of the sameness of 
nature which must exist between modes underlying consciousness 
and modes therein; and is rendered more probable by the 
lately discussed power of communion with the external world. 
It may be otherwise enforced. 

Mr. Spencer argues that cognition, being "the establishment 
of some connection between subjective states, answering to some 
connection between objective agencies," "it is clear that the 
process, no matter how far it be carried, can never bring within 
the reach of Intelligence • • •• the states themselves." What 
being within the reach of intelligence means, should have been 
explained. It seems to be a tenet of Agnosticism, that if we 
should come into possession of all knowledge, we should be 
compelled to reject as illusive all that appears in consciousness. 






THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 207 

That a state of mind can be and not be real, when being and 
reality mean the same, is an assertion not congenial for anv one 
to make; yet it is implied in the denial of our power to know 
anything in itself. If a mental state is a real phenomenon, it is 
therefore a real noumenon: inasmuch as we know it, we know 
a noumenon. I insist upon this because it is of positive 
advantage to Realism; and not because Mr. Spencer denies it; 
for I do not understand that he does. Being known in con- 
sciousness, is, in his view, to be known so far, but to be known 
no farther. 

From the knowledge of the subject which he admits, may 
be obtained the knowledge which he denies. Beyond the rela- 
tions of co-existence and sequence which mental affections bear 
to each other, something of their natures is presented in con- 
sciousness. It needs only to contrast love and hate, to bring 
an instance before us. Of so much of the natures of mental 
states as we can know in consciousness, we can unquestionably 



form true ideas — ideas resembling the realities for which the 



stand. These ideas we can divide in a way in which their 
correlatives are in fact never divided. With these ideas and 
their elements we can form combinations BUch as fcheir correla- 
tives never form. Thus we can, probably by logical pr 
certainly by a process of psychological development, arise to 
truths concerning subjective modifications, which are, Btrictly 
speaking, never presented in consciousness. It is by this pro- 
cess that such abstractions as joy, hope, fear, regret, are obtained. 
Probably to this process we are largely indebted for the r< cog- 
nition of our own personality. 

I must support the above by saying thai Mr. Spencer never 
thinks of denying thai reproduced modifications of mind are 
formed into combinations expressive of more than consciousness 
directly reveals. Without the power of in Borne manner tran- 
scending the presentations of consciousness there could be no 
understanding of* Evolution. Withoul this power, it would 
be impossible to think that mind, as we know it, may be 
reduced to co-existences and sequences of states; this th 
being an alluvium of the flow of consciousD 



208 THE DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED. 

Once across the line which divides mind as presented, from 
mind as only represented, there seems no necessary limit to our 
progress. If conception can give us a more thorough compre- 
hension of mind than perception, why call any part of its 
nature unknowable because it cannot be perceived? 

What are the arguments with which this and the preceding 
three chapters deal? They are confessedly arguments "from 
the very nature of our intelligence." (First Prin., § 27.) 
From the nature of intelligence as given in perception? By 
no means : they are deductions from the intrinsic nature of in- 
telligence, known only by symbolization. The inconsistency 
is an inevitable one. Were the deduction from appearances 
only, it would have no conclusiveness; for, notwithstanding 
appearances to the contrary, we could imagine an acquaintance 
of mind with its environment and with itself. Again: as no 
essential inability to comprehend is perceivable, it can be known 
only by conception; but if we truly represent more of a thing 
than is perceptible, we so far represent its intrinsic nature. 
To deduce unknowableness from the nature of mind, is neces- 
sarily to rely upon symbols of more of its nature than 
consciousness presents. 



THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 209 



CHAPTER XI. 

Tin: Final Argument. 

The Reconciliation Between Science and Religion, 

§ GG. There remains for our consideration a leading argu- 
ment to which all those so far examined are Bupposed to be 
subsidiary. With the preliminaries of this argument, the 
treatise on "The Unknowable" begins, and with its culmination 
that treatise is brought to a conclusion; while intervening dis- 
cussions are thought to converge at the point to which it leads. 
Valued by the rule- of logical estimation, it will be found n<»t 
to merit the prominence, or to demand the degree of elaboration, 
in which it has been presented: it falls toofarshorl of d 
stration to be conclusive, and is too simple to require much detail. 
But valued with regard to its practical efficiency, it will 
prove not to have been overestimated; for its deviation from 
logical rigidity insures it an extensive audience, and its relation 
to the dearest interests of mankind carries it to the hearts of 
all. The exact bearing of these remark- may be besl mani- 
fested by making known the character of the argument which 
they concern. Seizing upon the obvious necessity for a i 
ciliation between Science and Religion, Mr. Spencer turned it 
to his purpose, by arguing thai the basis of reconciliation musl 
be the doctrine thai nothing in itself is knowable. This is 
substantially bis presentation of the argument. 

"Of all antagonisms of belief, the oldest, the widest, the 
mosl profound and the tnoel important, is thai ben:— □ Religion 
and Science." | Firsl Prin., § 3.) Religion is too deeply rooted 
in our nature, Science too obviously grounded on fact, to be 
discarded. "On both rides of this greal conta then, 

truth musl exist.. ' ' ' And if both have b.i-. - in the reality 

of things, then between them there musl be a fundamental 

11 



210 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 

harmony." (First Prin., § 6.) This being so, "we have to 
discover some fundamental verity which Religion will assert, 
with all possible emphasis, in the absence of Science; and which 
Science, with all possible emphasis, will assert in the absence of 
Religion — some fundamental verity in the defence of which 
each will find the other its ally." ( First Prin., § 6.) As a belief 
common to all religions must be highly abstract; and as 
"Religion can take no cognizance of special scientific doctrines," 
nor Science take cognizance of special religious doctrines; "the 
most abstract truth contained in Religion and the most abstract 
truth contained in Science must be the one in which the two 
coalesce. The largest fact to be found within our mental range 
must be the one of which we are in search. Uniting these 
positive and negative poles of human thought, it must be the ulti- 
mate fact in our intelligence." (First Prin., § 7.) "Religions 
diametrically opposed in their overt dogmas, are yet perfectly at 
one in the tacit conviction that the existence of the world with 
all it contains and all which surrounds it is a mystery ever 
pressing for interpretation. On this point, if on no other, there 
is entire unanimity." (First Prin., § 14.) Every theory of 
creation " tacitly asserts two things : firstly, that there is some- 
thing to be explained; secondly, that such and such is the 
explanation." (First Prin., § 14.) But "analysis of every 
possible hypothesis proves, not simply that no hypothesis is 
sufficient, but that no hypothesis is even thinkable. And thus 
the mystery which all religions recognize, turns out to be a far 
more transcendent mystery than any of them suspect — not 
a relative, but an absolute mystery. 

"Here, then, is an ultimate religious truth of the highest 
possible certainty — a truth in which religions in general are 
at one with each other, and with a philosophy antagonistic to 
their special dogmas. * * * If Religion and Science are to be 
reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest, 
and most certain of all facts — that the Power which the Uni- 
verse manifests to us is utterly inscrutable." (FirstPrin., § 14.) 

An outline of the whole argument will be before us when we 
have added the following. 



THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 211 

"The consciousness of an Inscrutable Power manifested to 
us through all phenomena, has been growing ever clearer; and 
must eventually be freed from its imperfections. The certainty 
that on the one hand such a Power exists, while on the other 
hand its nature transcends intuition and is beyond imagination, 
is the certainty towards which intelligence has from the first 
been progressing. To this conclusion Science inevitably arrives 
as it reaches its confines; while to this conclusion Religion is 
irresistibly driven by criticism." (First Prin., § 31.) 

As intimated before, it cannot be denied that this argument 
ha- much practical efficiency. It consists of reasoning bo far 
from close as to be apprehended by the many, and is embodied 
in propositions so general that its force may be felt by those 
who do not clearly apprehend it. Moreover, its spirit is con- 
genial to multitudes in both the religious and the scientific 
camps who are wasted and wearied by the perennial conflict 
between the two great systems of belief. Having -aid so much 
regarding it- practical strength, let us address ourselves to die 
question of its logical stability. 

Instead of following it step by step, I prefer to attack it at 
the point where all its parts converge. That intellectual evolu- 
tion is bringing us to the recognition of an absolute and eternal 
nescience, is the sum and substance of it all. This proposition 
is divisible into two: that scientific progress is a spontaneous 
advance, and religious progress a forced retreat, towards the 
point where things in themselves are seen to be unknowable. 
Of these divisions in their order. 

§ 67. Ajs author of the dissertation on "The Unknowable," 
Mr. Spencer considered himself the oracle of thai department 
of Science distinguished a- Metaphysics. To do this waa im- 
proper onlyon the supposition thai his reasonings were al fault 
Were they at fault? or does Metaphysical Science support the 
conclusion he proclaimed? Foregoing criticism providi 

with an answer. 

Both induction and deduction have forced upon as < hap. 1 1. 

the truth, that every argument \\-*-<\, or which can be used, in 



212 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 

proof of unknowableness, is based on the knowledge it purports 
to prove impossible. A number of problems, considered 
insoluble and supposed to be peculiar to Ontology, were found 
in the first place ( Chaps. III., IV., & V.) capable of solution, 
and in the second place (Chap. VI.) presenting themselves for 
solution to Phenomenology. Deductions from the nature of 
intelligence were investigated with consonant result. The first 
we found to be drawn from a gross misconception of the 
process of comprehension; and learned that the actual nature 
thereof does not exclude realities from its sphere. ( Chap. VII.) 
In the second instance it was ascertained ( Chap. VIII.) that the 
unknowableness deduced was the unknowableness of something 
neither in existence nor capable of existence. The next 
deduction we learned ( Chap. IX.) to be at best meaningless ; to 
be drawn from an erroneous definition of life; and not to 
follow from either this or a proper definition. Taking then 
in hand an implied deduction, it was shown in opposition thereto, 
(Chap. X.) by testimony of consciousness and admission of 
opponents, that absolute knowledge is probable ; by criticism and 
analysis, that it is possible; and by synthesis, that it is easily 
accounted for. In conclusion of the same chapter it was made 
manifest that the deductive arguments are essentially suicidal. 
Now the last argument is before us; and the summary here 
ended indicates a weakness in that argument too. The Science 
of Metaphysics is, then, repugnant to Mr. Spencer's views. 
We must next inquire if it is not so with Science in general. 

After citing an illustration to which we shall afterwards 
advert, the author proceeds to say: "Thus it is with Science in 
general. Its progress in grouping particular relations of phe- 
nomena under laws, and these special laws under laws more 
and more general, is of necessity a progress to causes that are 
more and more abstract. And causes more and more abstract, 
are of necessity causes less and less conceivable; since the 
formation of an abstract conception involves the dropping of 
certain concrete elements of thought. Hence the most abstract 
conception, to which Science is ever slowly approaching, is one 
that merges into the inconceivable or unthinkable, by the 



THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 213 

dropping of all concrete elements of thought." ( First Prin.. 
In the next section we find the following: "The better inter- 
pretation of each phenomenon has been, on the one hand, the 
rejection of a cause that was relatively conceivable in its nature 
but unknown in the order of its actions, and, on the other 
hand, the adoption of a cause that was known in the order of 
its actions but relatively inconceivable in its nature." 

The a priori absurdity of the proposition, that the bettor inter- 
pretation of each phenomenon has been the rejection ofa more and 
the adoption of a less conceivable cause, is so great a- to amount 
toasufficient refutation. It is beyond dispute that the consequent 
is best explained through the antecedent, when the latter La m<»~t 
intelligible. So unbelievable is it that nescience is the light of 
knowledge, that I am in favor of finding Mr. Spencer guilty 
of a lapsus of expression. His meaning probably is not that 
better interpretation has been the substitution of definite by 
vague causes, but that such substitution is the concomitant of 
better interpretation. The latter rendering best harmonizes 
with the declaration, that the progress of Science "in grouping 
particular relations of phenomena under laws, and these special 
laws under laws more and more general, is of necessity a on 
to causes that are more and more abstract." We have, then, 
to deal with a very different argument from the one which at 
firs! seemed to have been presented. It is, let me say, a much 
more rational argument. The progn I 

collectively, certainly doea furnish much seeming justific 
of the inference that the scientific conception of causal ag 
is becoming more and more abstract The ever pr 
ever widening assimilation of fad to fact, and consequent 
attribution to like antecedents, is an assimilation of antecedent to 
antecedent, and a consequent dropping from to 
peculiarities. Will the process in time remove from th< 
ception of causation all it- concrete elements, leaving us t<> 
attribute all things to :i mere existence? 

It i< difficult to discover any grounds for thinking - 
change towards an extreme implies that the extreme most - 
time be reached, there is no end t<» the anomalies which 



214 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 

universal change implies. In particular, if the extreme must 
in this case be reached, we should prepare to abolish, as some 
propose to do, the hypothesis of noumenal causation altogether, 
and look for the conditions of every fact in antecedent phe- 
nomena. On the supposition that the comprehension of 
phenomena, consists, and wholly consists, in assimilation to other 
phenomena, this is the culmination to be expected. Mr. 
Spencer is settled in the belief, however, that when the cause 
has been deprived of all attributes but existence, the process of 
subtraction must cease. But what is the evidence that the con- 
ception of causal agency is to become as attenuated as is 
compatible w r ith its persistence in thought? The only evi- 
dence left for us to consider is that it is moving towards a 
state of so great attenuation. To reasons for saying that 

it might move past Mr. Spencer's culminating point, may be 
added reasons for thinking that it w 7 ill not move so far. When 
,the cause has come to be conceived as substance acting in space 
and time, the increase in the vagueness of its representation 
must give place to a counter-change. As support for this ex- 
pression of my views, I will name the fact, upon which we can 
scarcely place too much emphasis, that "The Unknowable" is 
not, and cannot be, conceived as unqualified being; but is, and 
must be, represented as some kind of substance acting somehow 
in space and time. Tell us that space, for instance, is but an 
impression wrought by external being upon consciousness, and 
immediately we picture the cause you name as spacially external, 
spacially extended, and changing its spacial and temporal rela- 
tions in the production of the appearance of space. Back of 
space, time, substance, and activity, when viewed as phenomena, 
we place that organism of things, of which, on the realistic 
hypothesis, each is a member, and which all compose. 

Supporting this consideration is a fact which Mr. Spencer 
strangely overlooks. As in assimilation of causes attributes 
are necessarily dropped, so in assimilation of effects is there a 
necessary progress towards abstractness. " Progress in grouping 
particular relations of phenomena under laws, and these special 
laws under laws more and more general, is of necessity a 



THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 215 

progress to causes that are more and more abstract;" but it is 
similarly a progress to phenomena that arc mure and more ab- 
stract. For the same reason that the Universal Cause is Less 
definitely conceived than the cause of but one effect, the Uni- 
versal Effect is less definitely conceived than is a particular 
effect. Science is ever adding to the denotations of the word 
"effect/ 7 and detracting from its connotations: will it therefore 
eventually mean no more than "caused existence?" There i> 
the same reason for thinking so, that there is for thinking that 
the ultimate signification of "cause" will be "causing exist- 
ence." Observe now, which will add something to the 
last consideration, that the assimilation of can-.'- is represented 
as resulting from assimilation of effects. The assimilation of 
two effects brings about the assimilation of their two causes; 
three causes assimilated, signifies three effect- previously assimi- 
lated. The grouping or unification of all causes, therefore, 
depends upon the prior grouping or unification of all effects. 
Effects are to vanish before their causes from the realm of con- 
templation! In both cases, tin- truth is, there will be 
the same deliverance: effects, no more than causes, can be 
reduced to anything less definite than substantia] activity. 

A second fact, of like bearing, which Mr. Spencer baa 
overlooked, is that scientific progress does oot entirely consist in 
likening one thing to another. If it did, the grand fin 
Science would be the disappearance from it- sphere of all fact-; 
for in no respect do all phenomena agree, except that in which 
they agree with "The Unknowable." In tie' universe, differ- 
ence, if not preponderant over similarity, i- no more capable of 
elimination. Each phenomenon presents something peculiar to 
itself — something thai will not classify; and this element p r- 
vades all others. Co-extensive, if not more than co-ext naive, 
with recognition of likeness, must therefore ignition of 

unlikeness. No fact ia thoroughly underet I until it i- not 

only completely likened to tie' like, but also compli I 

trasted with the unlike. Should we. how* 7i r, 

Science as solely occupied in reducing facts I 
and therefore to greater coherence and h< I 



216 THE FINAL AKGUMENT. 

should be guilty of an aberration similar to that of Mr. Spencer 
when he represents Science as solely occupied in reducing facts 
to greater indefiniteness, and therefore (although he Avould be 
loath to accept this consequence) to greater incoherence and 
homogeneity. Science does neither solely. The decomposition 
of facts and assortment of their like elements into general notions, 
should be understood to be but a mean to the better understanding 
of the objective synthesis, in which they are presented, and in 
which they are to be ultimately construed. Now another 

qualification must be subjoined. Neither through unlikeness 
alone, nor through likeness alone, nor yet through a combination 
of the two, may things obtain a final comprehension. The 
relation of cause and effect is a circumstance very available in 
reducing facts to their most comprehensible form. Causes 
that best explain their effects are those most definitely con- 
ceived. I shall attempt to illustrate so as to meet all Mr. 
Spencer's arguments to the contrary. The child who hears 
"hard times" attributed to a providential visitation, remains in 
about as much perplexity as before. It is not because the 
agency named, or rather its mode of operation, is not classified 
or not distinguished : on the contrary, the instance of causation 
to be understood is assimilated to the one, and distinguished 
from the other, moiety of all familiar instances of causation. 
The difficulty is that the relation of antecedent and consequent 
is not definitely delineable. For if we make it still less defi- 
nite, by telling the child that an unconditioned cause was that 
which occasioned the fact to be explained, we advance an 
explanation less efficient than the one previously advanced. 
Suppose we try the opposite experiment of naming a very 
definite cause — suppose we attribute the mysterious effect to 
the prevalence of dark spots upon the sun. "Here," we may 
suppose Mr. Spencer to interpose, "you have named a very 
definite cause, but the child is as far from comprehension as 
before." True; but not to the point. Comprehension through 
the relation of cause and effect requires not merely a definite 
cause; but requires nothing less than definite causation. Wait 
until we have made the causation in question definitely con- 



THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 217 

ceivable, by explaining to the child that the sun spots, by 
affecting crops, affected the general prosperity, and you will find 
that a flood of light will break upon his understanding. 
"But," we may suppose Mr. Spencer to object, "you must, if 
you wish the child to understand the truth, ultimately supplant 
the definite solution just given by another Less definite; a- you 
will perceive when you reflect that the real cause of 'hard 
times' was the failure of a single business house, which, by 
destroying mutual confidence, disturbed condition- of unstable 
equilibrium, and hence brought about a crash." Very true, 
and equally inconclusive. It would be useless folly to deny 
that the right solution is frequently less definite than the wrong 
solution. Nor is this tact dm- in every case to accident: neces- 
sarily an explanation which has long had possession of tin- field 
ha- come to be definitely conceived; and an explanation just 
arising to supplant it is necessarily vague. But no sooner does 
a new solution take the place of an old one than it begins :<> 
develop definiteness. Having given to die child the last solu- 
tion, how do you better it, but by going further into details? 
The initial failure is sufficiently intelligible to the child; but it' 
it were not, we would explain that SO much was due \\> 
much owing there, and that the embarrassment consequent upon 
the disproportion increased the same, ultimately bringing about 
suspension and exposure. Disturbances of unstable equilib- 
rium, and the following of failure from failure, we might 
plain by the familiar and exceedingly definite illustration of a 
structure of cards falling into utter ruin upon the withdrawal 
of one. Throughout our illustration, it has been uniformly 
manifested that the light which causation throw- upon the 
mystery of it- effect, i- proportionate t" the definiteness with 
which it is itself conceived. When t" this we add 

the conclusion, previously '. that phenomena ai 

incapable of complete assimilation as they are of unf. 
distinction, we shall apprehend no approach t" the conception 
of the 1 Fniversal Cause as an indefinite existent 

A teleologies! argument may b 
who occasionally resorts to argument* of the kind. I 



218 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 

deprived of explanation through causation would be a sore 
affliction. We are not to be consoled by telling us that dis- 
tinction and assimilation are powerful aids to comprehension. 
Are they alone as efficient as they and a realization, an extensive 
realization, of causation would be? We must answer that they 
are not. Mr. Spencer himself has spoken a confirmation of 
our misgivings. I do not refer to his belief that all facts 
are deducible, and have been by him in a manner deduced, from 
the continued existence of "The Unknowable." (First Prin., 
Part II., Chap. VI.) What I refer to is this: "were self- 
existence conceivable, it would not in any sense be an explana- 
tion of the Universe. No one will say that the existence of an 
object at the present moment is made easier to understand by 
the discovery that it existed an hour ago, a day ago, or a year 
ago. • * * The assertion that the Universe is self-existent does 
not really carry us a step beyond the cognition of its present 
existence; and so leaves us with a mere re-statement of the 
mystery." (First Prin., § 11.) After this we read with dissent, 
that " whoever contemplates the relation in which it stands to 
the truths of science in general, will see that" the truth which 
is "the basis of science" is "the Persistence of Force" (First 
Prin., § 61.); and that "by the Persistence of Force, we really 
mean the persistence of some Cause which transcends our 
knowledge and conception." (First Prin., § 62.) We must 
incline to the prior persuasion, that continued existence (for 
so he defines " persistence " ) is a very shadowy basis of solution ; 
that it explains present existence, but little more. It is 
probable, as we found it to be desirable, that the Cause which 
Science is ever investigating will always present greater 
definiteness than that of an unconditioned existence. 

The illustration of Mr. Spencer's views concerning the 
progress of Science, to which it was said we should return, is 
the following. 

" Of old the Sun was regarded as the chariot of a god, drawn 
by horses. * * * When, many centuries after, Kepler discovered 
that the planets moved round the Sun in ellipses and described 
equal areas in equal times, he concluded that in each planet 



THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 219 

there must exist a spirit to guide its movements. * ' ■ When. 
finally, it was proved that these planetary revolutions with all 
their variations and disturbances, conformed to one universal 
law — when the presiding spirits which Kepler conceived were 
set aside, and the force of gravitation put in their place; the 
change was really the abolition of an imaginable agency, and 
the substitution of an unimaginable one. For though the law 
of gravitation is within our mental grasp, it is impossible to 
realize in thought the force of gravitation." (First Prin., § 29.) 

I consider this example as about the most favorable to him- 
self that Mr. Spencer could have chosen. Here are some that 
do not favor him. The cause of the sensation of color, and of 
its various modifications, has been made more definitely conceiv- 
able by the more definite understanding of the nature of Light 
The sensations of heat and light are more completely accounted 
for than they would be if we had not ceased to attribute them 
to fluid substances which are so unlike fluids as to pass thr 
dense objects, such as glass or metal, much better than they 
pass through porous objects, such as wood. The cause of sound 
is much more clearly conceived by the instructor who gives the 
explanation, than by the scholar who Deeds it. A farm-boy 
has a very indefinite notion of the antecedents which terminate 
in the visible and conspicuous result of incubation; to the 
biologist its antecedents are far from vague. Tip' operation of 
tic machinery covered by his -kin is known to the Bavageonly 
through its external manifestations; while a definite a 
standing of its hidden nature i> at one- the aim ami the pride of 
an important department of Science. These examples, an. I they 
might If indefinitely multiplied, show that scientific pro 
is frequently towards a more detailed comprehension of can 

My choice of illustrations has been both guided and circum- 
scribed by a fact unfortunately not noticed by Sir, S 
Mysteries which are conspicuous and striking are the ones that 
present themselves as such to primitive man, and an- th 
therefore to which he seeks t>» find solutions, Hi- solutions 
being as definite a- hi- sense of gen iral congruity will p rrait, 
are very definite indeed, and must be subsequently 



220 THE FINAL AKGUMENT. 

by others less definite. So that if I should choose a conspicuous 
mystery as the basis of illustration, I should be met by the fact 
that the first inquirers have given it a definite solution, early 
scientists have given it a less definite solution, and later 
scientists have given it a solution the least definite of all. The 
examples given are not, therefore, as striking as the one of which 
Mr. Spencer has availed himself and others available to him. 

As has been already noticed, the general remarks just ended 
have a very important present application. On a priori grounds 
one ignorant of the fact might satisfy himself that the apparent 
motion of the sun must find a solution before the dawn of 
Science; that the first solution must be as definite as contempo- 
raneous knowledge would allow it to be; and that Science must 
sometime advance a less definite solution, perhaps falling into a 
similar error to be afterwards similarly corrected. Such indeed 
is part of the history of Science; but it is not all. Science 
often prefers a vague solution to one less vague; but when it 
has chosen between solutions, it wishes the one chosen to be, 
and proceeds to make it, as definite as it can be made. 

If this is not so, what means the hypothesis of influences 
projected from object to object through an intervening medium? 
Would not Science advance materially, if some one should ex- 
plain clearly what the force of gravitation is? This is a test 
question. If a solution of gravitation as definite, for instance, 
as a child can have of the mysteries of a watch, would in the 
least advance Science, the progress of Science is not essentially 
towards vaguer representations of causation. 

We have found nothing favoring, but very much opposing, 
the conclusion that a settled nescience is to be an outcome of 
scientific progress. That an examination of Religious evolution 
will show the same result, is, therefore, highly probable. 

§ 68. With a mere reference to the foregoing exposition, we 
may dismiss the claim that Science is, or ever has been, forcing 
Religion to a realm of nescience. If Religion will not spon- 
taneously accept an "Unknowable Cause" as the object of its 
contemplation, there is nothing to force it into doing so. What 



THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 221 

is the author's theory of the germination and development of 
Religion? The following is an abstract of the account which 
he gives in the first part of his work on Sociology. 

Primitive man shows no native tendency towards super- 
natural interpretation. Only after he has been " betrayed i nt< i an 
initial error" (§ 205) — only after certain experiences have 
suo-o-ested to him the existence of spirits, does he begin to think 
of them as agencies. He "regards a dream as a series of actual 
adventures: he did the things, went to the places, saw the per- 
sons dreampt of." (§ 206.) While he was conscious of his 
absence from his couch, others were conscious of his presence. 
"Untroubled bv incongruities, he accepts the fact- as they stand; 
and, in proportion as he thinks about them, he is Led to conceive 
a double which goes away during sleep and cornea back." 
(§205.) The unconsciousness of sleep being first explained 
by the absence of the other-self, all kinds of unconsciousness 
are eventually explained in the same way. The explanation is 
little by little extended to the insensibility of swoon, apo- 
plexy, catalepsy, ecstasy, coma, wounds, and finally death. 
Other kinds of unconsciousness being terminated by renewal 
of animation, the earliest inference of the savage is that death 
is so terminated. "He witnesses insensibilities various in 
their lengths and various in their degrees. Alter the im- 
k majority of them there come animations — daily after 
sleep, frequently after swoon, occasionally after coma, now and 
then after wounds or blows. What aboul this oth 
insensibility? — will nol reanimation follow this also? 3 
Among other experiences, reanimation after supposed death 
"helps to convince him thai the insensibility of death is like 
all other insensibilities— only temporary." I S B2.) From the 
not i on of an after-life terminated by return of the soul to the 
body, "the notion of an enduring after-life is reached tl 
Btages." ( § 100.) "The idea of death' differentiates dowry 
from the ideaof temporary insensibility. At ii: 
is looked for in a few ho,.,-, or in a few days, or in a I 
and gradually, as death becomes more definitely 
reanimation is not looked for till the end of all tl 



222 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 

"The doubles of dead men, at first assumed to have but 
temporary second lives, do not, in that case, tend to form in 
popular belief an accumulating host; but they necessarily tend 
to form such a host when permanent second lives are ascribed 
to them. Swarming everywhere, capable of appearing and 
disappearing at will, and working in ways that cannot be fore- 
seen, they are thought of as the causes of all things which are 
strange, unexpected, inexplicable. Every deviation from the 
ordinary is ascribed to their agency; and their agency is alleged 
even where what we call natural causation seems obvious." (§ 206.) 
"With the development of the doctrine of ghosts, there grows 
up an easy solution of all those changes which the heavens and 
earth are hourly exhibiting. Clouds that gather and presently 
vanish, shooting stars that appear and disappear, sudden 
darkenings of the water's surface by a breeze, animal-meta- 
morphoses, transmutations of substance, storms, earthquakes, 
eruptions — all of them become explicable. These beings, to 
whom is ascribed the power of making themselves now visible 
and now invisible, and to whose other powers no limits are 
known, are omnipresent. Accounting as they seem to do for 
all unexpected changes, their own existence becomes further 
verified." (§ 118.) The "machinery of causation which 
primitive mau is inevitably led to frame for himself, fills his 
mind to the exclusion of any other machinery. Fully to under- 
stand the development of human thought under all its aspects, 
we must carefully observe that this hypothesis of ghost-agency 
gains a settled occupation of the field, long before there is either 
the power or the opportunity of gathering together and 
organizing the experiences which yield the hypothesis of 
physical causation." (§ 120.) "Thus it becomes manifest that 
setting out with the wandering double which the dream suggests; 
passing to the double that goes away at death; advancing from 
this ghost, at first supposed to have but a transitory second life, 
to ghosts which exist permanently and therefore accumulate; 
the primitive man is led gradually to people surrounding space 
with supernatural beings which inevitably become in his mind 
causal agents for everything unfamiliar." (§ 206.) "Further, 



THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 

the hypothesis to which the ghost-theory leads, at first limited t<> 
anomalous occurrences, extends itself to all phenomena; bo that 
the properties and actions of surrounding things, as well as the 
thoughts and feelingsof men, are ascribed to unseen beings, who 
thus constitute a combined mechanism of causation.'' _ 7. 
While supernatural interpretation is extended, ideas of the 
other world and of its inhabitants undergo development. " The 
habitat of the dead, originally conceived as coinciding with that 
of the living, gradually diverges — here to the adjacent 
forest, there to the remoter forest, and elsewhere to distant hills 
and mountains." In the imagination of the savage, "the «>tli<r- 
life, which at first repeated this exactly, becomes more and more 
unlike it; and its place, from a completely known adjacent 
spot, passes to a somewhere unknown and unimagined." 
(§ 115.) A similar change occurs in the conception 

of supernatural beings. "The second-self ascribed to each 
man, at first differs in nothing from it- original. It is figured 
as equally visible, equally material; and no Less suffers hunger, 
thirst, fatigue, pain. Indistinguishable from the person himself, 
capable of being slain, drowned, or otherwise destro 
second time, the original ghost, soul, or spirit, differentiates 
slowly in supposed nature. Aiming to reconcile conclusions, 
progressing thought ascribe- a Less and less gross materiality; 
and while the ghost, having at the outset but a temporary 
second life, gradually acquires a permanent one, it deviates 
more and more in substance from the body: becoming ai I 
etherealized." I § 206.) "The second-self, originally con© 
as equally substantial with the first, grows step by step Less 
substantial: now it i- semi-solid, dow it is aeriform, now it i- 
ethereal. " Bya parallel progression, differ 

of caste among the population of the spirit-world aria 
stantially similar a- ghosts are at first conceived to be, they 
become unlike as fast as the tribe grows, complicates, and b 
to have a history : the ghost-fauna, almost h it the 

outset, differential "< >ut of the tm mbl 

ghosts, some evolve into deities, who retain their anthropomorphic 
characters. As the divine and the superior are, in the 



224 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 

primitive mind, equivalent ideas — as the living man and re- 
appearing ghost are at first confounded in his beliefs — as ghost 
and god are originally convertible terms; we may understand how 
the deity develops out of the powerful man, and the ghost of the 
powerful man, by small steps. Within the tribe the chief, the 
magician, or the man otherwise skilled, held in awe during his 
life as showing powers of unknown origin and extent, is feared in 
a higher degree when, after death, he gains the further powers pos- 
sessed by all ghosts; and still more the stranger bringing new arts, 
as well as the conqueror of superior race, is treated as a super- 
human being during life, and afterwards worshiped as a yet greater 
superhuman being. Remembering that the most marvelous ver- 
sion of any story habitually obtains the greatest currency, and that 
so, from generation to generation, the deeds of such traditional 
persons must grow by unchecked exaggerations eagerly listened to; 
we may see that in time any amount of expansion and idealization 
can be reached." (§ 206.) The apotheosis of the distinguished 
dead is perfected by lapse of time. Remote ancestors are deified 
before recent ones. "Along with worship of recent and 
local ancestors, there goes worship of ancestors who died 
at earlier dates, and who, remembered by their power or 
position, have acquired in the general mind a supremacy." (§149.) 
Another factor aids in giving to supernatural beings differences 
of rank. "When social ranks are established, there follow 
contrasts of rank and accompanying potency among supernatural 
beings; which, as legends expand, grow more and more marked. 
Eventually there is formed in this way a hierarchy of partially- 
deified ancestors, demigods, great gods, and among the great 
gods one that is supreme; while there is simultaneously formed 
a hierarchy of diabolical powers." ( § 207.) 

"The theory of the Cosmos, beginning with fitful ghost- 
agency, and ending with the orderly action of a universal 
Unknown Power, exemplifies once more the law fulfilled by 
all ascending transformations." ( § 207.) 

From gods and demons, Mr. Spencer's narrative passes 
abruptly to "The Unknowable," and abruptly stops. As the 
transition has by no means yet been made, his assumption of its 



THE PEBTAIi ARGUMENT. 225 

actuality amounts to no more than the prediction that it will be 
made; and the grounds of the prediction are those of which 
we are now in consideration. A new assertion must not be 
mistaken for additional proof. Equally gratuitous is 

the assumption, that attenuation of spirit-cause will cease when 
nothing is left to it but existence. If attribute after attribute 
of supernatural agency fades from thought as thought pro- 
gresses, analogy suggests that all its attributes will be excluded 
from thought the most completely evolved. AVe shall 

now see that the last transition being inadequately dealt with 
Mr. Spencer's account of the genesis of Religion contains little, 
if anything, in support of his nescience doctrini 

For Religion Mr. Spencer makes this claim: "In its earliest and 
crudest forms it manifested, however vaguely and inconsistently, 
an intuition forming the germ of this highest belief in which all 
philosophies finally unite." "It has everywhere established 
and propagated one or other modification of the doctrine that 
all things are manifestations of a Power that transcends our 
knowledge." (First Prim, § 28.) 

Clothed in a discreet ambiguity, this claim may seem to have 
a substantial significance. Deprived of its ambiguousness, it 
will stand forth in naked frailty. The "intuition forming the 
germ of" the "highest belief," is not a vague conscdousi] 
a power transcending knowledge. It is no more than the 
thought, that this circle of wind and dust, or that strange 
mocking sound, is due to some agency. Such belief may 
"modification of the doctrine that all things are manifestations 
of a Power that transcends our knowledge;" but it is a modi- 
fication exclusive of the contested elements. The cause which 
primitive religion contemplates, is nol the Cause of all thin.:--, 
but of this or that which seems mysterious; it is Dot a cause 
transcending all conception! but many causes definitely con- 
ceived. The basal intuition i- that there ifl a cause, not that the 
cause is of indefinable nature. If there be an Unknowable, if 
is not this which early Religion contemplates. I am happy to 
be able to quote the author to thi- effect "< '.in 90 many and 
such varied similarities [as those between worship of deities and 

10 



226 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 

worship of the dead] have arisen in the absence of genetic 
relationship? Suppose the two sets of phenomena uncon- 
nected — suppose primitive men had, as some think [ the emphasis 
is mine], the consciousness of a Universal Power whence 
they and all other things proceeded. What probability would 
there be that towards such a Power they would spontaneously 
perform an act like that performed by them to the dead 
body of a fellow savage? And if one such community would 
not be probable, what would be the probability of two such 
acts in common? what the probability of four? what of 
the score communities above specified? In the absence of 
causal relation the probability against such a correspondence 
would be almost infinity to one." (Prin. of Sociology, § 145.) 
This passage is of importance as a concession that the agency, 
of which primitive Religion is now and then conscious, is not 
"The Unknowable" — that the intuition said to form the germ 
of the so-called highest belief has as much in common with a 
contrary belief — that the first belief propagated by Religion 
is no more a " modification of the doctrine that all things are 
manifestations of a Power that transcends our knowledge," 
than it is a modification of the doctrine that all things are 
manifestations of a Power within our knowledge. Nay, it may 
in strictness be held, that primitive Religion contains the germ 
of belief in the cognoscibility of causal agency in general. 
Here is our author's confession and avoidance of this allegation. 
" Every religion, setting out though it does with the tacit asser- 
tion of a mystery, forthwith proceeds to give some solution of 
this mystery; and so asserts that it is not a mystery passing 
human comprehension. But an examination of the solutions 
they severally propound, shows them to be uniformly invalid." 
(First Prin., § 14.) If, as may reasonably be assumed, the 
force of this concluding qualification has been dissipated — if it 
has been shown (Chap. III.) that religious solutions of uni- 
versal existence are not essentially at fault; we may note the 
admission, that not only primitive religions, but all religions, 
embody a so-far insuperable faith that the mysteries which they 
contemplate are not insoluble. Truly there is meaning in Mr. 



THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 227 

Spencer's complaint that Religion "has all along pr 
have some knowledge of that which transcends knowle 
that, after assertion to the contrary it has, " with the next ! 
asserted that the Cause of all things possesses such or 
attributes — can be in so for understood." (First Prin., 
Assuredly there is an important admission in the charge that, 
when face to face with Science, " Religion shows a - r that 

all things may some day be explained; and thus itself betrays a 
lurking doubt whether that Incomprehensible Cause of which 
it is conscious is really incomprehensible." (First Prin.. 
We have now before us the means of justly estimating the 
claim, that the kernel of Religion is the germ of Agnosticism. 
With greater propriety may it be called the germ <>1' a 
quite contrary belief. Dismissing, then, the argument from 
germination as satisfactorily refuted, we shall next consider the 
argument from development. 

In what kind of change does the evolution of relig 
belief consist? The admission must be made, that it has 
consisted largely in change from contemplation of many definite 
caii-- of numerous particular phenomena, to contemplation of 
one comparatively indefinite cause of thing ml. ]< 

this change to be throughout the future a mere proloi 
what it has been in the past, until the » of nihiltv has 

been reached ? We have Mr. Speno [on to the contrary. 

His grounds are far from satisfactory: they arc that we cannot 
BUppi £S i sense of something unconditioned — a doctrine which 
we found (§§ M - 18 I to be untenable, and, so Long as the I 
may be supposed to have conditions, irrelevant Bui tfa 
the reason fails, the fad of admitting thai evolution may Btop for 
ever short of extremity, remains available to as, The implica- 
tion is that uniform p up to a certain | 
insure like progress pas( thai point. If Mr. 8 may 
believe ihat the excluding process will 
only is left, we may believe that it will cease whil ittri- 
butes remain. The obligation of bIiop this 
Latter belief, as Mr. Sp raght to Bhow ground 
former, of course rests on them who hold it. In brief, our 



228 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 

grounds may be said to be that the circumstances which tend 
to bring about attenuation of the causal conception, will, before 
the degree of attenuation predicted by Mr. Spencer has been 
reached, cease to operate upon it. This proposition needs 
some expansion. 

Religious advancement is partly spontaneous, partly forced. 
In the absence of Science, so-thought spiritual manifestations 
would have been from time to time assimilated ; and the cause 
of several would have been conceived more vaguely than the 
cause of one. From the nature of the circumstances it was 
inevitable that the most powerful spirits should be the oftenest 
suggested, and that the oftenest suggested should make the 
greatest acquisitions of power ; and it was similarly inevitable that 
these should survive the rest in tradition, gaining credit for their 
acts and powers, and thus losing specialties of nature. Add to 
which, that, in itself, the lapse of time would have been sufficient 
to greatly obliterate the definiteness and extend the power of 
permanently-existing gods. Without external coercion, Religion 
must necessarily have attributed the existence of all things to 
spirit-agency ; for habitual solutions are most readily suggested 
and most willingly applied. Science, then, is not entitled to the 
credit of having caused Religion to embrace the doctrine of a 
Supreme Power. It is far more probable that Religion has 
introduced this doctrine into Science. Yet there is much 

in religious development that is due to the coercion of Science. 
It is due to the coercion of Science that Religion has withdrawn 
its solution from mystery after mystery to which it had been 
erroneously applied. From this it followed that Religion has 
continually narrowed the application of its solution to more 
and more general, more and more abstract, and more and more 
recondite mysteries; until it has almost limited this solution to 
the most general, most abstract, and most recondite mystery — 
the mystery of mysteries. Possibly Religion would never have 
spontaneously contemplated the Supreme Power as the only 
power proper for its contemplation. It would have been more 
likely to retain in its creed belief in many minor powers. The 
Supreme Power would have occasionally encroached on demesnes 



THE FIXAL ARGUMENT. 

at first assigned to others, and would have occasionally crowded 
others out of theology; but it is doubtful whether it wool 
have become to Religion the sole worker of the wonders which 
Religion contemplates. If Science had not forced a substitute 
in the place of every subordinate agency postulated by Reli 
it is probable that Religion would now contemplate, as Science 
does, not only Cause in the general and abstract, but also i 
in the particular and concrete. There needed something more 
than is internal to Religion to dispossess it of concrete interpre- 
tation. Xor would Religion, without compulsion, have modi- 
fied sufficiently its gross representations of Supreme Power. 
Abstract Science from the inheritance of the age, and misrepre- 
sentations of the Highest Cause will grow daily more definite. 
But having changed its nature, Religion must change the 
course of its development. Old factors can no Ion-, r operate, 
because they no longer exist. When Religion ha- been induced 
to contemplate the Great Cause as substance acting in space 
and time, she has relieved herself of the influences which I' 
wrought constant increase in vagueness of conception. The' 
Cause is not to be made less definitely conceivable by 
of time; because lapse of time cannot cause any of the attributes 
essential to substance acting in space and time to fade from 
memory. It cannot be made less definitely conceivable by 
attributing to it a wider, and therefore less '1 finite, <•! 
effects; because we have already attributed to it the widest and 
mos< Indefinii • of all classes of effects; and becaue . 
we ascribe to it no effect less definite than su . activity, 

. or time, we ascribe to ii nothing which causes as b 
it more vaguely. It cannot be made leas definitely conceivable 
by blending it- nature with other causes lacking it- peculiari 
because we can conceive no other can-.- lacking the peculiarities 
of substance, activity, space, and time; and because, m< 
is the final product which we have already obtained byeliminat- 
as far as may be) the unlike peculiarities of dissimilar 
can- When 1 \<-\\>i\* m ha- learned to describe the 

Cause of all thin-- a- Bubstanoe acting in Space and time. 

Science can deprive her "i' no concrete infc 



230 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 

so long as she confines herself to this description, she can have 
no concrete interpretations. Nor can Science compel her to 
modify essentially this conception of the Cause; since this is 
just the conception which Science is compelled to entertain. 

In a high, but not an empty, abstraction Religion and Science 
find a common creed. 

§ 69. The abstraction, in adoption of which Religion and 
Science may find agreement, is not proposed as more than 
the germ of a complete and final reconciliation between them. 
It is about as abstract as Mr. Spencer predicted the basis of 
unanimity would be; it is far more abstract than progressing 
intelligence will permit it to remain. The complement of 
advance to that vagueness which eliminates concrete errors, is a 
subsequent advance to that definiteness consisting of concrete 
truths. Describe a cause as indefinitely as language will per- 
mit—define it as an undefined existence — and it will become 
more definitely conceivable in proportion as its manifestations 
are more definitely conceived : so even Mr. Spencer's proposed 
reconciliation would be no more than temporary. There is no 
reason for concluding, as he did, that neither Science nor Re- 
ligion can take cognizance of special doctrines of the other; 
except that these doctrines are irrelevant or unsound, which all 
are not. Concurrence on a special doctrine, it is true, is not 
likely to initiate coalescence; but, on the other hand, there 
can be no complete concurrence while any special doctrine is 
respectively asserted and denied. Even more than this may 
be said. If either Science or Religion holds, or shall hereafter 
come into possession of, any truth concerning that which both 
contemplate, it will be able to force assent from the other. We 
may predict, therefore, that when Science and Religion awaken 
to the truth that there is a fundamental sameness between them, 
they will operate together in the work of making their common 
conception more definite ; and we may also predict that through- 
out the process each will be prejudiced in favor of what it 
desires to contribute, and against that sought to be contributed 
by the other; and lastly we may predict that a complete 



THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 231 

reconciliation will be attained when each rejects its own errors 
and accepts the other's truths. The reconciliation does ad 
demand that everything should be explained; but only that there 
shall not be two sets of explanations. 

The reconciliation proposed by Mr. Spencer would be do 
reconciliation at all. No sooner would it become the accepted 
doctrine that the Cause of all things is unknowable, than each 
thinker would frame a conception of it to suit himself. The 
Materialist would conceive it as material; the Spiritualist would 
conceive it as spiritual; the Realist, of whatever denomination, 
would conceive it as he conceived it before: for, if nothing 
be knowingly affirmed of "The Unknowable/ 7 of it nothing 
can be knowingly denied. I am not speculating entirely on 
probabilities. "Is it not just possible," asks the author, reflect- 
ing on the nature of the inscrutable, "that there is a mode of 
being as much transcending Intelligence and Will, 
transcend mechanical motion. It is true that we are totally 
unable to conceive any such higher mode of being. But this 
is not a reason for questioning its existence; it is rather the 
reverse." (First Prim, § 31.) Following this example, any 
one might argue that the outer world is just what he thought it 
was before he read a word of Mr. Spencer's wiir i 

by an external agency," for example ); because if the impossibility 
of conceiving Buch a thing has been demonstrated, "this i- qoI a 
reason for questioning its existence," but u is rather the re\ 
It is not probable that many would choose to justify them* 
by such reasonings; Bince Mr. Spencer's doctrine them 

free to rely, for justification of their beliefs concerning external 

things, on the inclination to believe and the i 1 1 1 j ►« »~ - i ) » i 1 : 

refutation. Besides the question of the consti- 

tution of noumena in a Btab rpetuaJ agitation, 

Spencer's proposed reconciliation would leave unsettled the 
question of th< "I' phenomena. The Religionist would 

still hold that the first phenomenon was the man 

which he call- God; the Scientist would -till hold thai the 

group of manifestations which he calls the Phj 

was never derived from any manifestation other than w ha! 



232 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 

in all essentials, its prior self. Thus would the old dispute 
arise anew. Then there would be need for a reconciliation; 
and this would probably be brought about by adoption, 
on the part of both Science and Religion, of some high abstrac- 
tion, and subsequent reduction to consistent definiteness. They 
would probably be compelled, each by the other, to adopt 
the belief that substance, activity, space, and time, compose an 
eternal and universal phenomenon from which ever have pro- 
ceeded, and ever will proceed, all phenomena. And having 
found concurrence in this high abstraction, they would probably 
proceed to make joint inquiry regarding the kind or kinds of 
substance and activity, and the when and where. In the 

double inadequacy of the reconciliation proposed by Mr, Spencer; 
and in the probability that in so far as it might be rectified, it 
would be supplemented by essentially the same reconciliation 
that we propose; there is vindication of the latter. 

It will be seen that what is here predicted is not a differen- 
tiation which shall further increase the unlikeness between 
Science and Religion, but an integration which shall make 
them one. Integration is no less a part of evolution than 
differentiation ; in fact integration is represented by Mr. Spencer 
as the change from which follows increase of definiteness, co- 
herence, and heterogeneity. Nor, in the case of Science and 
Religion, would integration fail to bring about increased differ- 
entiation; for the differences cancelled would be more than 
compensated for by the possibility of a higher evolution in the 
world of thought than speculative differences and supposed 
speculative imbecility now permit. Mr. Spencer's reconciliation 
is to be reached by a progress towards indefiniteness of concep- 
tion, is to set a limit to the integration and coherence of 
scientific and religious thought, and is to bring the differentia- 
tion of Religion to a stand. The alternative reconciliation, 
being an integration of separate bodies of thought, promising 
rapid increase of definiteness, coherence, and heterogeneity, 
seems very much more conformable to the formula of evolution. 

If we seek to discover in the author's reasoning the underly- 
ing error, we will find it to consist in drawing too boldly the 



THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 233 

line of demarcation between Science and Religion. Tin i 
contrast between them, but it is a contrast of non-essentials. 
The peculiarity of Religion is that it has a solution for which 
it has sought to retain a mystery; the peculiarity of Science is 
that it has many mysteries for which it Beeks to find solution.-. 
Yet the contrast does not hold in respect to detail.-. It was 
when alert for the solution of many ni\ < -un- 

recognized, that the hypotb my was first 

adopted; and religious advancement has throughout con* 
very extensively in better adapting it- solutions i" the problems 
to be solved. As it has advanced, moreover, Religion has 
absorbed more and more of the scientific method; until in our 
day scarcely any theologian dares to wantonly distort 1 
dogmas, but dares rather to modify d -nit facts. On to- 

other hand also, the history of religious growth has been, on a 
small scale, repeated over ami over in the histo 
AVhen a scientific hypothesis has been once adopted, its adher- 
ents transfer to it the allegiance they owe to truth: tiny will 
unreflectingly extend it to additional facts; they will urge it in 
almost open opposition to fact; and, when obliged to abandon it 
as the solution of one mystery, they will find lor it another. 
The conduct of men of Science, a- well as that of their oppo- 

- in the religious camp, reminds us of the wit who 
that, having thought of a splendid answer to a conundrum, all 
he wanted was the other part A- is the case with R 
some scientific doctrines are gradually forced into a nam 
range of application, and in the same r i. by 

other scientific doctrines aethus threatend with complete 

extinction shade gradually into entire validity. Th 
between Science and IJ<li.L r ion is, th< ially liki 

between constituents of cadi. They differ, not in i 
elements, but in respect of extraneous circumstano -. II I 
ace which had gone astray, groping to attain th.' 
Science is Religion, now turned back t<» procure tip 
which at fir-: it <li<l not feel the need. 5 
hypothesis, neither is all oba rvation: in each th.' two methods 
are united ; in both, when joined, there will be :i similar u 



I 



234 THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 

How like each other are Science and Religion, may be better 
exhibited by a still deeper analysis. In both we recognize an 
intellectual element. Both seek truth, and both employ fact 
and speculation as the means to its attainment. If Religion 
should attain its highest wish, the Universal Cause would be so 
well apprehended as to explain all things; if Science should 
attain as much as it desires, all things would be attributed to 
an origin which will explain them : what either fails to realize 
the other loses. Verification of Mr. Spencer's prediction would 
take from Religion its intellectual element, consigning it to 
blind contemplation of what it cannot know. Besides 

the intellectual element, there is in both Science and Religion 
an emotional element. If there is anything external calling 
for such or such emotions, it is the duty of Science to produce 
and to sustain them, and of Religion to do the same. Should 
Mr. Spencer's prediction be verified, Religion would be de- 
prived of all but the minutest remnant of its emotional 
element; for there can be no fixed sentiment towards that 
which may be anything — anything from god to demon, from 
substance to possibility of sensation, from an active to a passive 
entity, from an infinite environment to a mere shell of con- 
sciousness. The emotion left to Religion might well be one of 
philosophical contempt. But besides their intellectual 

and emotional elements, there is a moral element in both Science 
and Religion. Belief and the emotions which it calls forth 
determine our estimate o^ conduct as right or wrong. So long 
as there are two sets of beliefs and sentiments, there will be 
two ethical codes. Religion cannot properly prescribe conduct 
without absorbing all Science; Science cannot rule our morals 
while Religion is the sole possessor of- a single truth, or the 
sole entertainer of a single proper sentiment. To say that each 
will fully recognize the claims which the other has to urge, is 
but to say that each will become the other. This of course is not 
what Mr. Spencer holds. He would take its moral element 
from Religion, and accord to Science the entire supervision of 
human conduct. Contemplation of "The Unknowable," 

devoid of thought, productive of no worthy emotion, and 






THE FINAL ARGUMENT. 

leading to no ethical consequences, is assigned to Religion; 

while to Science is assigned knowledge of the true, the g L 

the beautiful, — sustaining all just emotion, and revealing to as 
what is good or bad in conduct. This is the reconciliation 
issuing from extinction of one of the contending pnw 

It is safer to predict, that, as they struggle to perform the 
same function, they will eventually integrate. ( )r taking a [/ 

broader view, and allowing for the development which must 
follow fast upon advancing coalescence, we may predict that 
the Science and the Religion of to-day shall pass into soi 
thing more worthy than either, which shall take their pin 
It shall be composed of all the elements into which we have 
seen each of them may be resolved; but there shall be an 
absence of logical conflict between thought and thought 
tween emotion and emotion, and between act and act. It shall 
investigate both the ego and the non^ego; and shall reveal 
something of all that was, or is, or is to be. It shall teach 
what to love, what to admire, what to emulate, what to ob 
It -hall address itself at once to the understanding and the 
sentiment of man; proclaiming duty with persuasive voi 



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^ . 


























